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During the last decade there has been growing concern about lack of results in the 
health sector of many low-income countries. Prompted by a need to achieve progress, 
Results-Based Financing (RBF) has become an increasingly popular policy option 
and has been seen as a solution for the unmet Millennium Development Goals 4 and 
5, for child health and maternal health. RBF pays for results of chosen health 
indicators rather than inputs and therefore appealing to both recipient and donor 
countries. In 2015, over 30 low-income countries with the majority in sub-Saharan 
Africa including Tanzania were implementing RBF programmes to improve health 
services provision.  
Tanzania implemented a provider side RBF, aiming to motivate health workers by 
paying them financial incentives based on predetermined performance targets.  
Despite the widespread uptake of RBF in low-income contexts, there is little evidence 
to support that it works. Studies on RBF show mixed results and most of these studies 
focus on aspects of effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes. What is 
explored less are the policy processes that lead to the introduction of RBF 
programmes in low-income countries and how RBF affects the working environment 
and the interaction between health workers and health service users. This may in turn 
affect the overall success of RBF programmes.  
Aim 
The study aim to generate policy relevant knowledge on processes leading up to the 
introduction of RBF in a resource constrained health sector, and the challenges 
related to its implementation. To achieve this, the study investigates the roles played 
by both internal and external policy actors in the RBF policy process in Tanzania. It 
further critically examines the experiences of health workers with RBF and how they 





A qualitative case study design was used in the study. Data was collected in 
Mvomero and Rufiji districts and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and in Oslo in Norway. 
The study followed both the local Tanzanian RBF programme in Mvomero and the 
donor-funded Pwani pilot in Rufiji district. In-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group 
discussions (FGDs), policy document reviews and participation in RBF meetings 
were the main methods for data collection. A total of 70 IDIs and 27 FGDs were 
conducted between 2010 and 2013. Field notes and informal conversations during 
fieldwork were other very important sources of data for the study.   
Results 
The introduction of RBF in Tanzania was controversial. The process was long and 
contested. The actors, both external and internal, fought for their values and interests. 
It resulted in tensions, mistrust and frustrations in the health sector partnership, and in 
the end, Tanzania did not get space to act as an agent of her own development. The 
results further showed that the two RBF programmes that were implemented in 
Tanzania, one which received donor support and another which did not, were 
implemented differently. The locally funded RBF diverted from its programme 
design and paid health workers flat bonus regardless of performance. This was partly 
due to lack of capacity and partly due to concerns for equity and fairness. The donor 
funded RBF adhered to its design, including paying health workers according to 
performance and contribution towards RBF performance indicators that is, 
Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) staff, working directly with RBF performance 
indicators were paid more bonuses than non RCH staff. This system of payment was 
reported to be unfair and it was revealed that it had affected social relations at health 
facilities. Leadership at health facilities was concerned this would lead to the 
disruption of work and preferred a flat rate with a similar logic as in the local RBF 
programme. Moreover, the study revealed that in the local RBF programme, health 
workers used coercive strategies in order to meet RBF performance targets. It was 




The study showed that understanding processes behind the implementation of RBF is 
important as these help to explain why RBF programmes may fail or succeed. 
Additionally, the study revealed that RBF programmes can affect social relations 
among health workers and with health service users. The Tanzanian experience 
presents a picture where the country was overwhelmed by external influence in the 
RBF policy process and in the end could not follow its own development trajectory. 
As the theory of partnership in development aid posits, donor countries prefer an 
instrumental version of partnership, which entails imposition of their priorities, while 
disregarding country ownership. When Tanzania chose to follow her own path by 
launching a local RBF programme, partners in the Health Basket Fund withdrew their 
funding.  
Tanzania went ahead with the local RBF programme, but with little success. Payment 
in the programme used flat rates, partly due to lack of resources and partly due to the 
concern of fairness. The donor-funded RBF was better managed and resourced but 
the payment system of bonuses, which paid health workers differently by their 
centrality to performance indicators, was reported as fundamentally unfairness as 
predicted by workplace social justice theory, the Referent Cognitions Theory. Health 
workers changed their behaviors in response to RBF, as presumed by the Principal-
Agent Theory. In both districts, RBF negatively affected social relations among 
health workers and with their patients. It was revealed that RBF can lead to the use of 
coercive strategies as a means to reach performance targets in resource constrained 
settings. RBF has the potential of disrupting social relations, teamwork and intrinsic 
motivation among health workers. The Self-Determination Theory and Bourdieu’s 
concept of capital elucidates on how RBF is potentially detrimental to social relations 
and intrinsic motivation of health workers. Therefore the study recommends that 
caution is needed when implementing RBF programmes in low-income contexts, and 
that particular attention has to be paid to policy processes, social-cultural and 
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Operational definitions  
Results-Based Financing (RBF): This term can be used as a synonym for Payment 
for Performance (P4P) [1]. However, RBF is considered a wider term which includes 
a variety of other output-based financing models in the health sector [2]. Tanzania 
started by using the term P4P and has shifted to RBF in recent years but the focus of 
the programme is still the same, it targets the provider side (health workers) and 
offers financial incentives.  
Comprehensive definition: RBF involves “any program that rewards the delivery of 
one or more outputs or outcomes by one or more incentives, financial or otherwise, 
upon verification that the agreed-upon result has actually been delivered. Incentives 
may be directed to service providers (supply side), program beneficiaries (demand 
side) or both. Payments or other rewards are not used for recurrent inputs, although 
there may be supplemental investment financing of some inputs, including training 
and equipment to enhance capacity or quality; and they are not made unless and until 
results or performance are satisfactory” [1]. This comprehensive definition points out 
to the most important components of RBF programmes and is inclusive of different 
country experiences with RBF because unlike Tanzania some of the RBF 
programmes in low-income countries also target health service users.  
Condensed definition: RBF is “payment issued upon achievement of a 
predetermined performance target” [3].  
Pay [ment] for Performance (P4P): P4P can be “considered (a) synonym for RBF. 
Performance in (P4P) means the same thing as results, and payment means the same 
thing as financing. (This term) do not introduce any additional distinctions” [1].  
RBF performance indicators: are selected measures of performance that are used in 






Results-based financing (RBF) defined as payment issued upon achievement of a 
predetermined performance target [3] has become a popular policy option in many 
sectors including health. The term is used interchangeably with Payment for 
Performance (P4P).  
In the health sector, RBF programmes aim to improve access to, utilization and 
quality of targeted health services by providing incentives to the service providers 
(health workers) or to the health service users, or to both sides [1]. It is noted that 
expenditure on health through traditional input financing based approaches has 
increased in many low-income countries, but this increase is not commonly matched 
by better service delivery [4, 5]. User needs and demands are far from met in many 
low-income countries, and health systems continue to face many challenges including 
but not limited to shortages in well-trained and adequately paid workforce, lack of 
well-maintained and equipped health facilities, robust financing mechanisms, and 
reliable health management information systems [6, 7]. RBF is argued to have 
potential to address a number of these health system challenges [6, 8, 9]. It is claimed 
that in sub-Saharan African countries, health sector directed RBF programmes can 
potentially act as a catalyst for reforming the whole public sector into an efficient 
outcome based institution [6]. It is this vast promise of RBF that makes it attractive to 
politicians and policy makers in low-income contexts.  
Additionally, RBF pays for results rather than inputs making it favorable to donor 
countries, during a time when traditional aid modalities have increasingly come under 
scrutiny [10-12]. RBF is therefore seen as one of the new innovative modalities in the 
development aid landscape, considered to help donor countries in justifying how 
foreign aid is being used [13, 14]. Many bilateral and multilateral agencies as well as 
public-private partnerships have been promoting the use of RBF programmes. These 
include but are not limited to the World Bank (mainly through the Health Results 
Innovative Trust Fund [HRITF]), the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (Global Fund), World Health 
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Organization (WHO), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID) [2, 15, 16]. As a result, many 
low-income countries have increasingly been implementing RBF programmes in the 
health sector. In 2015, over 30 such countries were implementing RBF programmes, 
with the majority in sub-Saharan Africa [16]. Tanzania is among the countries which 
have embraced RBF, and this dissertation focuses on the experiences of the country 
with RBF. In particular it explores experiences relating to the RBF process from 
agenda setting to the implementation of the programme. In Tanzania, RBF aim to 
improve outcomes in maternal and child health services.  
Before examining the experience of Tanzania with RBF further, it is important to 
provide an overview of the country and its context. This will enhance the 
understanding of the forces that made RBF a plausible policy action in Tanzania. 
1.1 The country profile and health outcomes of Tanzania 
Tanzania is located in East Africa, off the coast of the Indian Ocean. The country has 
a population of 43,625,354, of which about 75% live in rural areas [17, 18]. Tanzania 
is classified by UN as a low-income country with an average gross national income 
(GNI) per capita of US$920 in 2014 [19]. The total health expenditure per capita was 
US$42.5 in 2011, a figure significantly lower than the regional average expenditure 
of US$148 in 2006 [20, 21]. The Government of Tanzania’s budgetary allocations to 
health on a yearly basis have been fluctuating between 7-11% of the national budget 
between 2008 and 2012 financial years [21, 22]. These percentage figures are 
significantly below the minimum health budget allocation of 15% as pledged by 
African Union heads of states at the Abuja declaration of 2001 [23].  
The country is burdened by diseases such as HIV/AIDS, diarrhea and malaria. In 
2012, the four main causes of death were HIV/AIDS (18.2%), lower respiratory 
infections (8.7), diarrhea (5.2%) and malaria [5.2%] [24]. The life expectancy stands 
at 52.46 years, which is slightly lower than the regional average of 53.21 years [21]. 
The four main reasons for outpatient visits at health facilities in Tanzania are malaria 
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(34%), acute respiratory infections (14%), pneumonia (7%), and diarrhea diseases 
(5%) [21]. 
Maternal and child health is a huge health concern in Tanzania. The inception of the 
now over Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 was important in 
identifying reliable trends and measuring health outcomes in all health related MDGs, 
especially maternal and child health. More importantly the MDGs brought maternal 
health at the forefront which was a previously neglected area [25]. Tanzania has 
witnessed rapid progress in Goal number 4 aiming to reduce the under-five mortality 
by two thirds from the 1990 level. In 2010, the country’s infant mortality was at 51 
per 1,000 live births [26], a significantly lower figure compared to the sub-Saharan 
Africa average of 79,05 per 1,000 live births. Its under-five mortality rate was at 81 
per 1,000 live births compared to the region’s 125.  
However, when it comes to maternal mortality targeted by MDG 5a, of reducing 
maternal mortality by three quarters of the 1990 levels, Tanzania struggled. In 1996, 
maternal mortality was 529 per 100,000 live births, and in 2015 it was at 410 per 100, 
000 live births [24]. In fact in 2008, Tanzania along with 10 other countries, five of 
which are in sub-Saharan Africa, was responsible for 65% of all maternal deaths in 
the world [27].  
1.2 The Tanzanian health care system structure  
Health care in Tanzania is provided by both public and private (not-for-profit and for-
profit) health facilities. The health system is organized in a referral pyramid, starting 
with dispensaries, health centres, district hospitals, regional hospitals, zonal national 
hospitals [28]. The total number of hospitals in Tanzania is 254, consisting of 140 
private owned (for-profit and not-for-profit) and 114 public owned [29]. Below 
hospitals there are health centres and dispensaries which are important in providing 
primary health care. As of 2013, there was a total of 711 health centres, 222 private 
and 489 public and 5, 913 dispensaries, 1444 private and 4469 public [29]. Table 1 




Tanzania has a basic health care infrastructure that extends into peripheral rural areas 
and this is mainly attributed to the early policies of central planning and equitable 
access to services spearheaded by the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere [30-
32]. It is estimated that about 80% of the population has access to basic health 
services, and that more than 90% lives within five kilometers of a primary health 
facility [33]. But even if there are structures in place to provide basic health services, 
the quality of these services are not necessarily good as many of these health facilities 
are not adequately equipped and staffed [34].  
Table 1: Health Facilities: type and ownership in Mainland Tanzania 
                  2012                          2013 
Facility 
Type  
    Ownership type  
TOTAL 
      Ownership type  
TOTAL Private Government Private Government 
Dispensary 1358 4322 5680 1444 4469 5913 
Health 
centre 
  244   498   742   222   489   711 
Hospital    129   112   241   140   114   254 
TOTAL 1731 2932 6663 1806 5072 6878 
Source: Statistical abstract 2013- The United Republic of Tanzania [29]  
1.3 Health systems challenges in Tanzania 
Tanzania is one of the countries with the lowest density of health professionals, with 
only 0.3 physicians and 4.4 nurses per 10,000 inhabitants. These figures are 
significantly lower than regional average of 2.7 physicians and 12.4 nurses per 
10,000 inhabitants [35]. It is worth noting, however, that Tanzania has a ‘physician 
type’ cadre known as clinical officers (COs). Clinical officers undergo three years of 
post-schooling (after lower secondary level) training. This cadre although not 
recognized as physicians, are skilled to manage common medical and reproductive 
health and simple surgical problems, which in high-income countries may be reserved 
for physicians [36]. They are, however, legally prohibited from performing caesarean 
sections [36].  
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Clinical Officers are more equally distributed than physicians also in rural areas and 
vital in the health system of Tanzania [37]. Nonetheless, the human resource situation 
in the health sector is dire and even policy documents of Tanzania describe the 
shortage of health professionals as a crisis situation [38]. The current Health Sector 
Strategic Plan III, states that only 35% of positions in the health workforce of 
Tanzania are filled with qualified personnel [33]. A number of studies in Tanzania 
have pointed to this lack of adequate and qualified staff as a main barrier for the 
access to and quality of care [34, 39-41].  
The acute shortage of health professionals in Tanzania is partly attributed to the 
severe economic difficulties faced by the country in the 1980s and the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme in the 90s [30, 38, 42]. These 
reforms led to reduced funding in the public sector, retrenchments and an 
employment freeze from 1993 to 1999. The employment freeze resulted in a sharp 
decline of the health workforce. It is reported that only 16% of health personnel 
graduates from training institutions in the period between 1995 to 2005 were 
employed in the public sector [43]. At the same time, Tanzania was also experiencing 
an increase in the burden of disease [38] 
Another reason behind the shortages of trained health personnel is brain drain, 
although no clear official figures are available for this [38]. It is estimated that 
Tanzania has 1,264 medical doctors working in the country and 1,356 working 
abroad, an emigration figure as high as 52% [44]. The emigration of health 
professionals greatly affects the health system of the country and causes devastating 
economic loss. Training a medical doctor from primary school through medical 
school is estimated to cost Tanzania US$ 27,256 and in total the country is estimated 
to have lost up to US$ 3,49 million in training medical doctors now working abroad, 
mainly in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States [44].  
Internal migration of health professionals in Tanzania from rural to urban areas is 
also widespread and this has implications for the availability of qualified health staff 
and quality of care in rural areas. There is a great variation in health worker 
6 
 
distribution per capita in Tanzania, spanning from 0.3 health workers per 1,000 
inhabitants in underserved areas, mainly rural, to 12.3 health workers per 1,000 
inhabitants in the best served areas, mainly urban [37]. For example, it is reported 
that the city of Dar es Salaam has as many as 30 times more medical officers and 
specialists than any of the rural districts [45]. A similar pattern is also highlighted in 
official statistics from the government of Tanzania, where Dar es Salaam has a high 
level of highly trained and specialized health personnel [46]. Other studies from 
Tanzania report that approximately one third of the existing health workforce in rural 
health facilities are unskilled [47] and that the number of skilled health workers is 
disproportionally low [48].  
A number of factors act as push factors for health workers to either migrate abroad or 
internally, varying from low salaries, poor working conditions including poor 
infrastructure, lack of incentives and proper supervision [49-51]. These conditions 
negatively affect the access to and utilization of health services in rural Tanzania. 
Poor working conditions have been reported in many studies in Tanzania as 
contributory to low levels of work motivation [34, 50, 52-54]. This problem is further 
compounded by lack of medical equipment and supplies. In Tanzania, basic medicine 
is available in less than 25% of public health facilities, and in about 48% of private 
health facilities, which is low even by the standards of other low-income countries 
[55]. This does affect the motivation of health workers and also reduces health 
service users’ confidence in the national health system, since their expectations are 
regularly not met [41]. Lack of confidence and trust in the health care system, 
especially the primary care system, results in low utilization and/or bypassing of 
primary levels of health care by users [39, 56, 57].  
The Government of Tanzania has over the decades carried out public sector reforms, 
including in the health sector with the aim of improving access to, utilization and 
quality of health services. The next section will present RBF in the Tanzanian context 




1.4 RBF in the context of public sector reforms in Tanzania 
RBF has to be viewed in light of public sector reforms currently taking place in 
Tanzania. Before moving into the details on the RBF programme design and 
implementation process, I will first briefly describe some few reforms relevant in 
shaping a results-based thinking in the public sector of Tanzania. Tanzania launched 
its first Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP I) in 2000 followed by PSRP II in  
2008 [58]. The main aim of the public sector reform programme is to make the public 
service a more effective, efficient and outcome based institution [58, 59]. Two 
eminent features of the reform are a strong focus on improving service delivery, and 
the need to improve staff incentive frameworks, including performance related pay 
[59-61].  
The Selected Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE) was introduced in 2000 , 
aiming to incentivize civil servants who were in key positions and perceived 
important in service delivery in government ministries and agencies [62, 63]. 
However, as the name suggested, SASE scheme was selective and has been critiqued 
for benefiting senior level managers and the bureaucratic elite while doing less or 
nothing to the middle level or frontline workers in ministries [64, 65].  
Another scheme under the public sector reform programme aiming to improve 
performance and motivation of public sector workers is the  Open Performance 
Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS), which was introduced in 2004 and made 
compulsory in the public sector [66]. OPRAS is an open performance appraisal 
system that replaced confidential performance appraisals [53, 58, 67]. The results 
from OPRAS are to be used in recognising individual worker performance, salary 
increments and promotions among other staff development aspects [68]. However, a 
study on how OPRAS was experienced by public sector health workers, revealed 
scepticism towards it as it was perceived not leading to any career advancement or 
financial gains [53]. In 2007 discussions on the need to introduce Results-Based 
Financing (RBF) started in Tanzania, and the health sector was to be used for piloting 
with the potential of scaling it up in the wider public sector [69].  
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The main aim of RBF in Tanzania is to stimulate and improve service outputs and 
outcomes in reproductive health [69, 70]. RBF assumes that the motivation of health 
workers is crucial for their performance. Therefore, increasing health worker 
motivation through supplement payments improves the utilisation and quality of 
health services [71]. One of the aims of RBF in Tanzania is: 
To provide better motivation and explicit attention to results, by ensuring that 
health workers and their supervisors are motivated to strive for better results 
in Maternal Newborn and Child Health services and other health services in 
the districts [69]. 
The RBF programme in Tanzania was funded by the Government of Norway, 
through the Norway-Tanzania Partnership Initiative [71, 72]. It is noteworthy that 
Tanzania implemented two different RBF programmes. The first RBF was 
implemented between 2009 and 2011 (in Mvomero district) and was locally funded 
[72]. The second was a donor-funded pilot in the Pwani region (where Rufiji district 
is located) implemented between 2011 and 2014. The pilot was managed by the 
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) [70].Currently, the country is scaling-up 
RBF into several regions including Shinyanga, Mwanza, Kagera, Simiyu and Tabora 
between 2016 and 2017, with more regions to subsequently follow. However, the 
scope of this dissertation is limited to the country’s experiences with the local RBF in 
Mvomero and the donor-funded Pwani pilot.  
Both the locally funded RBF programme and the donor-funded RBF pilot drew their 
performance indicators from maternal and child health services such as antenatal 
care, institutional deliveries, and post-natal care (appendices I and II). The Health 
Management Information System (HMIS) is another indicator in both programmes. 
The donor-funded pilot added more indicators on Prevention of Mother To Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) of HIV and family planning and as a result the design 
document states that the focus is on reproductive and child health services (RCH) and 
not only on maternal and child health services, as in the locally funded RBF 
programme [69, 70]. In both cases there are management teams set up for monitoring 
9 
 
at district and regional levels, and these teams are known as Council Health 
Management Teams (CHMTs) and Regional Health Management Teams (RHMTs) 
[69]. Bonus payments are based on performance and targets are set once each year 
and normally they cannot be changed during the course of the year [70, 73]. In the 
locally funded design, health facilities had a potential maximum bonus if all targets 
were met, depending on facility type, i.e., whether they are hospitals, health centres 
or dispensaries. For example, dispensaries had a maximum bonus limit of TZS 1 
million (approx. US$ 460), health centres TZS 3 million (approx. US$ 1,400) and 
hospitals TZS 9 million [approx. US$ 4,100] [69]. In the donor-funded RBF design 
maximum potential bonus for hospitals was US$ 7,900 and of this amount RCH staff 
would share US$ 5,300 and non-RCH US$ 2,600. Health centres could get up to US$ 
2,786 and dispensaries US$ 686 [70]. Health workers’ monthly bonuses would be 
approximately 10% (about US$ 30) of their monthly salaries [70]. Payments are 
made twice a year, following a six months cycle.   
Another major difference between the two programmes is that in the donor-funded 
programme, the bonuses for a health facility were divided into two parts, one for the 
staff and the other for operations or demand creation activities, while in the local 
programme all the bonus was for the staff. For the donor-funded programme, in 
hospitals, 90% of the RBF bonus went to the staff and 10% to operations. In health 
centres and dispensaries, 75% went to the staff while 25% went to operations [70]. 
The bonuses for operations were used for demand creation activities such as buying 
essential medicines or minor infrastructural development. Implications of the 
differences and similarities of these two RBF programmes are further discussed in 
sub-studies  
The following section presents literature on the origins and implementation of RBF in 
high and low-income contexts, including RBF’s unintended consequences and 
potential pitfalls.  
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1.5 Review of previous studies 
The search for literature was conducted using many databases and search engines 
available through the University of Bergen, such as PubMed (Medline), Web of 
Science, Cochrane, and Google Scholar. Standard searches were done using 
keywords, while a variety of synonyms were used to cover a range of words similar 
to the keywords. For example, payment for performance, results based financing, 
performance-based financing, performance-based incentives, output-based financing, 
output-based contracting, incentives in the health sector, financial incentives in the 
health sector were used. Additionally, bibliographies of relevant articles were also 
examined for other articles that could be useful. Retrieved articles were assessed for 
both quality and relevance to the study.  
1.5.1 RBF in high-income countries: scope and evidence  
This section aims to give a general picture on the origins of RBF, and to give general 
experiences of high-income countries with this phenomenon. I will therefore not 
delve into country specific details, given a low-income context focus of this 
dissertation. The US is one of the countries where RBF in the health sector originated 
from, and the country has many different RBF programmes at different levels of care 
[74-77]. Although the first RBF programmes in the health sector are traced back to 
the 1980s, as initiated by private insurers in the US [78], one programme 
implemented between 2003 and 2009, known as the Health Quality Incentive 
Demonstration [79-81], is considered a trailblazing programme that inspired many 
other RBF programmes in the health sector, including the well-known Quality and 
Outcomes Framework in the UK [82, 83], which was started in 2004 and is still in 
operation.  
Many countries in high-income context including but not limited to Canada, 
Australia, Israel, New Zealand and several European countries [84-87] are 
implementing RBF programmes in the health sector at varying levels. The normative 
rationale for the increase in countries implementing RBF is the need to improve the 
quality of care. It is noteworthy that in high-income countries, technologies for 
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performance measurement has improved significantly for the last two decades [78]. 
These technologies have helped in improving confidence in using RBF in these 
contexts.  
Despite its widespread use in high-income context, debates have been going on from 
as early as the mid-1990s on whether RBF promote right values in the public sector, 
including health sector [88-92]. This debate still goes on to date [15, 93-96]. Besides 
the issue of values, results on the effectiveness of RBF programmes in high-income 
countries has not been convincing, systematic reviews provide mixed results and 
cautions that the use of RBF in the health sector requires careful planning, design and 
consideration [74, 84, 97]. According to Eijkennar and colleagues [98], in order to 
have a successful RBF programme, three important questions have to be considered; 
what to incentivize, who to incentivize and how to incentivize [98]. While it may be 
assumed that in high-income context conditions (e.g. capacity and technical expertise, 
functioning public systems and value systems) maybe suitable to successfully work 
with and consider these three questions, literature shows that it is far from it [84, 98].  
Additionally, what is missing in RBF literature, even from high-income context is 
convincing evidence on the costs associated with RBF [99]. There are studies that are 
not necessarily conducted as economic evaluations of RBF programmes, but mention 
the cost-effectiveness of the programmes [85, 100-105]. From these studies it is clear 
that the debate on the cost-effectiveness of RBF is yet to be settled.   
From the presented literature it is clear that although RBF programmes in the health 
sector originated from high-income countries over two decades ago, conclusive 
evidence still lack on whether RBF is beneficial to the health systems of these 
countries. The next section presents RBF literature from low-income countries which 
fall within the scope of this dissertation. This literature is particularly relevant for 




1.5.2 RBF in low-income countries: scope and evidence  
Before moving into the studies, this paragraph presents a contextual backdrop of RBF 
programmes in low-income countries. This is important as forces that shape these 
programmes in low-income countries are different than in high-income-countries. 
RBF is a relatively new phenomenon in low-income contexts, and its introduction 
was largely driven by the need to improve outcomes in the health-related Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), that were unmet by most of these countries [15, 106]. 
In the current post-MDG era, where emphasis has been shifted to Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) [107], most of these RBF programmes by and large still draw 
performance indicators from maternal and child health [16, 108]. These targets are 
now covered by Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 3 (as targets 3.1 and 
3.2), which focus on good health and well-being [109]. Funding for RBF programmes 
in low-income countries is mainly provided through the Health Results Innovative 
Trust Fund (HRITF) and the newly established Global Financing Facility (GFF) in 
the World Bank [16]. These two Trust Funds are funded by the governments of 
Norway, United Kingdom, Canada and the US, with the aim of supporting low-
income countries to achieve results in maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH).  
RBF studies are still few and knowledge about its effectiveness still limited in low-
income contexts. Systematic literature review studies are cautious in their conclusions 
on whether low-income countries can benefit from RBF programmes [3, 106, 108, 
110]. A review study by Oxman and Fretheim [106] concluded that available 
evidence on the effectiveness of RBF programmes is too weak to draw general 
conclusions, but that these programmes appear less likely to create sustained changes 
in health service delivery [106]. A second review study by Witter and colleagues 
called for more robust studies to provide further evidence [108], while a third review 
study noted that there is significant uncertainty involved in transferring RBF 
programmes from developed health systems to less functioning and fragile health 
systems [3]. These review studies generally noted that low-income countries face 
different challenges than high income countries that may make it more difficult to 
implement RBF programmes [3, 106, 110].  
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One significant difference is that health systems in low-income countries are less 
functioning, which make it particularly challenging to implement RBF [3, 111-113]. 
Studies from Cambodia, Benin, DR Congo, Uganda and Tanzania found that the 
implementation of RBF programmes in these countries was negatively affected by 
health system challenges which included low technical and monitoring capacities, 
health worker shortages, inadequate infrastructure, lack of adequate medicines and 
equipment [111, 112, 114-116]. In Uganda lack of capacity and technical expertise 
was noted among the main reasons why the RBF failed in the country [111, 117]. 
While in Tanzania and the DR Congo, it was observed that not only was health 
systems challenges negatively affecting the RBF pilots but was also likely to affect 
the scaling up of these RBF programmes [114, 115]. Moreover, RBF depends rather 
heavily on accurate technologies of measuring performance, which in high-income 
countries have improved in recent years [78], while it remains a challenge in low-
income countries [110]. For example, a study from Cambodia found that lack of 
sufficient and reliable data to measure performance was a problem in the RBF 
programme [116]. 
In addition, some studies have pointed out that many RBF programmes in low-
income countries follow priorities set out by donor countries rather than country 
specific priorities [110, 118, 119]. An exception from this was reported in Cambodia, 
where the government was able to use its leverage and implement an RBF 
programme it wanted against the will of donors [120].The lack of local 
embeddedness in RBF programmes, especially regarding performance indicators, 
have led some health workers in Benin and other contexts to reluctantly support RBF 
programmes, as these performance indicators are perceived to ignore local health 
problems [110, 119]. Moreover, donor involvement and influence in RBF 
programmes has raised questions on the sustainability of such programmes in low-
income countries [110, 121]. In Burundi, it was noted that although the country has 
been implementing RBF for a number of years, the programmes remain largely 
fragmented and donor-dependent, which created challenges for the planned national 
scale-up [121].  
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Donor dependent RBF programmes also make the financial costs associated with 
RBF unsustainable as many of them are implemented through technical support from 
RBF specialists [110]. For example, in Tanzania, it was found that there were many 
transactional costs associated with the RBF pilot [122]. The transactional costs in 
Tanzania were above 50%, and only 22% accounted for the RBF bonus pay-outs 
[122]. However, these costs are bigger than in other contexts, for example in DR 
Congo [123]. Other studies from Benin [119] and Cambodia [116] reported big 
administrative costs associated with RBF programmes, which feeds into the debate on 
the cost effectiveness of these programmes [110]. Besides the Tanzanian study [122], 
there is not much literature on the cost-effectiveness of RBF programmes in both low 
and high-income context  
There are few studies that attempt to examine the perceptions and experiences of 
health workers with RBF programmes in low-income countries, and the few studies 
available report mixed results [119, 124, 125]. Studies from Cambodia, Burundi, 
Rwanda and Tanzania reported health workers having positive experiences with RBF. 
RBF was seen to have led to improvements in income, training, feedback, peer 
monitoring and teamwork, reducing absenteeism, data management and interaction 
with patients [116, 121, 124, 126]. It was also been found in Burundi that RBF can 
empower health facilities regarding decision making [125]. In Cambodia [112] and  
Burundi [121], the associated positive experiences of health workers with RBF was 
reported to have, moreover, led to reduced turn-over of health professionals.  
However, health workers also reported negative experiences associated with RBF 
programmes. These negative experiences include but are not limited to increased 
workload, dissatisfaction with allowances, lack of transparency and clarity regarding 
procedures leading to payments, and allegations of favoritism in the RBF programme 
at local health facility level [115, 116, 119]. In Benin, it was reported that two RBF 
programmes that were being run in parallel in the health sector were paying health 
workers differently, which led to feelings of injustice [119]. Moreover, it has been 
reported in Tanzania, Rwanda and Benin that additional activities of documenting 
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and reporting data did not only increase the workload of health workers, but also 
potentially were given priority over important tasks of care [118, 119, 122, 126].  
Impact evaluation studies on RBF in low-income countries have also reported mixed 
results on RBF [121, 127-132]. Positive effects were reported in some performance 
indicators in Rwanda [133], Tanzania [127], DR Congo [115], and in Burundi [121], 
among other countries. Other studies did not find any effects on RBF on certain 
performance indicators in Rwanda [134], in Cambodia [120] and in Tanzania [127]. 
Generally, it was observed that effects were greatest in performance indicators that 
were under direct control of health workers (e.g. postnatal care), where the potential 
for improvements was big (e.g. health facility deliveries), and on those with highest 
pay-outs (e.g. health facility deliveries in Rwanda) and those relatively easy to 
achieve [127, 132, 133, 135, 136]. However, some studies from Cambodia, Burundi, 
and Rwanda have cautioned that it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of RBF 
from other on-going interventions in the health sector [112, 121, 137, 138]. In 
addition, some studies reported on whether RBF promotes equitable access to and 
utilization of health services. One study from Tanzania reported that the RBF 
programme had a potential ‘pro-poor effect’[127], while studies from Rwanda [138] 
and Burundi [135], reported that RBF favoured groups of patients from the rich 
quantiles, who had many advantages including easy access to information and 
therefore easy to reach [135, 138].  
1.5.3 The unintended consequences and potential pitfalls of RBF 
Studies across contexts reported unintended consequences associated with RBF 
programmes. In this section, I will present these unintended consequences drawing 
from empirical evidence from both high-and low-income countries, as these may vary 
in the scope but not in nature. Generally, crowding out of intrinsic motivation and 
gaming are among these leading RBF pitfalls as presented here.  
In the health sector intrinsic motivation plays an important part [139-141]. In fact 
some health workers describe their work as a vocation and not just mere work [142-
144]. RBF can negatively affect this intrinsic motivation in health workers. In RBF 
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literature this is called crowding-out of intrinsic motivation [78, 110, 131, 145, 146]. 
Studies from DR Congo and Benin reported that RBF negatively affected the intrinsic 
motivation of health workers [115, 119]. For example, it was reported that while RBF 
had some successes in DR Congo, health workers overly relied on the financial 
incentives which resulted in their intrinsic motivation for care work to diminish 
[115], while in Benin monitoring of RBF was seen to be too controlling [119], 
thereby affecting health workers’ enjoyment of work tasks. Moreover, using RBF can 
be equated to a carrot and stick approach to work relations [15, 119, 131], which may 
further cause resentment and loss of self-esteem in health workers. Meessen and 
colleagues [147] in a study from Rwanda reported that when monitoring and 
supervision of RBF was excessively done, it was interpreted as lack of trust by 
frontline workers. It has been noted in the literature that the health sector relies on 
trust on varying levels [148, 149] and if such trust and the natural enjoyment of tasks 
is lost, it can potentially affects the sector’s functioning. When health workers’ 
intrinsic motivation is crowded out, it may lead to gaming.  
Gaming refers to strategies health providers can adopt in order to maximize profit by 
reaching RBF performance targets [15, 131]. One way of doing this is by prioritizing 
rewarded services while ignoring or pay little attention to least rewarded or 
unrewarded services [75, 76, 118, 126, 150]. Basinga and colleagues [133] in 
Rwanda found that health workers scored very well on performance indicators that 
had a highest payment and under their direct control. The prioritization of highest 
paid performance indicators, was also found in other studies in the same context [118, 
150].  
Additionally, health providers can avoid difficult-to-treat or difficult-to-reach 
categories of patients, for example, the chronically ill, the poor, those of old age, and 
noncompliant patients [75, 135, 138, 151-155]. For example a study in the US 
reported that physicians avoided treating minority patients as they were perceived to 
be noncompliant [156]. While studies from Burundi and Rwanda reported that RBF 
had a ‘pro-rich’ effect, as health workers found it easy to access groups of women 
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from rich quantiles than the poor [135, 138]. This behavior in RBF literature is 
popularly referred to as cherry picking, when health providers select more profitable 
groups of patients [110, 157-159]. 
Moreover, health providers can simply inflate (cheat) performance figures to achieve 
RBF targets [112, 115, 118, 150, 154, 160]. While this can be reduced by increased 
verification of reported results, many factors can affect the verification process, for 
example competence as was the case in Uganda [111], or conflict of interest and 
possible collusion with verifiers, as was alluded in studies from Burundi and 
Cambodia [112, 125]. Additionally, a thorough verification process can be too costly 
as was the case in Tanzanian [122]. Studies have also reported health providers 
holding on to last stocks of medical drugs [118, 150], as a gaming strategy to avoid 
drug stock-outs in cases where this is a performance indicator [110], resulting in 
patients not getting access to medicines that are in stock. Another risk noted in 
literature under gaming include paying more attention to the quantity of services 
while paying less to the aspects of quality [96, 147], which may lead health workers 
being less compassionate towards patients. In addition, RBF can lead to the provision 
of rewarded services despite the lack of competence to do so [118, 147, 161]. For 
example if low level health providers are rewarded for institutional deliveries but not 
for referrals, they may hold on to patients needing comprehensive essential obstetric 
care at referral level [15]. Moreover, it has been noted that using incentives and 
targets can potentially lead to the inducement of unnecessary demand for rewarded 
health services, which curtails the freedom of and potentially harm health service 
users [147]. For examples, it has been observed that women have been forced to take 
birth controls even in cases when they have reached menopause, as health providers 
chased for targets in family planning [15, 162].  
Literature in this section has presented an array of aspects that have to be guarded 
against when implementing RBF programmes across contexts. Predominantly 
however, the literature in this field is from high-income countries and from the field 
of economics, and does not cover other salient aspects in particular social settings. To 
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this end, Eldridge and Palmer [3] called for the need of multi-disciplinary case studies 
in the RBF field, outlining influential factors for the success or failure of RBF 
programmes in specific contexts [3]. Additionally, Magrath and Nichter [15] urged 
for multi-disciplinary studies, which includes some reflections on social theory in 
order to cover all dimensions of health workers’ motivation. With this in mind, the 
research gaps and study aim are identified and defined in the next section. 
1.6 Research gaps and study aim  
The existing literature has provided profound insights into the phenomenon under 
study. However, a number of gaps are identified from this literature. Studies in the 
RBF field conventionally focus on the effects of RBF programmes [74, 84, 127, 133], 
while less attention is given to processes, experiences and socio-cultural aspects. It 
has been noted that if processes leading to reforms in the health sector are not 
explored, it becomes difficult to understand why and how these reforms are carried 
out [163, 164]. In addition, we know from the literature presented that the success of 
and responses to RBF programmes varies across cultural contexts [15], but as long as 
studies do not focus on these specific aspects, it is difficult to fully understand why 
this is the case or which context specific aspects to pay particular attention to when 
designing RBF programmes. Moreover, the majority of RBF programmes reviewed 
in low-income countries are donor-funded, and therefore heavily influenced by donor 
preferences [119]. There are to my knowledge lack of studies that attempts to follow 
locally designed and implemented RBF programmes to see how they pan out. This is 
of importance as it may point to the likely trajectory donor-funded RBF programmes 
may take when local national governments took over. Additionally, most of the 
presented RBF studies are quantitative studies, which do not capture the involved 
actors’ experiences with RBF. While these studies are important and valuable in 
adding knowledge in the field, we may never fully understand why health workers in 
different contexts behave differently when Results-Based Financing programmes are 
introduced. Against this backdrop, the following study aim and specific research 
objectives have been defined: 
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The main aim of the study is to generate policy relevant knowledge about the 
processes leading up to the decision to introduce RBF in a resource constrained 
health sector, and challenges related to its implementation in such a sector. To 
achieve this aim, the following specific research objectives were pursued in paper I, 
II and III: 
 To investigate the policy process behind the introduction of Results-Based 
Financing in maternal and child health in Tanzania, illuminating in particular the 
interests and the roles played by the Norwegian Government, the Tanzanian 
Government and other involved development partners.  (Paper I) 
 To critically examine how a Results-Based Financing programme funded by local 
resources with no donor support was implemented and experienced by health 
workers. (Paper II) 
 To investigate health workers’ behaviour towards health service users and the 
strategies that they adopt in order to reach RBF performance targets  
(Paper II) 
 To explore how health workers perceive and experience the bonus distribution 
structure of a Results-Based Financing programme, paying particular attention to 
the social and cultural context and how it affects and/or influences social relations 
among health workers. (Paper III)  
1.7 Theoretical Perspectives 
The study approached the phenomenon of RBF explicitly and implicitly at different 
levels. To achieve this, it becomes imperative to use a variation of theories and 
concepts. Firstly, at policy level, I used the concept of ‘new public management’, 
which is rooted in neo-classical economics and neoliberalism [165], to understand the 
forces that make RBF attractive and appealing for many national governments. This 
concept however, is not actively used in analyzing RBF, but as a backdrop to the 
understanding of the origins and the notions to which RBF rests upon. Additionally at 
this level, I used the concept of partnership to analyze the type of partnership which 
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exists in the health sector of Tanzania, as RBF was introduced through a partnership 
(the Health Basket Fund).  
Secondly, RBF targets the motivation of health workers and in order to illuminate this 
aspect I used principal-agent theory, which is the theoretical basis for RBF [15, 110]. 
The theory defines workers (health workers) as self-interested and individualistic 
(homo economicus) [110] and therefore only pursues the economic dimension of 
motivation. To cover other forms of motivation, I used the Self-Determination 
Theory. Moreover, as RBF involves the distribution of goods (bonus payments) at the 
workplace, I chose to include a theory addressing justice at workplace, the Referent 
Cognitions Theory. Finally, all the theories introduced so far, to an extent give 
agency primacy over structural constraints. In this regard the concept of capital by 
Bourdieu is used in the understanding that in addition to economic dimension of 
motivation (economic capital), other form also exits, for example, social capital, 
which elucidates that individuals have some structural constraints which influence 
their decisions. Although the concept of social capital is not used in any of the sub-
studies, for the scope of the overall study, it becomes imperative to include a concept 
which locates health workers in a social environment where socio-cultural factors aid 
or undermine their agency. Descriptions of the theories and concepts are provided 
below.  
1.7.1 New Public Management (NPM) 
The theoretical background for NPM is found in the Public Choice School [166, 167] 
and the Chicago School of Economics [165]. These two schools of thought proffered 
strong criticism of large public sectors and the public sector governance of the time 
[165]. While the field of economics played an important role in shaping NPM, the 
concept is widely recognized as a hybrid where many fields, such as organisational 
theory, political science, and management theory have contributed [165, 168-170]. 
NPM is noted as the theory behind the most recent paradigm of how the public sector 
should be governed [165]. It is argued that the radical nature of NPM’s advocating 
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for the rolling back of the state made it politically appealing to neo-conservatism and 
neo-liberalism in the 1980s and to date [165, 171].  
The United Kingdom under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher has been recognized 
as the epicenter of the practical realization of early NPM. Thereafter it spread to 
Anglo-American countries and also into bilateral and multi-lateral institutions, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which further acted as transfer 
agencies of the concept globally [165, 168, 170, 172]. The aims of NPM are 
described as radical due to their neoliberal nature and ambitious [165, 171], and have 
been associated with limited success in some contexts [170, 173].  
Recent major public sector reforms in the African context have to be understood in a  
NPM perspective [174]. The robust promises of NPM became popular among African 
governments including Tanzania who aimed to reshape the public sector to deliver 
efficient and effective public services [175, 176]. Tanzania, for example, has been 
found to be suffering from both projectitis, a situation where a country finds itself 
running too many development projects at once, and reformitis, a situation where a 
country finds itself implementing too many reforms at the same time [60]. Most of 
the development projects and reforms are donor-funded [60]. For example, between 
1985-1995, Tanzania realized about 20 reforms in the public sector including the 
structural adjustment programmes [60]. A separate section in this dissertation has 
discussed a few of these reforms relevant to this study. The involvement of donors 
serve to illustrate the high dependency of Tanzania on development aid [60, 177]. 
While the influence of donors on specific reforms is hard to ascertain, several 
scholars consider the donors’ total political and financial influence intrusive and 
limiting to Tanzania’s ability to act as an agent of her own development [177, 178]. 
RBF as a health sector reform has to be understood in relation to this NPM paradigm 
and its assumptions.  
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1.7.2 Conceptualizing partnerships 
Partnerships in the field of development aid are often described in binary terms, as 
either weak or strong [179], or either genuine or instrumental [180, 181]. Partnerships 
promise an advent of a new type of relationship in aid where the “power of the purse” 
is reduced in favour of the “power of the owner” [182]. However, there is scepticism 
among some scholars as to the reality of this shift in power towards the recipient end, 
as donors tend to impose conditions to enter into these partnerships [182-184]. 
According to Abrahamsen, achieving genuine partnership is difficult “in a context 
when one party is in possession of the purse and the other the begging bowl”[181]. 
Critical voices therefore maintain that partnerships in development aid are simply a 
disguise of continued dominance of developing countries [179, 181].  
As a contested concept, several analytical frameworks have been proffered to 
examine the nature of partnerships. Crawford [180] developed a framework with four 
factors that need to be observed and followed if partnerships are to be considered 
genuine. These factors are: (1) mutual co-operation between multiple constituencies, 
both internal and external, (2) respect for sovereignty and the right of national actors 
to determine their own policy options, (3) equitable and meaningful relationship, and 
(4) time and commitment to build and maintain a strong partnership [180]. In our 
study, we used this framework to examine the type of partnership that developed 
between Tanzania and her partners in the health sector as the country opened up for 
partnerships in pursuing her developmental agenda [185].  
The partnership in Tanzania has been termed insidious [186], giving the country little 
room to manoeuvre due to its heavy reliance on donors [177, 187]. In the health 
sector, the first partnership was launched in 1999, the so-called Health Basket Fund. 
The fund’s aims are in close tandem with the 2005 Paris Declaration, which focuses 
on aid effectiveness and harmonization and giving recipient countries more control 
[188, 189]. The Health Basket Fund was led by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare and it initially had six donor-partners: Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 
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Danish International Development Agency (Danida), Department for International 
Development (DFID), Irish Aid, and the World Bank. The Netherlands, Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the German Development Bank (KfW), 
UNFPA and UNICEF joined the partnership later [188]. RBF in Tanzania was 
introduced through the Health Basket Fund partnership and therefore it is important 
to understanding the type of partnership that exists between Tanzania and her 
development partners in the health sector.   
1.7.3 Principle- agent theory 
RBF as a model borrows heavily from the principal-agent theory. The principal-agent 
theory seeks to explain how the use of financial incentives may enhance the 
performance of service providers who are not governed by market forces. According 
to Eisenhardt [190], there is a lack of alignment of the interests of the principal 
(employer) and the agent (employee) when it comes to the goals to be achieved by an 
organisation. In this regard, the principal tries to find ways of aligning the agent’s 
goals to the goals of the organisation [190]. RBF can be seen as coming from this 
perspective, where health workers as ‘agents’ are provided with performance bonuses 
by the principal (employer) in order to achieve health outputs and outcomes. RBF 
schemes arguably are on three main basic assumptions about human behaviour. RBF 
assumes that money motivates health workers, that effort can be measured and 
rewarded, and that financial incentives do not undermine other forms of motivations, 
for example intrinsic motivation. It is argued that RBF works best in organisations 
where workers undertake tedious work which output is simple to measure, such as the 
logging industry, fruit picking and tree planting among others [191-193]. Health 
workers, by contrast, work in a setting where ethical professional guidelines define 
their work, a setting where tasks are complex, challenging to perform and difficult to 
measure [89]. Folbre [194] notes that measuring outputs and quality in the health 
sector is difficult, as the services offered are sensitive, emotional and individual in 
nature and therefore impossible to denominate, unlike the “number of automobiles or 
pounds of corn” [194]. If measuring output and quality is difficult in the health 
sector, it is equally difficult to reward health workers according to effort. The 
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uncertainty in quality measurement makes the use of proxies attractive [194, 195]. In 
the health sector, quality care and health outcomes are difficult to ascertain as they 
are not instantaneous. Therefore, RBF schemes mostly measure quantity as a proxy 
for quality.  
The principal-agent theory does not consider non-financial motivation. In the health 
sector, there is evidence that forms of motivation other than financial matters. For 
instance, several studies have pointed to the strong existence of a ‘natural goodness’ 
or altruism in health sector workers [139-141, 143, 144]. The results from these 
studies suggest that health workers to an extent may be motivated by non-material 
motivations, and raise doubts about the correctness of the principal-agent-theory’s 
assumption that health workers care for financial incentives only.  
1.7.4 Self-Determination Theory (SDT): intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
Ryan and Deci postulates that “[t]o be motivated means to be moved to do 
something. Thus a person who feels no impetus or inspiration to act is characterized 
as unmotivated, whereas someone who is energized or activated toward an end is 
considered motivated”[196]. Everyone, either at work or in non-work situations, is 
faced with the question of how much motivation one has to perform certain tasks 
[196]. It is important to note that not only do people have different amounts of 
motivation at different times but also different kinds of motivation, and therefore 
motivation varies not only in terms of level but also in the orientation of the 
motivation [196]. For example, a health worker may be highly motivated to treat a 
patient (i.e., amount of motivation) for the reason that helping someone is inherently 
enjoyable, or in order to reach a certain performance target that will produce an 
external reward (i.e., type of motivation). Observe that in this example the level of 
motivation may not necessarily change but the focus and nature certainly do. It is 
important for health workers, therefore, to have enough motivation and the right 
focus in order to provide quality care.  
The Self-Determination Theory, developed by Deci and Ryan [197], makes a 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation, which is 
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proposed as the most expansive in humans, is defined as “doing something because it 
is inherently interesting or enjoyable” [196]. Extrinsic motivation is defined as 
“doing something because it leads to a separable outcome” [196]. These types of 
motivation are not exclusive of each other. However, the degree to which one is 
inclined towards any of these matters for one’s performance and the enjoyment of the 
task. The right balance between these two forms of motivation is therefore important 
at the workplace, as they influence each other. For example, increased extrinsic 
motivation through availability of financial incentives may diminish intrinsic 
motivation to perform workplace tasks [198].  
The SDT proposes three innate needs in humans for autonomy, competence and 
relatedness [196]. These needs have to be nurtured at the workplace, for workers to 
maintain intrinsic motivation. Figure 1 shows these three needs as adapted to health 
workers. Individuals cannot thrive in an environment without obtaining satisfaction 
of all of them[199]. For example, Ryan and Deci [199] postulates, if a workplace 
affords competence but fails to nurture relatedness, the result is an impoverishment of 
well-being. 
Figure 1: SDT’s basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness 









An adaptation of the Self-Determination Theory’ three human basic needs  [200] 
 
Health workers having the 
knowledge and the ability 
to complete a work task 
successfully or efficiently 
Health workers’ need to 
have close, affectionate 
relationship with co-
workers 
Health workers having the 
freedom from external 
control or acting out of 
their own volition 
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Given the significance of intrinsic motivation in the performance and enjoyment of 
tasks at the workplace, the question becomes: what is the best way to nurture these 
three innate needs in health workers? As Folbre [194] argued, the health sector is 
delicate, given the nature of services it offers to the society. While it is good for 
health workers to afford a decent life, it is better if they do this while enjoying their 
work and best if the quality of care is improved. While the principal-agent theory 
emphasizes external motivation as key in achieving organizational goals [190], the 
Self-Determination Theory goes further, uncovering other forms of motivation 
important to consider at the workplace [197]. These theories are used in this study to 
understand the individual and to an extent the social dimensions of motivation, which 
the RBF scheme in Tanzania seeks to improve.  
1.7.5 Referent cognitions theory  
While it may be common sense, it is important to note that employees of any 
organization prefer fair treatment over unfair treatment [201]. The question is what 
entails fair treatment, as this may be based on subjective experiences and is context 
specific [201, 202]. The issue of fairness at the workplace is a concern for social 
justice [203], and many social psychologists have been studying these concerns and 
proposed theories, commonly known as theories of social justice [204, 205]. 
However, these theories, tend to focus on issues of distributive justice, that is, 
emphasizing that outcomes are crucial in the fairness judgement process [203]. Other 
scholars, including Folger, build their work from this premise, but include procedural 
justice as another crucial aspect of the fairness judgement process [201, 202, 206, 
207]. Procedural justice concerns the perceived fairness of the process leading up to 
decision making [201]. Folger therefore proposed a link between these two notions of 
justice at the workplace in the Referent Cognitions Theory [201, 202]  
Folger argues for the link on the basis that these two notions (procedural and 
distributive justices) are not mutually exclusive, as procedures have an effect on the 
distribution [201]. The theory postulates that when an outcome is seen as unjust or 
unfair at the workplace, it results in moral outrage and resentment [201]. Therefore, 
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the experience of resentment towards an unfair outcome can be analyzed in two ways, 
that is, consideration of an imaginable better outcome that could have been more 
satisfying (distributive justice), and improper procedures or processes that may have 
hindered the attainment of the desired outcome (procedural justice) [201, 202]. For 
example, assuming health workers (or workers in any work context) have received a 
financial incentive, they may not only judge it as fair or unfair based on what has 
been distributed (distributive justice) but also based on how it has been distributed 
(procedural justice). It has been reported that that workers who feel that they are 
fairly treated by their organization show more motivation, commitment, and extra-
citizenship behavior (taking on voluntary tasks) [208]. Those who experience unfair 
treatment, by contrast, are more likely to show low levels of motivation and 
commitment, exhibit anti-normative behaviors, and even leave their jobs [209].  
RBF offers financial incentives to health workers upon reaching a predefined 
threshold in performance, based on certain performance indicators. Generally, only 
selected groups of health workers are entitled to receive such financial incentives, in 
this case health workers working with maternal and child health. Both the way in 
which these groups of employees have been selected and the difference in access to 
such incentives within a health care facility may impact on individual perceptions of 
fairness and justice.  
1.7.6 The social dimension of motivation: social capital 
This dissertation aims to make two central contributions to the knowledge about 
RBF. Firstly, it critically examines the policy process behind the introduction of RBF 
in a low-income setting. Secondly, it explores the experiences of health workers with 
RBF in a specific social environment. The theories presented so far are useful in 
explaining the phenomenon of RBF and the preconditions and assumptions that shape 
and drive it. As such, they also highlight one particularly central precondition for 
RBF programmes, namely the assumption that agents in the health sector are rational 
actors driven by individually founded motivations. What the theories so far discussed 
deal less well with is the social dimension of health workers’ motivation. The choices 
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health workers make and the strategies they adopt will be quite heavily influenced by 
both local culture and the specific social relations at their work place and in the local 
community [15]. This is the case to an extent that renders purely individualistic 
models of explanation insufficient (e.g. the principal-agent theory). There is therefore 
a need to broaden the theoretical base of this dissertation to include contributions that 
may help explain the social-cultural dimensions of motivation. 
Magrath and Nichter [15] have called for the active use of social science theory in 
order to have a holistic understanding of the motivation of health workers. The 
relationship between health workers and their social environment may contribute 
significantly to the explaining of how RBF is perceived and why it is experienced 
differently across social-cultural settings. The intention with such analyses is not to 
undermine the fact that health workers have individual agency, but to recognize that 
social structures implicitly or explicitly have an influence on how individuals choose 
to exercise their agency when engaging with an RBF programme.  
RBF is as noted above based on the precondition that health workers are rational, 
individualist, self-interest seeking actors. As also noted above, the majority of RBF 
programmes originate from the US and other western liberal countries [78, 97, 151, 
210, 211]. These are countries characterized by well-functioning institutions (public 
or private), better job opportunities, and high incomes enough to give individuals in 
these contexts more or better choices. It may be assumed that individuals in such 
social contexts find it both easy and sensible to accept and relate to the libertarian 
values [212], RBF is based on. In Tanzania, like in other low-income countries, the 
situation is very different. Firstly, elements like poor working conditions and fragile 
infrastructure render public institutions unstable. Secondly, significant remaining 
‘traditional’ elements in the society make modern elements that are introduced work 
differently than they would have done in more purely ‘modern’ contexts, often 
leading to dysfunction. In addition, the collective mindedness that follows from both 
the remaining significant influence of traditional values and a modernity 
characterized by scarce resources creates an environment where rational choices will 
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look different from what they would be in more profoundly ‘modern’, individualist, 
stable, wealthy western-style societies.  
For example, studies from Tanzania have revealed that the introduction of neo-liberal 
policies in the 1980s, replacing Nyerere’s policies based on Ujamaa (African 
socialism) values, challenged and reshaped the national provision system for public 
services, including health services [30, 213]. Cultural lag nevertheless causes some of 
the old, collective values to remain influential, evoking a nostalgic discourse of 
ujamaa [213]. In the same vein, an ethnographic study revealed that health workers in 
Tanzania, through nostalgia for an ‘egalitarian’ state, still perceive the now neo-
liberal state as a fair distributor of goods and services to the whole population [50].  
The concept of capital [214] may help to explain the social dimension of motivation 
and what is at stake when financial incentives are introduced in social settings such as 
Tanzania. In order to account for the structure and functioning of the social world, 
one has to acknowledge the existence of other forms of capital aside capital relating 
directly to economic gains [214]. In addition to the economic capital, other forms 
exist, such as cultural, social and symbolic [214]. In any given social setting, agents 
have access to various amounts of the various kinds of capital, and the total amount 
of capital one controls determines one’s position in the social setting [214, 215]. 
Cultural capital can be embodied (long-lasting dispositions), objectified (cultural 
artifacts or goods) and institutionalized (e.g. education, formal or informal) [214]. 
Social capital refers to the social networks and group memberships, which are 
important in providing support in time of need. Symbolic capital can be defined as 
resources available to individuals relating to their honour, prestige and recognition.  
It is important to note that these capitals, although distinct, are closely related and can 
in fact be converted from one form to another [215]. For example, cultural capital can 
be a means to economic capital, i.e. a health worker can use their knowledge and 
expertise in exchange for a financial incentive. However, this conversion of capital 
from one form to another is only possible as long as it is permissible in the social 
world of the agent in question [214]. If the transaction is carried out anyhow, without 
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respecting the rules of the game [214], it can affect the actor’s other capitals 
negatively. For example, if an RBF scheme is perceived to be encouraging 
competition or if the payment is considered to be unequal to the effort [15, 89, 160], 
social capital among health workers can be affected adversely. Similarly, if the need 
to meet RBF targets encourages prioritization of rewarded services and neglect of 
unrewarded services [52, 118, 131, 216], this can affect negatively the social relations 
between health providers and service users.  
Therefore, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is reasonable to assume that in a 
collectivist society, an individual’s reputation (or that of his/her family) may be more 
valuable than an economic bonus payment at work. If making choices leading to 
bonus payment implies acts that will reduce the reputation of one self and thereby 
one’s family in the local community, the reasonable choice will be to forfeit the 
bonus. Moreover, if agents choose to fully embrace the bonus payment regardless of 
the social risks involved, it is reasonable to assume that they will face stiffer social 
sanctions than the same acts would have produced in western liberal societies which 
are highly individualized. As noted elsewhere, Tanzania is a country suffering from 
projectitis [60]. Among other things, this implies that people are used to short-lived 
projects. This further reduces the chance that they will risk their social capital, which 
is stable and sustainable, for a few dollars offered by yet another project that no one 
knows whether will stay or go.  
In this regard, the concept of capital [214] helps to illuminates the socio-cultural 
dimension of motivation salient in this dissertation. It highlights that in a socio-
cultural context such as the Tanzanian, a health worker’s experiences with and 
perceptions of RBF may be influenced by a range of other concerns than the highly 
individualized choices and preferences that RBF, theoretically is based upon. Rather, 
people’s way of relating to RBF programmes must be understood as part of a 
complex social web, and therefore the actual effects and consequences of such 
schemes will extend far beyond the health sector, and are very difficult to predict. 
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2 Materials and methods 
2.1 Study design  
A qualitative case study design was used in this study. It is stated that good science 
has to be problem driven and not methodologically driven [217]. That is, as 
researchers, we begin with a research problem and then search for a suitable 
methodology. In this study, a case study design was suitable in examining in-depth an 
ongoing policy implementation [218] in the health sector of Tanzania, RBF. A case 
study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context” [218], it provides detailed and 
rich information about the studied phenomenon [219]. A qualitative case study 
methodology has advantages when the study is pursuing the how and why questions 
[218], as the case in this study. There are many typologies of case studies [220, 221], 
and in this study I followed the typology proposed by Thomas [220], as illustrated by 
figure 2 below.  
subject Purpose Approach Process 
                                     
                            Intrinsic                 Theory testing                                                      Nested 
                           Instrumental          Theory building                        mmultiple            Parallel 
                                                                                                             Sequential 
                                                                                                             Retrospective 
                                       Single             Snapshot 
                                                                                                             Diachronic 
Figure 2: Typology of the case design for this study, adapted from Thomas [220] 
Following arrows and boxes (in black) from left to right, the case study is based on 
RBF in Tanzania (subject), the study is exploratory and explanatory of the study 
phenomenon (purpose), the case study intends to describe and illustrate RBF in 
Tanzania (approach).The case study was multi-sited and conducted at multiple-levels 
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RBF in Pwani (nested cases) to present a whole picture of the Tanzanian RBF. 
Qualitative case study research design allows the use of multiple methods of data 
collection [218, 222]. In this study, the main methods used for data collection were 
in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), policy document reviews 
and participation in RBF related meetings, as summarized in figure 2. Using multiple 
methods of data collection help researchers to achieve triangulation, which improves 
the credibility of the study [218, 223, 224] 
2.2 Study setting  
The study was multi-sited and data was collected from two countries, Norway and 
Tanzania. In Norway data was collected in Oslo while in Tanzania it was collected in 
Dar es Salaam, Mvomero district in Morogoro region and Rufiji districts in Pwani 
region. Data for the study was collected in four phases between 2010 and 2013. Three 
of the phases were conducted by the researcher and one phase by a research 
collaborator and third author of paper II. In all data collection phases the researchers 
got help from research assistants. The phases for data collection took place in June- 
August 2010, July-October 2011, October-November 2012 and January-June 2013. 
During the first, second and fourth phases, data was collected from Tanzania, and the 









Figure 3: Own illustration of the research process for this study  
Phase 4: Dar es Salaam + Rufiji, 2013 
(Jan-Jun) by Researcher + Assistants 
Phase 3: Oslo 2012, (Oct-Nov) by 
Researcher + Assistants  
Phase 1: Mvomero, 2010 (Jun-Aug) 
by Researcher + Assistants
Phase 2: Mvomero, 2011 (Jul-Oct) by 










Mvomero and Rufiji are both rural districts and are both in the Eastern zone regions. 
Mvomero district was chosen because it is the only known district to have fully 
implemented the local RBF programme. The donor-funded pilot was conducted in the 
Pwani region and Ifakara Health Institute (IHI) carried out evaluations in the other 
five districts of Pwani [114, 122, 127], except Rufiji and the Mafia islands. Therefore, 
Rufiji remained the only district on the mainland where RBF data had not been 
collected. For this reason and the need to widen the scope on RBF experiences in the 
region, I purposively chose Rufiji. The district was also chosen over Mafia for 
practical reason of geographical accessibility.   
2.2.1 Mvomero district  
Mvomero is one of the six districts in Morogoro region of Tanzania. The district 
covers more than 7, 000 square kilometers and has a population of 312 109 [18]. 
Administratively, Mvomero is divided into 17 wards and 101 villages. The district is 
bordered by two regions, Pwani to the east, and Tanga to the north. To the southeast 
it is bordered by Morogoro rural district and to the west by Kilosa [225].The 
economy of Mvomero is heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture. The district 
has a significant population of traditional pastoralists of the Masaai and Sukuma 
tribes, some of these, who live in villages such as Kambala, Wame-Sokoine and Mela 
which are as far as 15 km to the nearest functional health facilities [226]. The 
distance and negative attitudes from health workers, according to our fieldwork 
accounts, affect the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health care 
among these groups. 
The district has 56 health facilities, including one mission hospital owned by Roman 
Catholic. It also has five health centres, one owned by a parastatal organization and 
four public, and 50 dispensaries (42 public, 3 parastatal, 2 private and 3 church-run) 
[227]. In terms of staff, all cadres have a significant shortage of staff except the 
medical attendant category, which is adequately staffed. The medical attendant 
category receives shorter training of at least one year, and the training is either pre-
service or in-service [50, 52]. Of the 187 clinical officers required in the district, 87 
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are available and of the 103 nurses required, 84 are available [46]. In Morogoro 
region, 98.3% women received antenatal care (ANC) at least once from a skilled 
provider and nurses and midwives, 83%, were more likely than other health 
professionals to provide ANC services [26]. In the eastern region of Tanzania, 
Morogoro had the highest number of women, 0.5%, receiving ANC from unskilled 
providers, i.e. village health workers and traditional birth attendants [26]. Six out of 
10 live births in the region are delivered by a skilled provider, and 27% of mothers in 
the region seek first postnatal checkup within 48 hours of delivery [26]. Morogoro 
region’s figures given above are above national averages; however, comparatively 
Pwani region, where Rufiji district lies, performs much better on the access to and 
utilization of maternal health services.   
2.2.2 Rufiji district 
Rufiji is one of the seven districts in the Pwani Region. It has a population of 217,274 
[18]. The population density is 17.7 people per square kilometer [228]. 
Administratively, the district is divided into 27 wards, 96 villages and 400 hamlets 
[18, 228]. The main economic activity of the district is agriculture, and 78% of the 
inhabitants actively participate in this sector [228]. Accounts from community 
members and health workers revealed that the district faces a huge challenge with 
water borne diseases, and that the water is saline due to its proximity to the Rufiji 
basin, which is the largest catchment basin in Tanzania covering 177,420 km2 [229]. 
The basin is the catchment area for the Rufiji River, which divides the district into 
two halves. The district has a delta zone and is a hard to reach area [230]. Health 
facilities in this delta area face enormous challenges in attracting and retaining 
qualified staff, procuring medical supplies, and communicating with the district 
health offices.  
The district has a total number of 64 health facilities, including two hospitals, five 
health centres, and 57 dispensaries [228]. Of the two hospitals, one is church-run and 
the other is public. All the five health centres are publicly owned. Of the 57 
dispensaries, 46 are public, four are church-run, four are private-for profit and one is 
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owned by a non-governmental organization [228]. All cadres in Rufiji have 
significant shortages except the medical attendant category, which is overrepresented. 
The staffing requirements for the district are 583 and of these, 301 are filled, a 
shortage of 49% [228]. In Pwani region, 99.5% women received antenatal care at 
least once from a skilled provider and nurses and midwives (94%) were more likely 
than other health professionals to provide these services [26]. Seven out of 10 live 
births in the region are delivered by a skilled provider, and 42% of mothers in the 
region seek first postnatal checkup within 48 hours of delivery [26]. All these figures 
provided are well above national averages, indicating that access to and utilization of 
maternal and child health services in Pwani are better than other regions in Tanzania. 
However, it should be noted that on its own, Rufiji is worse off than other districts in 
Pwani due to the fact that about a quarter of its health facilities are in the delta zone.  
2.3 Selection of research participants and study sites 
The study aimed to elicit experiences with and perceptions of RBF from two main 
categories of research participants, that is, policy makers and development experts 
and health workers. Additionally, the study benefited from health service users’ 
experiences on access to, utilization and quality of health care services. In order to 
achieve the study aim, the study used purposive sampling in the selection of research 
participants and research sites. According to Maxwell [231] purposive sampling is a 
strategy in which “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for 
the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other 
choices”. As a result, the researcher can use purposive sampling to select research 
participants and sites with a specific purpose of answering the study questions [223, 
232, 233]. This study benefitted from this advantage of purposive sampling as 
outlined below.  
2.3.1 Policy makers and development experts 
Policy makers and development experts were selected with the aim of understanding 
the policy process behind the introduction of RBF in Tanzania. At the policy level, 
in-depth knowledge and understanding of the health sector landscape and reforms in 
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Tanzania was required. Therefore, I was mainly interested in the organizations which 
had been members of the Health Basket Fund and/or Donor Partner Group for Health 
in Tanzania for a long time, such as founding members. Irish Aid, Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (Norad), Danish International Development Agency 
(Danida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the World 
Bank were selected using this criterion. The Royal Norwegian Embassy and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway were selected based on Norway’s role and 
influence on the RBF agenda in Tanzania. The German Society for International 
Cooperation (GiZ) was selected for their immense role and expertise in health sector 
financial reforms in Tanzania. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of 
Tanzania was chosen as the custodian of the RBF process in the country. The Clinton 
Health Access Initiative (CHAI) was selected as the organization managing the 
donor-funded RBF pilot in Tanzania. An overview of organizations and research 
participants under this category is provided under data collection methods section. 
To identify individuals best suited to give information on the RBF process, an e-mail 
was send to the organizations requesting an interview on RBF. The organizations 
responded selecting individuals with the best knowledge on the RBF process in 
Tanzania, including those who participated in the Health Basket Fund discussions. 
Three interview guides, for Tanzanian officials, Norwegian Officials and other RBF 
involved development partners were developed (appendices III, IV and V) to explore 
issues surrounding main trends and thematic priorities in development aid policy, 
countries and actors perceived to be proponents in the RBF process, agenda setting in 
the Tanzanian health basket, and experiences with RBF. Data collected from these 
informants was used in Paper I. Under this category, it is important to note that some 
important stakeholders in RBF, who were either supporting or opposing it, declined 
to participate in the study mainly citing the political sensitivity of the RBF agenda at 
the time.  
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2.3.2 Health Workers and Users  
The study targeted health workers to understand their experiences with and 
perceptions of RBF. In 2010 and 2011 we recruited health workers who were 
primarily working with maternal and child health services as this was the targeted 
service area for the local RBF in Mvomero (locally funded), and therefore workers in 
this section had in-depth knowledge on RBF. The 2010-2011 sub-study was aimed at 
eliciting the experiences of health with RBF before and after bonus payments. 
Therefore, in 2011 we wanted to re-interview the same health workers as in 2010. 
However, this was not possible as we only managed to re-interview three out of 
twelve. The other nine could not be located for a number of reasons, so we ended up 
recruiting new participants. Although we interviewed new participants, the 
experiences presented in paper II still provide a picture of the before-and after RBF 
bonus distribution. However, there is a possibility that this may have affected the 
quality of our data.  
In 2013, we knew that RBF in Rufiji (donor-funded) had been running for two years 
and that health workers were being paid differently, and because of this we were 
interested in the experiences of all health workers working in different sections. In 
addition, we also aimed at gathering information from health facility leadership and 
from health workers central to the implementation of RBF, for example, those 
responsible for coordinating Reproductive and Child Health services. This was 
primarily to map out health facility based RBF implementation challenges or areas of 
success, in order to pursue these issues further in IDIs and FDGs. To recruit health 
workers for the study in all cases we had to be introduced to them by their leadership, 
as permission is required to conduct research at health facilities. However, this raised 
some ethical concerns on consent as it is difficult to judge if all health workers who 
participated in the study did so out of their own volition or because they felt obliged 
to as long as their leader was involved in the recruitment process. We however, made 
sure that consent was coming also from each research participant. An overview of 





Figure 4: IDI with a health worker at a public dispensary in Rufiji District, the 
provisions at the table were bought by RBF facility funds 
Data was also collected from health service users, and their experiences with care 
were important in our study. The information we gathered from them was useful for 
triangulation purposes, and for follow-up interviews with health workers. For 
example, in paper II we pursued the topic of adverse santions towards home birth 
after this was reported in focus group discussions with mothers. However, no paper in 
this dissertation explicitly focuses on the experiences of health service users. We 
recruited health service users mainly through the help of health workers but also 
through our own social networks established during our stay for the data collection 
period. Whenever we got help from health workers, we made sure that consent was 
sought from the research participants themselves and that they voluntarily 
participated in the research. An overview of FGDs with health service users is 
provided under data collection methods section.  
2.3.3 Health Facilities 
Eighteen health facilities were purposively selected in the two districts, seven in 
Mvomero and eleven in Rufiji. The criteria for the selection of health facilities 
differed in Mvomero and Rufiji. This is mainly due to the scope and focus of the sub-
studies conducted in these districts. Firstly, for the data that was collected in 2010 and 
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2011 in Mvomero, the emphasis was on primary health care workers’ experiences 
with RBF. Therefore, we targeted dispensaries and health centres. Secondly, the 2010 
sub-study was part of my master’s thesis in Gender and Development studies and its 
scope was not as wide as the 2013 sub-study. In the end we covered one church-run 
health centre and six public dispensaries in Mvomero. Table 2 gives an overview of 
health facilities that were selected.  
Table 2: Overview of selected health facilities  
Mvomero- 2010 and 2011 Rufiji-2013 
Facility type  Ownership  Facility type Ownership  
Dispensary A Public  Dispensary A Public 
Dispensary B Public Dispensary B Church-run 
Dispensary C Public Dispensary C Church-run 
Dispensary D Public Dispensary F Public 
Dispensary E Public Dispensary G Church-run 
Dispensary F Public Dispensary I Public  
Health Centre G Church-run Dispensary J Public  
  Health Centre D Public  
  Health Centre E Public  
  Hospital H Public  
  Hospital K Church-run  
 
The 2010 sub-study, therefore acted as a formative study for the 2011 and 2013 sub-
studies. For the Rufiji sub-study of 2013, whose scope and focus was wider, four 
main criteria were used for selecting health facilities. Firstly we aimed to cover all 
levels in the health referral system, hence we selected two hospitals, two health 
centres and seven dispensaries. Secondly, we aimed at covering a wide geographical 
distribution of health facilities. Thirdly we had obtained the RBF performance report 
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for cycle 4 for health facilities in Rufiji therefore, we wanted to include both facilities 
that had been performing well and those not. Fourthly, we included both church-run 
and public owned health facilities. The rationale behind these selection criteria was to 
get a comprehensive, in-depth picture of the varying experiences with RBF. 
However, in practice it became particularly challenging to meet all these criteria, for 
example some of the worst performing health facilities in Rufiji district were in the 
delta zone which was difficult to access.  
 
Figure 5: Entrance to Ikwiriri dispensary in Rufiji district.   
2.4 Data collection methods 
The methods that were used for data collection included in-depth interviews (IDIs), 
focus group discussions (FGDs), policy document reviews, participation in RBF 
related meetings, and field notes and informal conversations. A brief account of these 
methods is given below. 
2.4.1 In-depth Interviews (IDIs) 
In-depth interviews (IDIs) were used as a data collection method. In his book, Kvale 
[234] posed a simple yet fundamental question in social research, “if you want to 
know how people understand their world and lives, why not talk with them?”[234]. 
IDIs are suitable for eliciting in-depth information on research participants’ 
experiences and worldview, and in our study all the three papers used data collected 
through this method. In total, 70 IDIs were conducted; thirteen with policy makers 
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and development experts for paper I, and 57 with health workers and administrators 
for paper II and III. IDIs with policy makers and development experts were 
conducted in English and all took place in the offices of the research participants or 
meeting rooms at their workplaces. IDIs with health workers and administrators were 
conducted at health facilities, and the majority of these were conducted in Swahili. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give an overview of participants in IDIs.  
Table 3: Overview of IDIs with policy makers and development experts (Paper I) 
Agency/Organization Number of Interviews 
GiZ Tanzania 2 
Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC) 1 
Ministry of Health & Social Welfare  2 
Irish Aid/Health Basket Coordinator 1 
Danida 1 
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) 2 
World Bank – Tanzania 1 
Norad 1 
The Royal Norwegian Embassy- Dar es Salaam 1 




Table 4: Overview of IDIs with health workers in Mvomero district (Paper II) 
Category of informants Number of interviews 
Clinical officers (CO) 3 
Nursing staff 17 
Medical attendants (MA) 2 
Laboratory staff 1 




Table 5: Overview of IDIs with health workers in Rufiji district (Paper III) 
Category of informants Number of interviews 
Medical officers (MO) 2 
Assistant Medical Official (AMO) 2 
Clinical Officers (CO) 3 
Nursing staff 11 
Medical attendants 11 
Laboratory staff 2 
Officials from the district health offices 1 
Total  32 
 
Interview guides were used with health workers covering the following themes: 
expectations towards RBF, experiences with RBF, prioritization of work within the 
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health facility, strategies used to attract patients/clients, barriers to quality care, 
perceptions on individual work motivation, work relations and experiences with 
bonus distribution (appendices VI, VII, and VIII).   
2.4.2 Focus group discussions (FGDs)  
Human beings are social and like to gather and belong to a group. Social science has 
tapped into this naturally occurring behavior and refined it into a research method 
[235]. Focus group discussions allows the gathering of people with similar 
background and experiences to discuss a specific topic, and it is a method that reveals 
information that may be less accessible in interviews [236, 237]. For instance, in our 
study we discovered that health workers were more willing to reveal what they 
thought to be problematic with the RBF programme in FGDs than in IDIs. We 
gathered FGDs data from two categories of participants; health workers and health 
service users. A total of 21 FGDs were conducted with health service users, between 
2010 and 2013. Among these, 15 were with women and six with men. Topic guides 
were used covering themes ranging from quality of care, access to care, availability 
and acceptability of care, with an emphasis on maternal and child health services 
which are targeted by RBF in Tanzania. FDGs with this category of informants were 
carried at various places but mainly at health facilities and at the house of one of the 
participants (or local contact person). Research assistants facilitated all the FGDs 
without my presence sometimes, and reasons for this are discussed under 
trustworthiness in qualitative research in chapter 4. Table 6 gives an overview of 
these focus group discussions with health services users. 
Six focus group discussions were conducted at five health facilities with health 
workers as summarized in the table 7. The FGDs were conducted at health facilities 
in Swahili. Three FGDs were with RCH staff at hospitals and health centres or with 
workers primarily responsible for RCH services at the dispensary level. Two FGDs 
were with non-RCH staff and one FGD with non-medical staff at a hospital. The 
reason for grouping participants as RCH, non- RCH and non-medical was to explore 
the sensitive topic of bonus distribution, as these groups were paid differently. All 
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focus groups had an average of five participants, a number encouraged in the 
literature [236]. To increase the range of information, participants in IDIs were not 
included in FGDs. A topic guide was used during FGDs exploring the following 
themes: perceptions of care provision as a profession, experiences with the RBF 
programme, social relations, strategies to attract patients/clients, and community 
involvement (appendix IX). Data generated from FGDs with health workers was used 
in Paper III. 
 Table 6: Overview of FGDs with health service users 
Gender Year Total 
2010 2011 2013 
Female groups 2 6 7 15 
Male groups 1 5 0 6 
Total groups 3 11 7 21 
 
Table 7: Overview of Health workers who participated in FGDs  
FGD 
number 
Category of staff Location Participants Men Women 
FGD 1 RCH  Hospital (public) 5 1 4 
FGD 2 RCH Health Centre (public) 5 1 4 
FGD 3 RCH Dispensary (church-run) 4 0 4 
FGD 4 non-RCH Hospital (public) 6 3 3 
FGD 5 non- RCH Health centre (public) 5 3 2 
FGD 6 non- medical Hospital (church-run) 5 4 1 
Total   30 12 18 
 
 
2.4.3 Policy documents reviews 
Policy documents were of utmost importance to the study, and were used mainly 
from a realist perspective [238], i.e., as a means of understanding the RBF policy and 
design in the Tanzanian context. Hence, policy documents were essential in providing 
background information to the study and in defining the questions and trajectories 
that were pursued [239] in the IDIs with policy makers and development experts. 
Policy documents central to our study include: The Pwani region P4P pilot: design 
document [70], Health sector startegic plan III (July 2009-June 2015), Partnership 
for delivering the MDGs [33], The national road map strategic plan to accelerate 
reduction of maternal, newborn and child deaths [240], Payment for performance 
strategy 2008-2015 [69], Implementation guidelines- payment for performance [241]. 
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These policy documents were instrumental in  uncovering the political frames [238] 
for the RBF process and in supplementing primary data collected [239] from the 
representatives of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Data collected through 
policy document reviews was mainly used in Paper I.  
2.4.4 Participation in RBF related meetings 
In addition to the already presented data collection methods, I participated in 
meetings on RBF in Dar es Salaam between January-June 2013 both as a participant 
and as an observer. Although this method of data collection may seem similar to 
participant and non-participant observations, in this study I will not specifically use 
these terms. It has been noted that during fieldwork we generally observe and 
participate in events, but participant observation requires more than this mere 
observations and participation [242, 243]. Participant observation requires a 
systematic way of gathering and using information gained [242], and a great deal of 
time to immerse with study participants [242-244]. To an extent I did not manage to 
achieve some of these criteria.   
Two meetings were particularly important for me during my fieldwork. The first was 
a stakeholders’ meeting on RBF held in January 2013 which was giving a review on 
the status of RBF in the health sector of Tanzania. The meeting provided me with an 
opportunity to identify influential actors in the RBF field. During this meeting initial 
contacts with potential research participants in Dar es Salaam were made. The 
meeting also contributed to the identification of potential sources of secondary data 
for the study. The second meeting occurred when I was requested by the RBF joint 
assessment committee, which consisted of Norad, the World Bank and USAID, to 
assist as a resource person to gather literature on RBF in Tanzania and other low 
income settings. This role was important for gaining access to and building rapport 
with key informants in the study. The participation in the RBF meetings was 
therefore important for gathering background information, for refining the research 
questions, for the identification of potential informants, for the development of the 
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interview questions [238], and for mapping of secondary data sources, as these were 
mainly accessed through these meetings. 
2.4.5 Field notes and informal conversations  
Field notes were taken during data collection. The researcher noted down events that 
were observed, including informal conversations with or among study informants and 
community members in the data collection sites. In interviews and FGDs, key issues 
and statements were noted. These field notes were important at various stages of the 
research process, such as data collection, and during analysis and report writing. 
Thus, the field notes were important for data triangulation.  
2.5 Data analysis  
Analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing process from the first interview and 
depends to a degree on the conceptual capabilities of the researcher [245]. Beyond the 
capabilities of the researcher, qualitative analysis has to be rigorous, systematic and 
credible [245]. The majority of the audio recorded IDIs and FGDs that were 
conducted in Swahili were transcribed and translated to English by research 
assistants. These were carefully checked by a research collaborator, a senior 
researcher at Ifakara Health Institute (IHI) in Tanzania, to ensure the quality of 
translation [246, 247]. The IHI collaborator also listened to some audio recordings, 
comparing them to some few transcripts that had been transcribed in Swahili 
checking for the quality of the transcription process and then translations to English. 
Transcribed IDIs and FGDs were imported into OpenCode 3.6 [248], for the purposes 
of data management. Using Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) makes it easier to store and retrieve data, but caution must be taken as 
CAQDAS cannot replace the human element and do the analysis [249]. If there is 
over reliance with CAQDAS, there is a danger that the analysis can become 
superficial and counteract deep engagement with data, which is the crux in qualitative 
data analysis [249]. The study used two data analysis methods, qualitative content 
analysis [250], for paper I and III and meaning condensation [234, 251], for paper II. 
These two methods do not differ so much on their practical applications, but as I 
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advanced with my PhD training, I found procedures of qualitative content analysis as 
outlined by Graneheim and Lundman [250] more pragmatic and easy to follow. 
Inductive analysis was used as it is suitable for both qualitative content analysis and 
meaning condensation [245]. A brief account of these two analysis methods and steps 
taken follows.  
2.5.1 Meaning condensation 
Meaning condensation is a synopsis of the meanings expressed by the informants into 
shorter formulations. It involves a process of shortening long statements into briefer 
statements rephrasing what the informant said in fewer words [234]. The method of 
analysis was developed by Giorgi [251] on the basis of phenomenological 
philosophy, but this does not limit its use to phenomenological studies [234]. The 
analysis involves five steps [234]. Firstly, the transcripts were read thoroughly to get 
a complete sense of the whole, which is the familiarization stage [249]. Secondly, the 
transcripts were uploaded into the software OpenCode 3.6, where meaning units of 
the text were determined as expressed by the research participant. Thirdly, the 
meaning units were coded. The coding was in vivo, staying as close as possible to 
research participants’ viewpoint. Sub-themes were extrapolated from these codes. 
The fourth stage involved the interrogation of the meaning units in terms of the 
specific purpose of the study. Lastly, mutually exclusive themes were identified and 
used to present results supported by representative extracts. Themes that were 
identified are: 1) RBF bonus paid at flat rate, 2) attitudes towards alternative usage of 
the RBF funds changing after payments, 3) RBF having improved services and 
cooperation at health facilities and, 4) strategies used to make women deliver at 
health facilities, which is shown in table 8. These themes were used to structure the 
presentation of results in paper II. Analysis was conducted by the researcher working 
closely with a research collaborator and co-author who had collected the data, with 
experience with various qualitative analysis methods. Working in teams during the 
analysis facilitates a quality data analysis process [252].  
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Table 8: From meaning units to theme in meaning condensation: strategies to make 
women deliver at health facilities  
Meaning unit Codes/Condensed 
meaning unit  
 Sub-theme           Theme 
We said that for those who deliver at home their babies 
won’t be vaccinated and the babies won’t get clinical 
cards, but they still continued to deliver at home. 
Maybe we should look for other means, like fining 
them. We should tell them that those who deliver at 
home will be fined 
Denying of live birth 
cards and vaccination to 






































Last year there was a clinical officer who used to tell 
women that if they give birth at home they will be 
charged a fine…He was just saying that to scare them. 
If you tell them that, they are afraid to get the fine. So 
up till this day there is no one who gives birth at home 
Using threats of fines, to 
scare women and 
encourage them to deliver 
at health facilities 
We heard that at “Dispensary B” they have more 
deliveries these days, so we asked ourselves how are 
they doing it? How come they are getting safe 
deliveries, how are they doing it? After inquiring about 
their successes we are now educating our colleagues. 
(…) If she won’t deliver here, then she won’t get a 
clinical card for the baby. So it is just an educational 
competition.  
Learning from other 
facilities to deny mothers 





When we go for seminars we sometimes ask what 
others do to sensitize the people. So whatever you hear 
from others, if you haven’t tried it yet, then you should 
also attempt it to see how it works, (…).  
Meeting places are 
channels to learn new 
strategies for increasing 
facility deliveries 
I don’t think fining the mother is a good approach. We 
should rather educate women by telling them the 
consequences of delivering at home. There are many 
ways to mobilize them like telling them that they won’t 
be given a birth card at the dispensary.  
 
Proper health education 









 They (women) come here because we sensitize 
expecting mothers (…) We tell them that here the 
equipment is sterilized well compared to that used at 
home, which is not sterilized. They just hang the 
gloves to dry which is very risky, it can lead to AIDS 
transmission. Once they hear that they can get AIDS, 
they come in large numbers. 
Educating women on the 
benefits of facility 
delivery and risks of home 
delivery 
The community here is different from that one (where 
they fine patients). Here, people are quite tricky just a 
minor thing and he/she will go to the village 
administration or to the Councillor to report! You ask 
yourself why you should cause all that? 
Some communities report 







2.5.2 Qualitative content analysis  
Graneheim and Lundman [250] provide a concrete analytical framework to analyze 
and synthesize qualitative data moving from manifest to latent content. The process 
as always in qualitative data analysis started with a thorough familiarization of data 
[249] by reading the transcripts several times. After this familiarization stage, 
transcripts were uploaded into OpenCode 3.6 to continue with the analysis. 
Paragraphs and pieces of the text referring to specific experiences were then 
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identified forming meaning units. The meaning units, at manifest level, were then 
coded. The various codes were refined and sorted into categories [250]. Some 
transcripts at this stage were coded together with a PhD colleague, which was 
important in enhancing the quality of the process and inter-coder agreement [252, 
253]. The underlying meaning of the categories (latent content) was formulated into 
themes [250], which were presented as results in the paper I and II. Table 9 shows an 
example of how the process of analysis moved from meaning units to themes.  
Table 9: Examples of meaning units, condensed meaning units, sub-themes and 
themes in qualitative content analysis developed for Paper III 
 
Category: bonus distribution concerns in OpenCode 3.6 
Meaning unit Condensed 
meaning unit  
Description close 





The report for RBF comes from RCH every 
end of the month, but when the bonus come 
it is shared equally, even with security guards 
RCH staff do more 
work 
RBF indicators 

































I think it is a normal problem for human to 
fight for money. Sometimes you see 
someone who doesn’t even put an effort at 





is a problem 
RCH’s work is important but they cannot 
accomplish this task alone, why then do they 
need more bonus than anyone else. Everyone 
deserves the same RBF bonus.  
Flat rates are fair 
‘everyone toils’ 
A flat rate need 
to be used for 
RBF bonuses 
When we sit and try to solve our problems 
here concerning RBF bonus, the RCH staff 
do not support me because RBF favors them. 
I see this program has some negative 
impacts. Just imagine you have a family and 
you give food to one of your child while the 







We normally get our bonuses too late. 
Sometimes, some people can get their money 
early while others get it late and we wonder 
how this is possible 
The need for RBF 










Sometimes we do good work and report good 
data, but during the verification process, 
somehow we always end up with lower 
figures. This affects our RBF bonus money. 
We don’t know what they take into 
consideration 
Data is not captured 
properly 
RBF data is not 
captured 
properly 
The thing I don’t like about RBF is that it 
doesn’t consider the workload. As you can 
see we are a dispensary here but we do a lot 
and serve many people, …sometimes more 
than a health centre but when RBF bonus 
money come they don’t  consider that 
workload or the number of people we serve 
Target setting not 
fair 
The criteria for 
setting RBF 




2.6 Philosophical and ethical considerations 
Ethics and reflections on epistemological questions are an integral part of good 
science. When following a qualitative case study design which aims to understand a 
study phenomenon in its ‘real-life’ situation [218], it entails the researcher to be in 
constant contact with research participants [254, 255]. Although this is an advantage 
in acquiring in-depth knowledge for a case study [219], it raises ethical challenges 
and concerns on knowledge production. This section outlines these concerns and how 
they were handled in the study.  
2.6.1 Epistemological paradigm 
In science it is important to reflect on how knowledge is created and constructed. 
Reality is not some objectifiable truth waiting to be discovered out there, through a 
positivist scientific inquiry [256]. Reality is socially constructed [257], and in order to 
tap into this reality there is need to work in close collaboration with research 
participants, allowing them to tell their stories, present their experiences and 
worldviews [221]. A case study naturally relies on context specific knowledge [253, 
258], and therefore a constructionist view on knowledge fits well into its design 
[221]. The epistemological roots of this study are therefore in the constructionism 
paradigm as also encouraged by leading scholars on case studies such as Merriam 
[259] and Stake [260, 261]. Besides the constructionism paradigm being in tandem 
with case studies, the paradigm allows the researcher to be reflexive, knowing that he 
or she is a tool in the research process. My constant awareness and reflections on 
these epistemological questions during the research process helped in facilitating 
trustworthiness in this study.  
2.6.2 Ethical clearance  
Ethics clearance was sought through the National Institute for Medical Research 
(NIMR/HQ/R.8a/Vol.IX/1515) (appendix X). Additionally in order to increase the 
involvement of native Tanzanian researchers in the research project, I approached 
Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), which provided me with a collaborating partner, a 
senior researcher at the Institute with qualitative researcher experience. As a 
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requirement from IHI, my research proposal was submitted to the Ifakara Institutional 
Review Board and granted institutional clearance [IHI/IRB/No: 24-2012] (appendices 
XI). Therefore during data collection periods, IHI could monitor if the project was 
not violating research ethics and guidelines in the country. In Norway, the study did 
not require ethical clearance, but was however, registered by the Data Protection 
Official for Research at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
 
2.6.3 Consent, confidentiality, anonymity and harm 
Participants in this study were informed about the research and its objectives. 
Participation in the research was voluntary and participants were informed about their 
right to withdraw from the study at any point. Informed consent forms were prepared 
in both English and Swahili to facilitate access to research participants (appendices 
XII and XIII). Policy makers and development experts tended to sign and return the 
consent forms, while frontline health workers and health service users preferred to 
give oral consent. However, according to Davies [262], it is the participants’ 
voluntary acceptance to take part in the research which is of importance, and not 
whether it is given orally or in writing. In cases where I used gatekeepers to recruit 
research participants, for example, health workers and health service users, particular 
attention was paid that consent was obtained from the research participants 
themselves. In addition, confidentiality was facilitated, which is challenging when 
using gatekeepers [263]. For example, health facility leadership may at times show 
some curiosity wanting to know what would have been talked about in IDIs or FGDs. 
Under these circumstances I would use my skills to politely refuse to reveal such 
information. Facilitating confidentiality and anonymity in social research is important 
in lessening the risk of harming research participants [264].    
 
It was explained to research participants that the IDIs and FDGs will be recorded for 
academic use only, without the use of names that can lead to the identification of 
participants. Data collected was anonymized by labeling health facilities by letters, 
and informants by titles. For policy makers, whose identity could have been revealed 
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by using their job titles, I referred to them by using their work organizations in the 
study. However I did not guarantee them anonymity as they would be still identified 
based on their expertise on RBF or on their opinions on the subject. They too were 
aware of this and some chose not to participate in the study or requested us not to 
record certain information (or not to record at all), or they would tell us not to use 
certain information during the writing process. While this was frustrating sometimes 
not to record or use the information collected during the study, it was more important 
to respect the rights of research participants. 
2.6.4 Dissemination in local settings 
In lay language some researchers have been seen to smash and grab research data. 
That is when researchers collect data for their own benefit with no interest of 
extending some kinds of benefits to communities involved. A number of promising 
models to extend research benefits to research participants such as community 
engagement, are emerging [265]. Given the nature of this study and its main aim of 
generating policy relevant information, I used the dissemination of results as a means 
of offering benefits to some of our research participants. The implementation of RBF 
in Tanzania is on-going and as a result any kind of evidence is needed for immediate 
use. A number of ways were used to facilitate that policy makers get quick access to 
the results, including, a dissemination trip to Dar es Salaam and Rufiji in Tanzania, in 
January 2016. Additionally, alerts for published articles were sent, unpublished 
manuscripts were provided upon request, and popular science articles were published 
both in Tanzania and Norway, the RBF funding country, were used as strategies for 
disseminating research findings. Unfortunately I could not disseminate directly to 
health workers and users but I facilitated that policy makers had access to their views 
as expressed in IDIs and FDGs through the representative extracts that are used in my 
published and unpublished work.    
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3 Results  
3.1 Paper I 
Introducing payment for performance in the health sector of Tanzania- the 
policy process 
The introduction of RBF in the health sector of Tanzania was controversial. The 
actors involved in the process, which include donors in the Health Basket Fund, the 
Government of Tanzania and high level politicians outside the Health Basket Fund 
fought for their values and interests. The process was characterized by high political 
pressure from the Norwegian and Tanzanian political leadership. On the Norwegian 
side, the Tanzanian RBF agenda was initially driven directly by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs through the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, without the 
technical assistance from Norad. Norad was brought into the discussions later when 
the agenda faced resistance from other donor agencies in the health partnership.  
Our informants noted that the process of introducing RBF was top-down and both 
middle level bureaucrats and technical staff from the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare in Tanzania and Norad felt left out in the initial stages but were then 
pressured to introduce and support the RBF agenda in the Health Basket Fund. In the 
Health Basket Fund, the RBF agenda was heavily resisted by other partners, among 
them Danida, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and Irish Aid. The 
main point of contention was that the RBF agenda was being pushed in to the 
Tanzanian context when there was little evidence to support that such mechanisms 
work in low income settings. In addition, it was interpreted as utterly disrespectful of 
Norway, which was just rejoining the Health Basket Fund in 2007 after pulling out in 
2002, to introduce such a bold and contentious agenda which would affect how the 
partnership works. It was argued by other partners in the Health Basket Fund that 
RBF was introducing ‘neoliberal’ values in the health sector of Tanzania.  
Faced with the enormous resistance, Norway showed willingness to find a common 
ground with other partners. However, the Government of Tanzania was adamant to 
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continue pursuing the RBF agenda, and in 2009 it launched its local RBF initiative, 
which is the subject of Paper II. Donors reached a consensus not to support the 
Government’s local initiative. The Government of Tanzania went ahead with the 
national roll-out, but with no funding the initiative was less than successful and was 
realized in a few districts, including Mvomero. At this point, alliances in the Health 
Basket Fund were shifting with the World Bank and USAID supporting Norad on the 
RBF agenda and other partners showing willingness to learn more about the RBF 
programme. The donors in the partnership agreed to try RBF as a pilot in one region.  
It should be noted however, that the open support for RBF by the World Bank, the 
main financial contributor in the Health Basket Fund, was perceived as critical in 
moving the agenda forward. Meanwhile, the failure of the local RBF initiative 
prompted the Government of Tanzania to go back to the partnership and was 
prepared for a compromise. All partners reached a consensus for a pilot despite 
strained relations and in January 2011, the Pwani pilot was launched. Paper III 
presents the experiences from this donor-funded RBF pilot.  
3.2 Paper II 
When incentives work too well: locally implemented pay for performance (P4P) 
and adverse sanctions towards home birth in Tanzania- a qualitative study 
Payment for the local RBF in Mvomero did not follow the intended RBF programme 
design, health workers at health facilities were all given a flat rate instead of 
prioritizing RBF targets. However, although the health workers were paid a flat rate 
not based on actual results, we noted that this probably had little impact on how 
health workers behaved before the payment. This was so because they thought the 
payments were going to be based on the actual RBF design. Health workers were 
very grateful for receiving the bonuses despite that it was a reward for their effort. 
They perceived the RBF bonus as a gift (zawadi), something they could not demand 
but should be grateful for. The district health administration reported that flat rates 
were used in bonus payments for two reasons, firstly for equity and fairness concern, 
and secondly due to the lack of capacity to properly run the RBF programme. It was 
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revealed to us by the district leadership that RBF had been discontinued in Mvomero, 
but none of the health workers were aware of this and as a result, they were still 
working expecting new bonus payments.  
It was noted that the attitudes of health workers towards RBF changed before and 
after they had received the payment. In 2010, before the bonus, a large number of our 
informants were skeptical of RBF. They perceived RBF as a vertical intervention 
with little impact on health outcomes. In addition, the majority of health workers 
pointed before RBF payments to severe shortages of medical supplies and equipment 
and suggested that RBF money could instead be used to procure such supplies, which 
will make their work much easier and benefit health service users. In 2011, after the 
bonus payments the majority of health workers preferred getting bonuses over paying 
for medical supplies. In 2010 some informants were also cautious that RBF may lead 
to unethical behavior. There were, however, some informants who argued that RBF is 
a viable strategy to improve health services.  
Both in 2010 and 2011, some health workers perceived RBF as a good strategy to 
foster cooperation and teamwork at health facilities. There was a realization among 
health workers that the only way an individual can benefit from RBF bonuses was by 
being a team member, as payments were supposed to be based on health facility 
performance. This was noted to also encourage peer monitoring, which was seen as 
important in reducing absenteeism and improving work morale. Some health workers 
were keen to compete with neighboring health facilities in order to bring in more 
service users and meet RBF performance targets. In this regard health workers 
revealed a number of strategies they were using to attract more service users. Some of 
these strategies were positive, including improving health education, extending 
outreach programmes and improving their attitudes towards service users including 
using appropriate and respectful language.    
However, it was revealed that health workers could only go as far as resources 
allowed them to attract service users with positive strategies. In resource constrained 
settings health workers may resort to coercive strategies or sanctions. It was reported 
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by health workers that some sanctions were applied, especially towards those giving 
birth at home, in order to increase facility deliveries which was one of the RBF 
indicators. No health worker confirmed to us that their facility was applying these 
negative sanctions, but they pointed out that neighboring facilities did it. However, 
they acknowledged that they themselves used threats to discourage home deliveries. 
Such threats would include charging those who gave birth at home up to TZS 10 000 
(approximately USD 5), or deny the mothers a live birth card. Some health workers, 
mainly low-level cadres such as medical attendants, considered that fining women is 
a good idea as long as it encouraged facility deliveries. Focus group discussions with 
mothers collaborated that such sanctions were indeed applied, and not only threats. 
The district health office was also aware of such threats and acknowledged that 
regardless of whether the sanctions were real or not they nevertheless scare mothers 
who would have given birth home to seek post-natal care, as a result particular 
attention is needed on these practices that may discourage the utilization of and 
access to care.  
3.3 Paper III 
The inescapable question of fairness in Pay for Performance bonus distribution: Health 
workers’ experiences in Tanzania- a qualitative study 
 
The RBF payment system of the donor funded Pwani RBF pilot was seen by involved 
health personnel as fundamentally unfair. Health workers were paid differently 
depending on whether they contributed directly to RBF indicators or not. The 
reproductive and child health (RCH) staff, who contributed directly to RBF 
indicators, were paid more than non-RCH staff. Bonus payment was therefore 
contingent on effort and results towards RBF targets. However, it is important to note 
that at some health centres and dispensaries all health workers were paid an equal 
bonus, as it was argued that at lower level health facilities the demarcation of tasks 




The majority of RCH staff who were paid equal bonuses with non-RCH staff at 
health centres and dispensaries considered the payment system as unfair. They argued 
that they were the ones contributing directly to the achievement of RBF targets and 
therefore deserved more than their non-RCH counterparts. They were aware that 
RCH staff at some facilities in the district were paid more than non-RCH staff, and 
therefore were not happy to be treated differently. On the other hand, the RCH staff 
who were paid more than non-RCH staff perceived the payment system as fair. They 
reported that the RBF programme had increased their workload, and that being paid 
more was a recognition for this and therefore justifiable. In some cases, the RCH staff 
even complained that the differences in the bonuses between them and non-RCH 
were very small, and they would like to see the gap increased.  
 
The non-RCH staff, who were getting less RBF bonus payments, reported that the 
payment systems was fundamentally unfair. They argued that like RCH staff, they put 
a lot of effort into doing their duties; hence there was no justification for the unequal 
distribution of RBF bonuses. They reasoned that it was not their fault that all RBF 
indicators were drawn from RCH. They therefore perceived their smaller bonuses as 
a punishment for factors out of their control. Non- RCH staff reported to be 
demotivated by the bonus payment system, as the system was disregarding them 
while favouring the RCH staff. It was reported that the payment system was causing 
tensions among health workers. The leadership at health facilities was concerned that 
RBF was impacting negatively on social relations and teamwork, which in turn 
greatly affected service delivery and quality. Some health workers and the majority of 
health facility leadership suggested that a flat rate across board was the fairest way to 
distribute RBF bonuses.  However, the RCH staff vigorously refused this suggestion, 
arguing that the payments were based on merit. 
 
Besides the bonus payment system, it was also reported that some elements in the 
management of the RBF programme were unfair. It was reported by some health 
workers that data verification was not done in an accurate way. They noted many 
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cases where reported data and paid bonuses were different, which was considered to 
be a loss on their part. In addition, some health workers reported that bonus payments 
were regularly delayed. The district leadership collaborated to these reports about 
delays and explained that this was a pilot and an efficient bonus disbursement system 
was not yet in place. However, they were working towards such a system. For 
example, it was explained that some health facilities did not have bank accounts 
where the money could be deposited or that the committees responsible for verifying 
health facility payments were taking too long time to do so. The study revealed that 
the bonus system that was followed by the Pwani RBF pilot was by and large 
perceived as highly unfair which may have impacted on social relations at the 
workplace. Therefore, contextual factors are important to consider in an RBF 







4 Discussion  
4.1 Methodology  
This study builds on the knowledge that was gained from my master’s studies on 
RBF in Tanzania (cf Chimhutu, 2011). To date, I have followed the RBF story as it 
unfolded for a period spanning six years (between 2010 and 2016), from agenda 
setting, implementation and evaluation. This study aimed at sharing this story, by 
providing an in-depth picture. In methodological terms this attempt fits a case study 
design [219]. During this period, I have been working with a research team (academic 
supervisors, research collaborators and co-authors) with in-depth contextual 
knowledge of Tanzania, which has greatly benefitted me as a researcher. However, 
the credibility of research study is not only based on knowing the context, or on 
knowing the study phenomenon but crucially on how a researcher can document the 
procedures that were followed during the research process to facilitate trustworthiness 
[250], including limitations of the study.  
It is noteworthy that case study as a methodology has been questioned [253] on 
aspects of reliability and validity [217]. The following section gives an account on the 
procedures I followed in trying to achieve scientific rigor, with full recognition that I 
was an instrument in the process of generating this knowledge [266].  
4.1.1 Trustworthiness in qualitative research 
There is a lack of consensus on which concepts to use when describing 
trustworthiness in science. Quantitative tradition uses concepts such as validity, 
reliability and generalizability, while the qualitative research tradition is increasingly 
adopting the concepts of credibility, dependability and transferability to describe 
trustworthiness [250, 266, 267]. I will use concepts linked to qualitative research 
inquiry to explain procedures followed in improving trustworthiness of this study.  
4.1.1.1 Credibility 
In qualitative research, the researcher is seen as an instrument in the research process, 
and therefore, the credibility of the study depends on the steps taken by the researcher 
to ensure scientific rigor [266]. Decisions such as the focus of the study, selection of 
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the research context, research participants and the approach to data collection all have 
a bearing on the credibility of the study [266]. In order to capture various experiences 
with RBF in the Tanzanian health sector, three categories of informants were 
purposively selected. These categories comprised policy actors (mainly members of 
the Health Basket Fund), health workers (the health workers receiving the 
performance bonuses) and health service users (the intended beneficiaries of RBF). 
These three categories of research participants were critical in understanding the 
introduction and use of performance incentives in the health sector of Tanzania. To 
further ensure a rich variation of perspectives within these three groups, additional 
sub- categories were sought. For example, when it comes to health workers, effort 
was made to ensure that the views of both health workers directly targeted by RBF 
(Reproductive and Child Health [RCH] services), those working with non-RCH 
services, and non-medical staff were included.  
Triangulation is seen as an important aspect in qualitative research to increase the 
accuracy and credibility of the research [222, 223]. In this study, triangulation was 
central to ensure credibility of the study, not only was triangulation important through 
the purposive selection of study participants but also by using different methods in 
data collection. Various methods were used for data collection and these include IDIs, 
FGDs, policy document reviews as well as being a participant and an observer during 
the course of the fieldwork.  
During the data analysis process, clear procedures were followed to generate 
presented results which facilitate the credibility of the study. In this regard, this study 
used illustrations showing the analysis procedures, as presented in tables 8 and 9 
under data analysis section in chapter 2. While illustrations make it easy for readers 
to follow and understand the analysis procedure, it is also important to expand on 
how the coding exercise was carried. Coding for paper I and III was done with the 
help of a PhD colleague in four workshops, as part of an advanced qualitative 
methods course, at the Department of Health Promotion and Development, University 
of Bergen. After each coding session, we met and discussed the differences and 
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similarities that were emerging from our coding. While four sessions were not 
enough to code all the transcripts, the exercise was important in creating an initial 
coding framework and to serve as a reflective exercise reminding me the essence of 
keeping my codes grounded in the views expressed by research participants. More 
often than not as researchers we are tempted to quickly reach a higher level of 
abstraction in the coding exercise (based on our theoretical and in-depth knowledge 
of a study phenomenon) which provides a great danger of ignoring the voices of 
research participants. After developing an initial coding framework, transcripts were 
uploaded into OpenCode 3.6 software for data management [248], where the coding 
exercise continued.  
Analysis for paper II was done in close collaboration with a research collaborator 
(and co-author for paper II, who had collected the data in 2011), a senior researcher at 
the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), with vast experience of conducting ethnographic 
work in Tanzania and broad knowledge in qualitative data analysis. We followed the 
same procedures as outlined above until we reached an agreement on which themes 
were coming out of our data, and used these to present results using representative 
extracts as expressed by research participants. It is generally agreed that inter-coder 
agreement in qualitative research facilitates credibility to the analysis process [222, 
266]. In addition, the outcome of the analysis process was shared with the research 
team (academic supervisors) in an effort to increase the transparency and credibility 
of research findings. Moreover, all the papers in this study have direct representative 
extracts, which according to Graneheim and Lundman [250] improves credibility of 
the results and the analysis process.     
4.1.1.2 Dependability 
Dependability is another concept that is important in increasing the trustworthiness of 
qualitative studies. This deals with the consistency over time in data collection and 
decisions the researcher repeatedly made during the research process [250]. In this 
study, topic guides and interview guides were used, with the realization that 
important insights salient to the research topic will emerge during the process of data 
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collection. The guides contained broad questions regarding the phenomenon, which 
during the course of the study narrowed down to specific insights. For example, in 
paper II I was able to pursue the issue of home birth sanctions after it was reported in 
focus groups with mothers. However, the general objectives of the study largely 
remained the same, and even slight changes were communicated in the research team, 
which scholars in this area encourage [250].  
4.1.1.3 Transferability  
Transferability is important for the trustworthiness of research findings. 
Transferability refers to the extent to which findings can be transferred to other 
settings or groups [268]. First and foremost it has to be stated that Tanzania is a big 
country and that each region and district has its own specific characteristics. 
Therefore it is important to scrutinize the study districts noting their own unique 
characteristics. This according to Malterud [269] is important as it may reveal 
limitations for the applicability of study findings in other contexts. Seale [270] also 
posits that a detailed description of the context can facilitate informed decisions on 
whether research results are transferable to other contexts.   
 
Rufiji shares many common characteristics as many typical districts in Tanzania. For 
example it is heavily dependent on agriculture, having the same local government and 
administrative structures. An important distinction about Rufiji is its delta zone, a 
result of its closeness to the coast. The delta area is hard to reach and faces enormous 
challenges in providing health services, almost a quarter of dispensaries in Rufiji are 
located in this area, signifying its vastness. While Pwani region scores well above 
national averages in many health outcomes, including maternal and child health, 
Rufiji performs worse than other districts in the region, selected health status 
indicators for Rufiji and Mvomero districts are provided under study setting in the 
methods chapter.  
 
Mvomero relies heavily on agriculture and is in Morogoro region, which 
comparatively has a worse health status profile than Pwani region. The most notable 
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aspect of the district is a significant population of pastoral communities of the Masaai 
and Sukuma tribes. These groups have limited access health services, as some walk 
up to 15 km to access functional health facilities. Additionally, in the eastern region 
of Tanzania, Morogoro has the highest number of women (0.5%) receiving antenatal 
care from village health workers and traditional birth attendants. These unique 
characteristics may have influenced the study results in ways unknown to the 
researcher, and therefore making the results not relevant in other contexts.  
 
However, our study builds on a good case for transferability. Social-cultural factors 
were noted to be important dimensions to consider in RBF programmes as these 
influence how and why these programmes are perceived and experienced in a 
particular way. This lesson is valuable across cultural contexts. Our results can also 
be generalized as country experiences in a low-income setting, and therefore can 
inform policy makers in similar contexts of potential pitfalls in RBF programmes. 
Moreover, with theoretical backing and well explained research process, readers can 
make a decision as to whether these findings can be transferred to other settings. To 
this end, it is important to note that although qualitative research facilitates 
transferability [250], it is not an end in itself. 
4.1.2 Language barrier and the interpreter effect   
There are a number of challenges in carrying out research in contexts where you do 
not have enough linguistic competency [271]. My competency in Swahili is limited. 
However, I originally come from Zimbabwe and can speak Shona language which 
shares some similarities with Swahili. My experience in Tanzania is that whenever I 
stay for more than a month at a time, my level of Swahili significantly improves to 
the level of following conversations and converse at colloquial level. However, in 
order to collect quality data, I worked with native research assistants. My research 
collaborator at Ifakara Health Institute (IHI) has been very helpful in finding suitable 
research assistants. In most cases I have worked with former IHI research assistants 
who are not only knowledgeable on the study context but also the study phenomenon, 
as IHI conducts official RBF evaluation studies in the country. Despite having 
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knowledgeable research assistants, relying on them influence research in a number of 
ways, including introducing new nuances in the research [271, 272]. A useful strategy 
I often employed in checking quality, was to make sure that the first interviews are 
listened to and/or translated by my research collaborator (or under his supervision) at 
IHI, who I have been working with on the topic of RBF for a period of six years. This 
strategy helped a lot to see if the right or intended questions are being addressed and 
in identifying new unexpected information that may be coming out of IDIs and FGDs 
worthy exploring further. However, given the exploratory nature of qualitative 
methods, limited linguistic competency is a significant limitation.   
4.1.3 Role of researcher 
It is important to reflect on my own role as a researcher and how this may have 
influenced the study. The researcher can influence data and findings in many ways at 
various stages of the research process [273]. Intersubjective elements such as gender, 
perceived social class, values and theoretical background may influence a study in a 
number of ways unnoticed by the researcher. However, through the process of 
reflexivity researchers can evaluate ways in which these intersubjective elements may 
have influenced their research [274].  
When conducting FGDs with mothers, sometimes it was difficult for them to be 
conversant in my presence. This may be related to a number of issues, such as socio-
cultural and religious beliefs and values related to gender and gendered hierarchies. 
The topic guides had discussion issues about the quality of maternal health care, 
which touches on sensitive issues. As a male researcher, some mothers were not 
comfortable to discuss these issues in my presence. In these cases I had to leave the 
focus group to my research assistant who was a female. Leaving the research assistant 
to facilitate the FGD, even when she was trained, may still have affected the quality 
of the data collected.  
In addition, my background, concerning both theoretical assumptions and practical 
work experience plays a big part in how I experience and interpret the social world. 
Theoretically, I am someone who reads literature on development processes and their 
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impact on social justice and equity. This has an impact on what phenomenon I choose 
to pursue in my research work and from what angle. Moreover, I have been working 
in the civil society and very engaged in political and student activism in Zimbabwe, 
promoting grassroots citizens’ rights, their participation in decision making and 
political processes. This history of grassroots mobilization and advocacy reflects on 
my research work and can influence the type of knowledge I produce. 
Another important issue to reflect on is my lack of professional medical experience or 
training. When health workers are communicating they may use terms and language 
not easily accessible to someone with no training in the field. When this happens for 
example during an interview, you may miss an opportunity to follow-up on an 
interesting dimension. Moreover, coming from Norway, a country funding the RBF 
initiative in Tanzania may have influenced research findings. Health workers in 
Tanzania work under difficult circumstances. In that context, additional financial 
incentives are important in their lives. When research participants know that the 
researcher is coming from a programme funding country, they may perceive you as 
an evaluator and therefore provide overly positive views (or negative ones depending 
on their motivations) hoping that their views may influence the direction of the 
programme. 
Moreover, during the course of the fieldwork I felt as an insider-outsider. Qualitative 
case study relies on in-depth knowledge of the context and therefore the outsider 
feeling may affect the process of data collection, for example the limited linguistic 
competence as noted above. However, as someone born in Zimbabwe, there are a lot 
of practices I share socially and culturally with some people of Tanzania. Even 
politically, Zimbabwe in early days of independence pursued some Nyerere inspired 
socialist policies. Tanzania also played a critical role in Zimbabwe’s liberation 
struggle. With all this I felt as an insider and this greatly aided the research process. 
Therefore every time I go to Tanzania, I feel like I am home, away from home, 
vacillating between the insider-outsider duality.  
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4.2 Discussion of results 
The growing number of RBF programmes in low-income countries cannot be 
overlooked. This study has shown that understanding processes behind the 
implementation of these programmes is critical to understanding why and how such 
initiatives fail or succeed in different settings. The study also explored the social 
dimension of health workers’ motivation involved in the RBF programmes, how and 
why they behaved in the way that was reported in the study and the possible 
implications of such actions and/or behavior to the quality of care. This section of the 
dissertation will therefore, raise discussion points that were prominent in the three 
papers.  
4.2.1 Protracted policy process and partnership politics 
Paper I showed that the process leading to the introduction of RBF in Tanzania was 
long and contested. Activities in the Health Basket Fund during this process raise 
fundamental questions about partnerships in development aid. Partnerships are often 
seen in the literature in binary terms as either ‘strong or weak’ or as ‘instrumental or 
genuine’ [179, 186]. According to Crawford [180] there are four principles to be 
observed in genuine partnerships.  
 
Paper I showed that from the beginning the partners in the Health Basket Fund lacked 
mutual cooperation, which is Crawford’s first characteristics of a good partnership. 
There were two groups fighting for their interests and values, with one group 
supporting and the other opposing RBF. Not only was there no mutual cooperation in 
the beginning but alliances continually shifted during the course of the process, 
making it even harder to achieve mutual cooperation. Norad and the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare fought together to introduce the RBF agenda 
in the Health Basket Fund but later disagreed on the nature and scope of the RBF 
programme. While Norad and other donors preferred a pilot, the government of 
Tanzania was adamant to launch a national RBF roll-out [72].  
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Tanzania went ahead launching the local RBF addressed in Paper II, which can be 
interpreted as the country’s right to choose her own policy option, the second 
principle of partnerships [180]. However, the development partners withdrew their 
funding demonstrating their power, which according to Mercer [186] is insidious. For 
donors, this is a strategy that works in whipping local national governments in line 
particularly in contexts where the countries are heavily reliant on development aid 
[177, 187, 275]. Tanzania is a country known to have a weak negotiating capital 
when it comes to aid. Her debt and balance-of-payment crises in the 1980s gave 
donors the opportunity to expand their influence [276]. While on one hand the 
country is referred to as the unofficial darling of donors, getting generous handouts 
[275], the country on the other hand pays for this by being subservient to its 
development partners [177]. This warrants a scrutiny of the type of partnership which 
exists in the health sector of Tanzania. Abrahamsen [181] raised a fundamental 
question when it comes to the rhetoric of equal partnerships: is it possible to achieve 
them when one party is holding the purse and the other a begging bowl? [181]. The 
insidious expression of power in the partnership is also demonstrated when the World 
Bank, the largest funder of the Health Basket Fund, changed its position and put RBF 
as a condition in the partnership. This move by the Bank was seen as critical in 
moving the RBF agenda forward. However, this ability by the World Bank to 
coalesce other partners to support the RBF agenda contributes to portraying the 
partnership as purely self-serving and instrumental. This expression of power 
disregards Crawford’s third principle of equal partnerships, which emphasizes having 
an equitable and meaningful relationship [180].  
 
Crawford’s fourth and final principle of genuine partnerships is the need for time and 
commitment [180]. This is important in building trust. Norway, which was rejoining 
the partnership in 2007 after leaving in 2002, was accused of quickly introducing a 
controversial agenda in the partnership, before gaining trust from her partners. This 
action was interpreted by other partners as being mischievous and disrespectful. 
Using this as an example, I argue that this fourth principle was not observed either. It 
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is therefore clear that according to Crawford’s four principles of partnerships, the 
Health Basket Fund partnership may be classified as weak or instrumental. This may 
explain why the process resulted in frustrations, tensions, mistrust, and above all, in 
Tanzania failing to pursue her preferred option.  
 
The instrumental use of partnership is particularly striking and raises fundamental 
questions on how developing countries can meet the needs of their people when they 
lack a voice in development partnerships or when expressing such voice calls for 
retributive measures. At the same time, rhetoric in development aid documents such 
as Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003), Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) [189, 277, 278], 
continue to emphasize on country ownership. Each succeeding declaration claims to 
have learnt from the failures of the past declaration, but practice largely remain the 
same as examplified by the type of partnership which exist in the health sector of 
Tanzania.  
 
One strong critic of development aid to the global south, Dambisa Moyo, has put 
forward a thesis that aid is dead [12]. She argues that aid is not doing any good to the 
global south, if anything it is propping up corrupt regimes, while subverting the 
citizens’ rights of holding their governments accountable [12]. In her argument, the 
relationship between a donor and recipient country can be seen as symbiotic, but not 
necessarily good for democracy and development [12]. Tanzania presents a classic 
case of a country caught up in this conundrum where the country has to ingratiate 
development aid in exchange of being a laboratory of projects and reforms whose 
effects are unproven. To this end, Therkildsen [60] diagnosed the country with two 
diseases, of projectitis and reformitis.  
4.2.2 High political pressure with high stakes  
There is a general consensus that RBF programmes in low-income contexts were 
spurred by the need to meet or speed up progress towards health related MDGs, 
especially goals 4 and 5 [6, 15, 106]. This need may help to explain the high political 
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pressure towards the RBF programme in Tanzania. The interest can be explained by 
the concept of agenda-setting circumstances from Grindle and Thomas’ framework 
on political economy of reform [279]. The framework is useful in analyzing policy 
reforms and has the following key elements: environmental context, the agenda-
setting circumstances, and policy characteristics [279, 280]. According to the 
framework, a policy agenda-setting circumstance can be perceived to be either a 
crisis situation or non-crisis. When it is perceived to be a crisis situation, there will be 
the involvement of policy elites [279].  
 
High level politicians who include the former Prime Minister of Norway, Jens 
Stoltenberg, and the former President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, were very much 
involved in setting the RBF agenda as reported in paper I. Their involvement can be 
interpreted as what Grindle and Thomas [279] call high stakes which are involved if 
non action is taken on agenda-setting circumstances that are considered to be a crisis 
situation. I argue that failure to meet health-related MDGs presented high stakes for 
national governments (Tanzania), and also for countries perceived to have been 
leading the MDG 4 and 5 agenda such as Norway [281-284]. High political will is 
important for reforms to be prioritized [164, 279], but if perceived as intrusive, it may 
lead to unintended consequences, as it did in the case in question. During the RBF 
policy process in Tanzania, technical people and policy experts felt alienated in the 
early stages of the RBF agenda and then pressured either to support or implement it. 
As shown in paper I, Norad was invited into the process quite late by its Foreign 
Ministry. This happened even though Norad offers the Ministry important technical 
expertise. This further suggests the highly politicized nature of the decision to 
implement RBF in Tanzania. I argue that the immense political pressure delayed the 
RBF policy process in Tanzania rather than aiding it. In addition, both the political 
pressure and the misunderstandings in the partnership led Tanzania to implement two 
RBF programmes, which are discussed in the next section  
69 
 
4.2.3 Implementation differences and socio-cultural values  
Paper II and Paper III presented two different RBF initiatives in two districts of 
Tanzania, Mvomero and Rufiji. Paper II presented the experiences with the local RBF 
in Mvomero, while Paper III presented the donor-funded RBF in Rufiji. There are 
clear differences in how these two initiatives were managed. First and foremost, for 
the Mvomero RBF, the Government of Tanzania used its own resources and the 
district of Mvomero did not receive technical support at any stage. The programme 
did not adhere to its operational design, for example, no verification of data was 
carried out, and only sporadic monitoring was reported. In Rufiji, on the other hand, 
the RBF programme followed its operational design, and was managed by specialists 
from Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI). Data was verified, and there was 
monitoring and feedback on RBF performance indicators. Even though the donor-
funded RBF was better managed, there were substantial complaints about the 
verification process, payments, and workload among others.  
 
Paper II has shown that with no donor and technical support, the local authorities in 
Mvomero struggled to manage the RBF initiative. The failure by the Government of 
Tanzania to manage its local RBF programme ended up being implemented only in 
one district (Mvomero) raises questions about its ability to manage the RBF 
programme when it decides to scale-up the RBF programme and took over from 
CHAI. After all, Tanzania is a country with a history of over relying on donor support 
on reforms and programme implementation [60, 177]. A cost-effectiveness analysis 
study of the donor-funded Pwani pilot has since concluded that the cost to manage 
such programmes are substantial for Tanzania in particular and for low-income 
countries in general [122]. Therefore, as a country with a high level of donor-
dependency both in terms of aid and management of development projects [60, 187], 
it raises the fundamental question of the sustainability of RBF in Tanzania. As 
discussed above, donor countries prefer to set agendas at the expense of local national 
governments [179], and these agendas are mostly influenced by policy shifts in donor 
countries and not in recipient countries. Therefore if priorities or conditions change in 
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donor countries, there is a high likelihood that local national governments in recipient 
may not be able to sustain some of these reforms and programmes. The question of 
the sustainability of RBF programmes, in case donor countries withdraw external 
funding has been raised in the RBF literature [9] and it is worth pondering upon.  
 
In paper II it is demonstrated that the local authorities lacked capacity and technical 
competence to run the RBF initiative. Undue donor interference can also contribute to 
this inability of local institutions in building this competence. For example, 
Tanzania’s main argument for launching the local RBF was that the country wanted 
to learn by doing [69].While this muddling through approach [285] may be seen as 
wasteful and risky by donor agencies and countries, it may be a necessity for 
countries at this stage of development in developing enduring institutions and 
capacities. Uganda is a good example of a country in the region that failed to develop 
capacity and technical expertise in its local institutions before implementing a 
performance-based contracting programme, and as a result the programme failed 
[111]. In the Ugandan case, the inability to develop capacity was perceived to have 
been caused by the high speed at which the reform was carried by donors which did 
not give the country enough time for preparation [111]. Paper I has shown that 
although the policy process was long in Tanzania, most of the time was used in 
dealing with politics in the partnership while no one was pushing for capacity 
building. When the donor-funded RBF pilot started it was largely managed by 
external experts, with little involvement of the staff from the local institutions. This 
therefore means that Tanzania will likely face insurmountable obstacles when 
scaling-up RBF.  
 
Another important difference to note between the two RBF initiatives is that the 
bonus payment systems were different. The local RBF programme in Mvomero paid 
health workers a flat rate, while the donor-funded RBF in Rufiji paid according to 
work tasks. In paper II, health workers did not complain about the flat rate payment 
system, while in paper III the payment system was reported as unfair. According to 
71 
 
Folger [201] the distribution of money or goods at the workplace, if seen as unfair,  
can cause resentment (distributive injustice). In addition, procedures leading to the 
distribution modality can also cause procedural injustice. For example, in paper III 
non-RCH staff questioned the logic of RBF in prioritizing RCH services only, the 
prioritization which also led to the perceived unfair distribution of bonuses. The 
distribution of RBF bonuses in the donor-funded RBF was not only perceived as 
unfair but consequently affected the motivation of health workers. RBF studies form 
Benin [119] and Nepal [160] also reported that RBF bonuses can lead to a feeling of 
social injustice at workplace.  
 
When a group of workers perceive that another group has been favoured, it can 
diminish their intrinsic motivation. According to the Self-Determination Theory 
[196], health workers, just like all other humans, need to have a sense of relatedness, 
i.e., to have a close relationship with co-workers. If a bonus payment system alienates 
one group, it affects the social relations existing at the health facilities. In the health 
sector there is a lot of interdependency among and within different sections at health 
facilities. When social relations among workers are not good, it inevitably affects 
teamwork, which is significant in health care [286]. Not only did the non-RCH staff 
reported to be demotivated, they also felt unappreciated. This feeling may lead 
workers to question their competence at the workplace if their work tasks are not as 
valued as that of their colleagues with same level of training and qualifications. In 
this regard the bonus payment system did not only negatively affect the innate need 
for relatedness but they also led non-RCH staff into questioning the value of their 
competence. Bertone and Meessen [125] observed that excessive monitoring of RBF 
may be perceived as too controlling, and can also negatively affect the autonomy of 
health workers. To this end, Ryan and Deci postulates that when the three needs of 
relatedness, competence and autonomy are not nurtured in a social environment, the 
result is reduced intrinsic motivation and the impoverishment of well-being [199]. In 
the health sector, this may have negative impact on the quality of care provided to 
health service users and to the health outcomes. 
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In both papers II and III, the district and health facility leadership preferred paying 
the bonus through a flat rate, citing fairness concerns. Fairness is an important aspect 
in many social settings and certainly at workplaces [209, 287]. The socialist recent 
history based on the philosophy of African communal living, ujamaa, may further 
increase the emphasis put on this in Tanzania. Magrath and Nichter [15] emphasized 
the need to pay attention to the social and cultural contexts in RBF programmes, as 
these may partially explain why some RBF programmes succeed or fail. Different 
societies have different fairness principles that prevail in them. In theory, it can be 
argued that in a society that is libertarian [212], RBF programmes may be viewed as 
fair, as individuals in these societies may perceive the payments to be based on their 
performance and effort. On the other hand, in societies that are egalitarian [212], RBF 
can be seen as unfair because a health worker’s effort is not the only decisive factor 
that determines the achievement of RBF targets, or lack of it. 
 
While no state can be classified as strict egalitarian in modern times, principles of 
egalitarianism stand strong in socialist societies or those that once followed a socialist 
path. Such societies have a commonly shared belief that inequality is predominately 
rooted in an unfair social structure [212]. In a capitalist society, on the other hand, we 
assume RBF principles to find support, as the libertarian values recognize and reward 
individual effort and talent [288], even if this creates inequalities. One may counter 
argue that Tanzania has since fully embraced neo-liberalism after Nyerere. While this 
is a valid point, it has to be observed that the influence of Nyerere and his ideas are 
still relevant in the Tanzanian society of today and evoke a nostalgia [213]. 
Moreover, it has to be noted that Nyerere himself built his political ideas from an 
African philosophy of communal life, which encourages communalism and 
discourages individualism, a philosophy which endures in many local communities in 
sub-Saharan Africa until today.  
4.2.4 You pay for oranges and get lemons: unintended consequences of RBF 
Paper II and III demonstrated that RBF can change health worker behavior, and that 
this change can either be good or harmful to the quality of care and health service 
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users. External motivation, including financial incentives, have been documented to 
influence human behavior and negatively affect intrinsic motivation [198, 289]. In 
paper II, health workers reported different strategies used to attract service users. 
Some strategies were positive, including offering health education, improving staff 
attitudes and using appropriate and respectful language towards patients. However, 
health workers used these positive strategies only as far as resources could allow 
them. In a context where resources are limited [39, 52, 114], health workers were 
forced to used coercive strategies towards those giving birth at home, in order to meet 
the target on health facility deliveries. Although health workers maintained that the 
fines were threats and never applied, it was noted that the threats were likely to have 
prevented those who had home birth to seek post-natal care, out of fear that they will 
be sanctioned. RBF studies from Rwanda reported that health workers prioritized 
profitable RBF targeted service areas [150], and neglected non-rewarded services 
[118]. Therefore, as the principal-agent theory predicts, financial incentives can 
indeed change health workers’ behavior, but the conundrum is to what extent is this 
change positive. 
  
Unintended consequences of RBF programmes have been reported for up to two 
decades in different settings [89, 93-95]. Nevertheless, RBF initiatives are spreading 
rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa. This does not mean that there are no success stories of 
RBF initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa reported in studies [133, 147]. Most of these 
studies that report positive results in the region are from Rwanda. Therefore 
particular attention needs to be paid on factors that make Rwanda a stellar example of 
RBF success. A recent qualitative study from Rwanda by Sayinzoga and Bijlmakers 
[290] on the drivers for the health sector performance has warned policy makers and 
scholars not to attribute the success the country has seen in the health sector to a 
single intervention [290]. They argue that if only one intervention is copied from 
Rwanda, e.g. RBF, and fast-tracked somewhere else it is likely to fail as the robust 
model of Rwanda in the health sector is a result of a holistic approach [290]. This 
argument is in line with our study that an in-depth look into social-cultural and 
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contextual factors is important in understanding the success or failure of RBF 
interventions. Additionally, Ssengooba [111] noted that RBFs seem to exemplify one 
of those interventions being promoted as a success when in reality its performance in 
many countries has generated mixed effects [3, 291].  
4.2.5 Alternative lens and the high acceptability of RBF 
Results of this study have presented two important yet irreconcilable insights. Firstly 
the results have shown that health workers quickly responded to the RBF programme, 
willing to risk their social relations among themselves and with their patients. This is 
exemplified by the introduction of sanctions on home birth and when the health 
workers were fighting for their bonus payments. Secondly it has been revealed that 
social justice and equity are important aspects in Tanzania. This is exemplified when 
policy officials revealed that one of the reasons that the government wanted a 
national RBF and not a pilot programme was for equity reasons. Additionally, district 
and health facility leadership and some health workers also cited equity and social 
justice as the main reason why flat payments was or would have been the fairest 
bonus distribution modality.  
 
A paradox between individualism and collectivism values can be discerned from 
these accounts. The concept of capital by Bourdieu [214] can help in shedding light 
on this paradox. In this study economic capital can be identified as relating to direct 
financial benefits from RBF, and social capital as social networks of health workers, 
which include but is not limited to, their workmates and communities they serve. 
Forms of capital are intertwined and interdependent, and one form can be converted 
(or affected by) to another form [214, 215]. However, the conversion has to be 
permissible in the particular social settings, or otherwise agents can face sanctions 
[214, 215]. My study has revealed that by pursuing economic capital (RBF bonus) 
health workers were willing to risk their social capital. This willingness by health 
workers to engage in behaviors that endanger their social relation has been reported 
in other contexts [15, 118, 153]. In theory, it may be expected that in a collectivist 
society, an individual’s reputation and that of his/her family may be more valuable 
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than a financial incentive at work. If making choices leading to bonus payment 
implies acts that will reduce the reputation of one-self and thereby one’s family in the 
local community, the reasonable choice will be to not go for the bonus. Yet in this 
study health workers benefiting financially from RBF embraced the bonus payments 
even at the expense of their social capital. Additionally Tanzania as a country that 
suffers from projectitis [60], it can be reasonably assumed that health workers have 
witnessed a lot of projects that are short-lived, and therefore may be cautious in 
embracing RBF if it entails jeopardizing their social networks, which may be 
considered to be stable over time. Again this study does not support this assumption, 
paper II has shown that the perceptions of health workers about RBF positively 
changed after bonus payments. In 2010 health workers in Mvomero were skeptical 
about RBF and proposed that it was better to use RBF funds in improving conditions 
for service delivery. This position is supported by evidence from Tanzania as barriers 
to the access of care are predominantly from the provider side [34, 39, 49, 292]. 
However, in 2011, the majority were supporting RBF bonus payments. 
 
Why then were health workers willing to risk their social capital for RBF bonuses? 
Health workers in Tanzania work under very difficult circumstances [292] and their 
salaries are low [50]. Using a pyramid of needs, Kalk and colleagues [118] offered an 
explanation of why in a low-income context health workers are expected to quickly 
accept RBF and change their behaviors in response. Salaries for health workers’ in 
these contexts are far lower to cover their basic needs [118]. These salaries barely 
allow them to feed or educate their children [118], and yet a working person is 
expected to nearly feed a village. Therefore it is reasonable that the acceptability of 
RBF programmes is high among health workers in countries like Tanzania, as was 
also observed in Rwanda [150], Burundi [132], DR Congo [115].This high 
acceptability, however, does not necessarily mean that health workers in these 
contexts are more willing to risk their social relations, it only illustrate that their 
options are limited, than their counterparts in high-income countries. If we imagine 
giving someone a choice of either watching their children sleep hungry and appease 
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their work colleagues by allowing them a big portion of performance pay or vice 
versa. Probably many may choose to feed their children, close social unit, first and 
then worry about community relations, extended social unit, afterwards. This 
therefore implies that financial incentives can in fact have great adverse effects in 
low-income settings, which are observable even in a very short time of 
implementation as demonstrated in this study. Due to this power in incentives, RBF 
programmes have been labeled as intrusive, punitive and manipulative [145, 211, 
293, 294]. It is therefore more likely that Tanzania and other low-income countries 
will continue to face these challenges associated with RBF. Some may counter argue 
that improving the design of the programmes may help to curb the unintended 
consequences, while this is valid, it may help but to a limited extent. The fact that the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework RBF programme in the UK, is still associated with 
many unintended consequences after running for over a decade [211], shows that 
running RBF schemes is challenging. Once incentives are in play, gaming finds a 
way.  
 
Challenges in the health sectors of low-income countries extend far beyond the 
motivation of health workers. Ssengooba and colleagues [111] in their study of a 
failed RBF programme in Uganda, concluded by urging the country not to go the 
RBF way as it is littered with many hazards. As noted elsewhere, a recent study from 
Rwanda, a country often cited as a shining star of RBF in the sub-Saharan Africa, 
emphasized that improvements in the health sector of the country are a result of a 
holistic approach and not one intervention [290]. Moreover, rural health workers in 
Tanzania, in a recent study, reported supportive interpersonal environment as one of 
the most significant factors for job satisfaction [292], and if RBF negatively affect 
this, it may have wider impacts extending beyond the health sector as health workers 
are part of a complex social field embedded in wider social cultural systems [15]. 
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5 Conclusion  
The RBF policy process in Tanzania was protracted, leading to tensions and mistrust 
among Health Basket Fund partners. External partners played a decisive role, leaving 
less space for Tanzania to be an agent of her own development. The study 
demonstrates the dilemma of a donor-dependent country when Tanzania tried her 
own policy option based on values important to the country, it collapsed due to lack 
of funding. Should Tanzania choose to scale-up the RBF programme, there is a 
danger that without specialized support the RBF initiative may fail again given the 
weak infrastructure and national institutional capacity. 
 
RBF programmes are risky endeavors in resource constrained contexts. As 
demonstrated in this study, health workers in these contexts may easily be lured by 
financial incentives, which may compromise not only their intrinsic motivation but 
their social capital. If health workers perform their work tasks for the sake of 
financial incentives, it can lead to gaming which is detrimental to the quality of care. 
Additionally, it is important to pay attention on how the bonus payment method 
addresses the question of fairness at the workplace, as socio-cultural factors play an 
important part in this. Moreover, the success of RBF may depend on how the 
programme design balances the need for results and the nurturing of social relations 
which are important in the health sector. However even if RBF programme designs 
improve and incorporate these aspects, unintended consequences in RBF programmes 
across contexts are many and can unsettle health workers more than motivating them.  
 
Holistic approaches rooted in systems thinking may take time to show results but are 
more sustainable, and Rwanda is a persuasive example of a country that has invested 
in this approach in the health sector and is beginning to enjoy the benefits. What is 
happening there does not need to be misinterpreted as a miracle from the RBF magic 
bullet, for a magic bullet it may not be.  
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6 Recommendations and future research  
Tanzania is at a cross roads. The RBF route is appealing and yet evidence coming 
from the country does not hold a promise of reaching the intended final destination of 
social justice and equity in health. The country however, is determined to drive ahead 
into this intricate labyrinth from lessons learnt so far. Particular attention needs to be 
paid to the fact that RBF programmes are always challenging to implement, and even 
more so in resource constrained contexts. Based on this study, the following are my 
policy recommendations:  
 There is a need to broaden the scope of stakeholders that participate at the 
design stage of RBF programmes to include a multi-disciplinary team, and 
including frontline health workers and health service users.  
 There is a need to broaden the indicators in order to tackle the fairness issue. 
When indicators are wide enough, all health workers can contribute towards 
RBF targets and this may reduce conflicts at health facilities.  
 Social and cultural factors and the meaning of fairness need to be considered 
when designing the RBF bonus payment system in local health sectors.  
 Effort is needed in reforms that are less divisive and intrusive, reforms that 
ensure that the ultimate goals of social justice and equity are ensured in the 
health sector, for example investing more resources in salary reforms.  
Future research is in this area is needed given the exponential increase in the number 
of RBF initiatives in low-income countries. Too little is known about adverse 
consequences, hence there is a need to pursue this in other contexts. Another under 
researched aspect is on the extent to which the intrinsic motivation of health workers 
is affected. Lastly but most importantly there is need for more researchers with social 
sciences or with a multi-disciplinary background to be involved in this field, for a 
number of years the field has been a preoccupation for scholars from the field of 
economics and to an extent some aspects, such as processes, cultural and social 
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Abstract
Background: Prompted by the need to achieve progress in health outcomes, payment for performance (P4P) schemes
are becoming popular policy options in the health systems in many low income countries. This paper describes the
policy process behind the introduction of a payment for performance scheme in the health sector of
Tanzania illuminating in particular the interests of and roles played by the Government of Norway, the
Government of Tanzania and the other development partners.
Methods: The study employed a qualitative research design using in-depth interviews (IDIs), observations and
document reviews. Thirteen IDIs with key-informants representing the views of ten donor agencies and government
departments influential in the process of introducing the P4P scheme in Tanzania were conducted in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania and Oslo, Norway. Data was collected on the main trends and thematic priorities in development aid policy,
countries and actors perceived to be proponents and opponents to the P4P scheme, and P4P agenda setting in
Tanzania.
Results: The initial introduction of P4P in the health sector of Tanzania was controversial. The actors involved including
the bilateral donors in the Health Basket Fund, the World Bank, the Tanzanian Government and high level politicians
outside the Health Basket Fund fought for their values and interests and formed alliances that shifted in the course of
the process. The process was characterized by high political pressure, conflicts, changing alliances, and, as it evolved,
consensus building.
Conclusion: The P4P policy process was highly political with external actors playing a significant role in influencing the
agenda in Tanzania, leaving less space for the Government of Tanzania to provide leadership in the process. Norway in
particular, took a leading role in setting the agenda. The process of introducing P4P became long and frustrating causing
mistrust among partners in the Health Basket Fund.
Keywords: Payment for performance (P4P), Results-based financing (RBF), Health systems, Low-income contexts,
Partnership, Maternal and child health, Health worker motivation, Tanzania
Background
In the last decade, expenditure on health has increased in
many low income countries, but this increase is not com-
monly matched by better service delivery [1]. User needs
and demands are far from met, and in many countries the
health system continues to be plagued by inefficiency due
to worker absenteeism and resource leakage, poor quality
of care and inequity in access to health services [2]. There
is a growing confidence in Payment for Performance (P4P)
as a tool to address these problems [2], both among donor-
and recipient countries. P4P is defined as payment issued
upon achievement of a predetermined performance target
[3]. While donor countries see the P4P mechanism as an
attempt to improve the efficiency of aid by emphasizing
measurable results, recipient countries see P4P schemes as
an opportunity to fulfil unmet health needs.
There are a number of arguments for and against the
use of provider P4P mechanism in the health sector of
low income countries and both these arguments are sup-
ported by empirical studies. On one hand, it is argued that
P4P represents a powerful motivational tool to improve
the way health facilities and individual health workers re-
spond to users. It is also argued that P4P can facilitate the
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pooling and integration of resources and thus improve ef-
ficiency and the potential spill-over effect into the whole
public sector in low income countries [2]. A study carried
out in Rwanda concluded that P4P can be an effective tool
to strengthen the quality and the use of maternal and
child health services [4]. On the other hand, there are
strong arguments against introducing P4P in the health
sector. Through the introduction of monetary incentives,
it is argued that P4P is ‘crowding out intrinsic motivation’ ,
undermines motivation among workers who are not part
of the P4P scheme and erodes social relations and team-
work through competition and envy [5, 6]. Studies in
Rwanda and Tanzania have found negative unintended ef-
fects of P4P schemes including gaming and the introduc-
tion of adverse sanctions [6–8]. The evidence available on
P4P schemes in health care is thus inconclusive and can-
not be documented across settings [9].
Despite lack of solid evidence on effectiveness, P4P is
gaining political support, and a number of countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania, are trying out P4P
to accelerate the progress towards Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDG) 4 and 5 to improve child and maternal
health. Like other low income countries, Tanzania is facing
huge challenges in providing good quality health care to its
population, and inadequate funds and lack of human and
material resources negatively affect the motivation and per-
formance of health workers [10–12]. Less than half of all
deliveries are attended by skilled personnel [13], and the
quality of birth care is generally poor [14]. Maternal mor-
tality in Tanzania in 2013 was at 390 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births [15] and neonatal mortality in 2013 was
at 21 neonatal deaths per 1000 live births [16].
To improve the quality and the utilization of maternal
health services a P4P pilot was introduced in Tanzania in
2011 [17]. The decision making process that led to the
introduction of P4P involved many bilateral and inter-
national partners with different agendas. It has been ob-
served that inadequate attention has been given to policy
development processes in the health sector of low income
countries [18]. Attention has been paid to the policy con-
tents, ignoring why and how the reforms are carried out
and the actors involved [19]. Our study aims to bridge this
gap by investigating the policy process behind the intro-
duction of P4P in maternal and child health in Tanzania
illuminating in particular the interests and the roles played
by the Norwegian Government, the Tanzanian Govern-
ment and the other development partners. To situate the
study we first present the historical ideological context of
governance and the more recent partnership model of
governance in Tanzania.
From self-reliance to good governance
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 was based on the political
philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the first President of the
United Republic of Tanzania, and emphasized central plan-
ning and equitable access to services including health care
[20–22]. Nyerere and his vision of a self-reliant post-
colonial country attracted a lot of attention and aid from
countries all around the world [23]. In the 1980s many low
income countries adopted structural adjustment pol-
icies (SAPs) promoted by the International Monitory
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as a necessary condition
for borrowing money and securing economic growth
[22, 23]. SAPs involved the scaling down of the public sec-
tor and stimulated private sector growth. Nyerere resisted
the pressure from IMF and the World Bank to introduce
structural adjustment policies in Tanzania [21, 23, 24], but
in the wake of the oil crisis in 1973 and a costly military
intervention in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin in 1978–79,
Tanzania was in an economic crisis and in need of more
aid [23, 25]. Nyerere left office in 1985, paving way for a
new administration [23, 24] led by president Ali Hassan
Mwinyi, who had no option but to agree to the demands
of IMF and the World Bank.
A World Bank report of 1989 [26] defined the devel-
opment challenges in Africa as a crisis of governments’
inability to manage national affairs, or of governance,
and argued for a new development paradigm based on
good governance [27]. Good governance is defined as a
governing system “epitomized by predictable, open and
enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos; an executive arm of government ac-
countable for its actions; and a strong civil society par-
ticipating in public affairs; and all behaving under the
rule of law” [28]. Under the good governance paradigm,
the notion of partnership between development partners
is central. Tanzania opened up to this new paradigm.
Partnership in the health sector
The relationship between Tanzania and donor countries
has not always been smooth with regard to agenda setting
and ownership. In 1995, sour relations between the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania and donors led to the appointment
of an advisory group to assess how the development co-
operation between the Government of Tanzania and the
official donor organizations could be strengthened and im-
proved. The outcome was a report critical to both the
donor countries for not giving Tanzania space for owner-
ship and to the Government of Tanzania for not being pro-
active in providing leadership [29].
About the same time the Government of Tanzania had
secured its first World Bank credit in the health sector [29]
and in 1999, a sector plan of action was developed with the
aim of pooling funds in the health sector. The Health Bas-
ket Fund was established as a pooling mechanism aiming
to simplify administration and coordination and give more
control to Tanzania [30]. These reforms put Tanzania in
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the driving seat and worked to increase donor confidence
in the country [24].
The Health Basket Fund, as an instrument of Tanzanian
ownership of all activities in the health sector, was led by
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and ini-
tially involved six donors: Norwegian Agency for De-
velopment Cooperation (Norad), Swiss Development
Cooperation (SDC), Danish International Development
Agency (Danida), Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID), Irish Aid, and the World Bank. The
Netherlands, Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the German Development Bank (KfW), UNFPA
and UNICEF joined later [30]. In our study, we are particu-
larly interested in founding members of the Health Basket
Fund, as they have insight into the full history of the Health
Basket Fund and extensive knowledge of the power dynam-
ics and agenda setting in the Health Basket Fund over time.
Conceptualizing partnerships
Partnerships are often described in binary terms as ei-
ther ‘instrumental’ or ‘genuine’, or as either ‘strong’ or
‘weak’ [31, 32]. While the rhetoric of partnership tends
to emphasise a strong version which involves reciprocity,
policy dialogue and meeting commitments, a weak ver-
sion implies that decision making processes constantly
come under the review of donors, undermining the aim of
country ownership [33]. Maxwell and Riddell contend that
a weak version of partnership is commonly preferred by
donors (24). For partnerships to work well, Crawford
propose a framework with four factors indicating a genu-
ine partnership: (1) mutual co-operation between multiple
constituencies, both internal and external actors, (2) re-
spect for sovereignty and the right of national actors to
determine their own policy options, (3) equitable and
meaningful relationship, and (4) time and commitment to
build and maintain a strong partnership [31].
Donor-government partnership in Tanzania has been
termed a ‘contested process’, one which obscure a more
‘covert and insidious’ expression of power by development
partners [33]. The introduction of P4P to improve mater-
nal and child health in Tanzania is a case in point and illus-
trates a power struggle between shifting alliances within
the Health Basket Fund and tensions between the interests




The study was carried out in 2012 and 2013 in two loca-
tions: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Oslo, Norway.
Data collection and analysis
A qualitative study design was adopted to explore narra-
tives and perceptions surrounding the introduction of P4P
in Tanzania. In-depth interviews were conducted, observa-
tional activities were carried out and reviews of policy
document and other relevant secondary data were con-
ducted. Data was collected by the first author in two
phases, October-November 2012 in Oslo and January-
June 2013 in Dar es Salaam. Below is an account of the
method we used for data collection and how these
methods are triangulated in the study.
Participation in the meetings on P4P
The first author participated in a number of meetings on
P4P in Dar es Salaam in the period of January 2013 to
June 2013 both as a participant and as an observer. Two
of the meetings were particularly important. The first
was a P4P stakeholders meeting, held in January 2013
which gave an overview of the status of P4P in health
care in Tanzania and provided an opportunity to identify
influential actors in the field. During this meeting initial
contacts with potential informants in Dar es Salaam
were made. The meeting also contributed to the identifi-
cation of potential sources of secondary data for the
study. The second meeting occurred when the first author
was requested by the P4P joint assessment committee,
which consisted of Norad, the World Bank and USAID, to
assist as a resource person on literature on P4P in Tanzania
and other contexts. This role was important for gain-
ing access to and building rapport with central infor-
mants in the study.
Overall, the participation in the P4P meetings were
important for gathering background information, for re-
fining the research questions, for the identification of
potential informants, for the development of the inter-
view questions [34], and for mapping of secondary data
sources.
Policy documents
Policy documents were of utmost importance to the
study, and were used mainly from a realist perspective
[34], that is, as a means to understanding the P4P policy
and design in the Tanzanian context. Hence, policy doc-
uments were essential in providing background informa-
tion to the study and in defining the questions and
trajectories that were pursued in the in-depth interviews.
Policy documents central to our study include: The Pwani
region P4P pilot: design document [17], Health sector star-
tegic plan III (July 2009-June 2015) Partnership for deliver-
ing the MDGs [35]. The national road map strategic plan
to accelerate reduction of maternal, newborn and child
deaths [36], Payment for performance strategy 2008–2015
[37], Implementation guidelines- payment for performance
[38]. These policy documents have been instrumental in
uncovering the political frames and in supplementing pri-
mary data collected from the representatives of the Minis-
try of Health and Social Welfare.
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In-depth interviews (IDIs)
Detailed information on a range of themes related to the
introduction of P4P in the health sector in Tanzania was
obtained through IDIs conducted with representatives of
organizations and agencies identified during participant
observation in the meetings and conferences. The ques-
tions that were asked in interviews were tailored to suit
the perceived roles played by different actors, and this
process was aided by the information obtained in policy
documents, and during observations. Three interview
guides were designed: one for Government officials in
Tanzania; one for Norwegian informants, and one for
other development partners and stakeholders. Although
these three interview guides had different specific (for
detailed interview questions refer to additional files 1, 2,
and 3), they were all guided by the following general
themes: trends and thematic priorities in development aid
policy, countries and actors perceived to be proponents of
the P4P scheme, and agenda setting in the Tanzanian
Health Basket Fund and the introduction of P4P.
The P4P agenda in Tanzania was first introduced into
the Health Basket Fund. In choosing the informants for
the study, we used purposive sampling following two cri-
teria. To achieve the objective of the study we were in-
terested in the views of members of the Health Basket
Fund who were influential during the P4P introduction
process by either supporting or questioning the P4P
agenda. Through this criterion, we were able to identify the
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Tanzania, the
World Bank, the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation (Norad), the Danish International Development
Assistance (Danida), the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC), German International Cooper-
ation (GiZ) and Irish Aid. All these members (with the ex-
ception of GiZ) were formative members of the Health
Basket Fund in 1999. They were selected based on the as-
sumption that they therefore possessed more knowledge
on the founding principles of the Health Basket Fund than
members that joined at a later stage. Secondly, we were in-
terested in organizations/agencies outside the Health Bas-
ket Fund that appeared to be important stakeholders in the
P4P agenda setting and the subsequent P4P pilot. Based on
this criterion we identified the Clinton Health Access Ini-
tiative (CHAI), an organization managing the P4P scheme
in Tanzania on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare. In addition, we included the Norwegian Embassy
in Dar es Salaam, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who played an important role in introducing and
funding the P4P programme in Tanzania. From these 10
organizations/agencies, a total number of 13 in-depth in-
terviews with key-informants were conducted, 11 of these
in Dar es Salaam and two in Oslo. Informant selection in
the organizations focused on individuals knowledgeable of
the P4P agenda setting and process in Tanzania, and the
majority of our informants were representatives of their or-
ganizations in the Health Basket Fund. An overview of the
interviews conducted is summarized in Table 1.
All interviews were conducted in English and based on
informed consent, and all except two were recorded.
The two interviews were not recorded due to the prefer-
ence of the informants. In addition to recording, rapid
note taking was used in all interviews. The recorded IDIs
were transcribed verbatim and error checked. The ana-
lysis of the material started with a review of transcripts
which were later imported to NVivo 10 for data manage-
ment purposes. Qualitative content analysis was under-
taken, looking for both manifest and latent content [39].
Coding units were identified and condensed [39]. Sub-
themes were developed from the codes and defined into
themes that we used in presenting our results.
Research ethics
Research clearance was granted in Norway through the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services and in Tanzania
through the Ifakara Institutional Review Board, and the
National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR/HQ/R.8a/
Vol.IX/1515). Individual consent was sought and obtained
free of coercion.
Results
The introduction of P4P in the health sector in Tanzania
was controversial. The actors involved, including the bilat-
eral donors in the Health Basket Fund, the World Bank,
the Government of Tanzania and high level politicians
outside the Health Basket Fund, fought for their values
and interests and formed alliances that shifted in the
course of the process. In the following we will describe the
process with emphasis on 1) the role of high political pres-
sure, 2) the conflicts and changing alliances in the Health
Basket Fund, and 3) consensus building.
Table 1 Overview of IDIs
Agency/Organization Interviews
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare- Tanzania 2
World Bank – Tanzania 1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway 1





Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 1
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) 2
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High political pressure
The history of Norwegian development aid to Tanzania
goes back to the early years after independence, and
Norway remains among the most influential donor coun-
tries in Tanzania. The idea of P4P in Tanzania originated
from the Norwegian-Tanzanian health sector partnership
initiative (NTPI) which was signed in 2007 by the President
of Tanzania and the Norwegian Prime Minister. The aim
of the partnership was to enhance progress to reach MDGs
4 and 5 using P4P mechanism. As all informants pointed
out, this was a top-down process. The P4P agenda was de-
fined by high level politicians both from Tanzania and
Norway. The prominent role of high level politicians led to
a considerable amount of political pressure to introduce
P4P in Tanzania. As one informant in the Norwegian Em-
bassy noted:
[Former] Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway and
President Kikwete of Tanzania met in 2007, so as you
can see the engagement was at a very high level
regarding P4P. After this meeting we were requested to
support the health sector [through P4P] in Tanzania,
but prior to this, the embassy wasn’t really visible in
the health sector in Tanzania. (Staff, Royal Norwegian
Embassy, Dar es Salaam)
The strong engagement of high level political actors
in the P4P agenda kept the involvement of technical
actors in defining and shaping the agenda on a low
level. In Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
said to have bypassed the Norwegian Agency for De-
velopment Cooperation (Norad), which provides tech-
nical support to the Ministry. Norad was not consulted
about the P4P agenda and Norad staff expressed great
scepticism to its introduction in Tanzania. As one inform-
ant pointed out:
We were raising some questions around P4P since we
had a feeling that the treatment was prescribed before
the diagnosis, because they said let’s do P4P in
Tanzania. Really, without even looking at what are
the barriers to the quality of services, to the
delivery of services and so on and so forth, but the
recipe was already coming, and we quietly and
quickly realized that we cannot maneuver much
outside this P4P thinking. (Official, Norad)
In Tanzania, the consensus among some high level bu-
reaucrats and technical staff in the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare was that the health system was not ready
for P4P, as it was perceived as a piecemeal reform. It was
pointed out that there was need for a reform that takes a
systems approach to the challenges in the health sector of
Tanzania, as highlighted by the following quote:
The primary problem that we are facing in Tanzania
is a health system that isn’t working well. If you think
of the six building blocks of a health system, all those,
including financing, infrastructure, health management
information systems, among others, P4P could have
worked well if all these blocks were functioning well, so
around P4P you need to get the system working well for
desired results. (Official - Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare, Tanzania)
Partners in the Health Basket Fund, among them
Danida, SDC and Irish Aid, were not happy about how the
P4P agenda was introduced. The partners felt that P4P was
being pushed from above without adequate evidence show-
ing that such mechanisms work in low income contexts.
Officials from these international development agencies
interact with officials from the Government of Tanzania
regularly; hence there was a common understanding that
the P4P agenda was driven by high level politicians. The
understanding was that technical staff in the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare in Tanzania was not in a pos-
ition to oppose or refuse the P4P agenda. As one informant
put it:
The thing is that there is political drive and political
push to go for that [P4P] and this political push
comes from Norway and therefore the government [of
Tanzania] was not in a position to say no despite that
the basic foundations to support P4P, either at health
facilities or in the health system were not available.
(Official, Danida)
Our reviews of policy documents showed a marked
lack of progress in health outcomes relating to MDG 4
and 5 in Tanzania [35, 36] and there was great pressure
on the Government of Tanzania to find a way of improv-
ing these health outcomes and reach the international
targets in child and maternal health. The need to docu-
ment better health outcomes stimulated and justified a
search for new strategies. As one official expressed:
People were saying we are not achieving enough
and we were mainly concerned that we might not
reach targets for health related MDGs, especially
goals 4 and 5. Because of this we were thinking of a
way to accelerate progress towards these targets.
(Official - Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,
Tanzania)
When politicians in Tanzania were searching for ways
to make progress in MDG 4 and 5, politicians in Norway
were looking for partners willing to use P4P schemes in
maternal and child health. One informant recalls how
Tanzania was chosen as a potential P4P partner:
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The Norwegian government wanted to go into countries
that were really struggling with child mortality as well as
infant mortality, and so countries were picked according
to that. India was one, and then Pakistan was chosen,
and then there was a need for some countries in Africa.
Tanzania became the obvious choice, because it is a
relatively easy country to work in, in terms of stable
political conditions, and also quite strong leadership,
with a strong President. (Official, Norad)
Conflicts and changing alliances in the health basket fund
The Government of Norway pulled out of the Health
Basket Fund in 2002, but re-joined in 2007, presumably
for the purpose of financing the P4P scheme in the
health sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs engaged
Norad as the Norwegian partner in the Health Basket
Fund with the assignment of introducing the P4P agenda
to the Health Basket partners. The move was not posi-
tively received by the majority of actors in the Health
Basket Fund:
Norad was just rejoining the health basket at the time
when we introduced the P4P agenda. People did not
approve of that, especially coming with such an agenda
of P4P, some of the donors were totally against it, like
the Danes, they were appalled by it both politically and
otherwise. Even the World Bank and USAID could not
come openly to support us for fear of a backlash. The
Dutch were furious, saying we were not serious, calling
us names, and saying we were trying to hijack the
Health Basket Fund. (Official, Norad)
Other development partners perceived it as disrespect-
ful to introduce such a highly value-laden and politically
charged agenda without broad consultation. Pushing the
P4P agenda through the Health Basket Fund was inter-
preted as going against the values of the partnership, es-
pecially the earmarking of funds in the basket. The
introduction of the agenda was therefore met with resist-
ance in Health Basket Fund.
In addition to conflicting values, opponents of the P4P
agenda pointed to the need to evaluate the feasibility of
P4P in the health sector of Tanzania in particular and low
income contexts in general. In response, Norad commis-
sioned two evaluations in 2008, whose findings did not
support the introduction of P4P scheme in Tanzania. The
reports concluded that there was lack of evidence on the
effectiveness of P4P [40] and that the health system in
Tanzania was not ready for a full scale national P4P
scheme [41].
However, preparatory work for a full scale national P4P
scheme had already started after the signing of the NTPI.
In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
produced two policy documents: the Payment for
performance strategy 2008–2015 [37], Implementation
guidelines- payment for performance [38]. The Govern-
ment of Tanzania was ready to start the implementation of
a full scale national P4P scheme. The Health Basket Fund
partners, notably Danida, SDC, and Irish Aid which were
and still are among the leading contributors of funds the
Health Basket continued to resist the agenda. In addition,
the position of the Norwegian partner on the agenda was
changing mainly because the results from the evaluations
did not support a full scale national P4P scheme. Instead,
Norad proposed a P4P pilot in one region. This suggestion
was openly supported by some of the members in the
Health Basket Fund among them The World Bank and
USAID, but was rejected by the Government of Tanzania:
The government’s position back then was that there were
too many pilots in the country and if there was going to
be anything it has to go full-scale. A pilot would mean
that one district or region would benefit. Tanzania
has a strong feeling about equity issues, you know
from our history, and because of this the government was
determined to go ahead with a full-scale implementation.
(Official - Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,
Tanzania)
While acknowledging the lack of adequate conditions
to implement a full scale national P4P scheme, the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania was adamant that they do not need
perfect conditions to start the scheme, instead they pre-
ferred a “learning by doing-approach”. In 2009, the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania went ahead attempting the
implementing of a full scale national P4P scheme. The
Health Basket Fund partners were not happy about this
move, including Norad:
P4P came with pressure such that the government was
forced to go full scale with P4P. Yet the system was not
ready and it didn’t function and the basket partners said
we cannot do it. We pulled out and did not finance that.
This was a real blow because it created tensions between
basket partners and the government. I really feel sorry.
We lost valuable time, energy and confidence in this
process. (Official, Swiss Development Cooperation)
The attempted full scale national P4P scheme did not
receive funding from the Health Basket Fund, but a few
districts implemented the scheme from 2009 to 2011.
With no funding and without a proper Health Manage-
ment Information Systems in place, the full scale national
P4P scheme faced a number of challenges.
The common position against the Government of
Tanzania’s full scale national P4P scheme improved rela-
tions among donor partners in the Health Basket Fund.
Most notably was the open support of the World Bank to
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the proposal of Norad for a P4P pilot in one region. Being
the main funder of the Health Basket Fund, the support of
the World Bank was important in redirecting the P4P
agenda in Tanzania. The interest and active pursuit of the
P4P agenda by the World Bank was not well received by
all members in the Health Basket Fund as some were still
skeptical to the agenda.
The World Bank is now putting P4P as a condition for
funding the basket. P4P may not be bad as such, but
we would expect the Bank to come with a lot of
expertise and negotiate with all the partners to get
that [the agenda] through, but it was not exactly like
that. It was discussed with the partners but I am not
sure if there was broad consensus on this approach. It
was pushed on the Basket and now we have to make
the best of it. (Official, Swiss Development
Cooperation)
As the full scale national P4P scheme became increas-
ingly difficult, the Government of Tanzania softened its
stance on the scope of the P4P scheme. Together with
the World Bank, Norad and USAID plans for a P4P pilot
in the Pwani Region were started. In 2011, the Pwani Re-
gion pilot was introduced in Tanzania with the aim of
scaling up after evaluation. The pilot was a result of con-
stant changes in alliance among members in the Health
Basket Fund.
Building consensus
The potential of scaling-up the P4P pilot meant that a
common position regarding the agenda needed consensus
among members of the Health Basket Fund. This consen-
sus building process had begun during our data collection
period. The Government of Tanzania, the World Bank,
Norad, and USAID were leading this process, as the fol-
lowing statement illustrates:
Things were not very clear when P4P was introduced.
People needed more understanding of the design and
operations of the program, which was not readily
available. Many were skeptical of the design, so
Norway, which is one of the members in the Basket,
asked if we could look more into the concept and this
is how the pilot came about. Now as we do these
assessments, we see that more donors are coming in
and a taskforce for P4P has been formed by the
Ministry and we have partners like USAID, the World
Bank and Norway, the Germans. Also the chair of the
basketeers [Irish Aid at the time] is being co-opted.
(Official, World Bank Tanzania)
In one of the meetings of the Joint Assessment com-
mittee comprising USAID, the World Bank and Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare, the possibility of inviting
other development partners to take part in recently
established ‘National P4P Taskforce’ was discussed. Se-
nior level politicians in Tanzania who had strongly ar-
gued for a full scale national P4P scheme gradually
changed position and increasingly supported the views
of their technical staff as shown by the following extract:
There is an emerging consensus that P4P needs to be
viewed within the broader health systems reforms…
there is need to make sure facilities receive essential
medicines in time, are well equipped and meet
minimum staffing standards so that they can perform
and deliver quality services. [Former Minister of
Health and Social Welfare, Tanzania [42]]
Opponents of P4P in Tanzania were calling for a whole
systems approach in implementing the P4P scheme. The
argument was that P4P must not be seen as the panacea
to problems facing the health sector of Tanzania; as such
the scheme has to be integrated in the existing efforts.
With high level political officials in Tanzania calling for a
whole systems approach to P4P, the scheme seems to be
approaching a large degree of consensus.
Discussion
In this section we will discuss Norway’s interest in the
P4P agenda and partnership contestations, and the role
of the government of Tanzania in the P4P agenda setting
linking it to the question of ownership.
Norway’s interest in the P4P agenda and partnership
contestations
Our data demonstrates that Norway played an important
part in bringing the P4P agenda to Tanzania. Norway’s
interest in P4P schemes in the health sector can be traced
to Jens Stoltenberg, who was the Norwegian Prime Minis-
ter 2000–2001 and 2005–2013. Stoltenberg, an economist
by training, supported the idea that saving the lives of
children in developing countries is a moral and political im-
perative which carries economic benefits [43, 44]. In 2007,
Stoltenberg launched the Global Campaign for the Health
Millennium Development Goals, a campaign promoting dif-
ferent initiatives, including P4P schemes, to ensure ‘value
for money’ while reaching the most vulnerable groups [45].
In addition to substantial financial support to the UN, glo-
bal child and maternal health campaigns, and global health
initiatives such as GAVI and the Gates Foundation, Norway
was and still is engaged in bilateral partnerships with sev-
eral countries lagging behind in MDGs 4 and 5, including
India, Tanzania, Nigeria and Malawi [43, 46].
Through the Norwegian Government’s involvement in
health related MDGs, in particular goals 4 and 5, Norway
emerged as a prominent player promoting the introduction
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of innovative financing mechanisms in health and other
sectors globally [44, 47, 48]. One should note that there
was high interest in the Norwegian policy environment re-
lating to outcomes of MDGs 4 and 5. We will examine this
interest using the agenda-setting circumstances concept in
Grindle and Thomas’s framework on political economy of
reform. The framework is used in analyzing policy and
organizational reforms in developing countries and its key
elements are environmental context of reform, the agenda-
setting circumstances and the policy characteristics [18, 49].
We find the agenda-setting circumstances adaptable to the
global policy agenda setting. According to the framework,
the policy agenda-setting circumstances can be perceived
as either a crisis situation or not [49]. When an agenda-set-
ting circumstance is seen as a crisis situation, there is be
high political interest and the involvement of policy elites.
In such circumstances, there is a sense of urgency to ‘do
something’ as political and economic stakes are high for in-
action [49]. We argue that the possibility of failing to meet
the health related MDGs could be interpreted as a crisis
situation, especially by the actors that had been actively
supporting them. In the same regard, a perceived crisis
situation calls for innovative strategies [49], such as using
P4P in the health sector of low income countries to accel-
erate progress towards MDGs 4 and 5. To this end, the
concept of agenda-setting circumstances helps to explain
the high level political interest in P4P on the Norwegian as
well as the Tanzanian side.
The other development partners in Tanzania did not
share this strong political interest in P4P. Our data show
that these actors in the Health Basket Fund did not ap-
prove of the way P4P was introduced in the Health Basket
Fund. The introduction was perceived to have been largely
politically motivated and not following the principles im-
portant in a partnership. To further shed light on this, we
apply Crawford’s framework on genuine partnership.
Crawford [31] proposed four principles guiding genuine
partnerships. The first principle emphasizes mutual co-
operation between actors. Our data suggests that different
actors in the partnership had different interests. Alliances
were constantly shifting in the Health Basket Fund. It was
perceived that Norway ‘pushed’ the P4P agenda before
seeking broad consensus and co-operation from all part-
ners. In the eyes of other long-term and major financial
contributors in the Health Basket Fund, such as Danida,
SDC and Irish Aid, Norway did not respect mutual co-
operation, a principle considered to be fundamental for a
genuine partnership. This, in our view, contributed to the
derailing of the P4P agenda in Tanzania.
The second principle of partnership concerns the sover-
eignty and right of national actors to make their own pol-
icy choices. In the context of the P4P agenda in Tanzania,
none of the international donors in the Health Basket
Fund observed this important principle. On different
occasions the P4P agenda was driven by international ac-
tors in the Health Basket Fund and not by the government
of Tanzania. Norway and the World Bank took turns in
pushing the agenda while the other development partners
constantly opposed the P4P agenda, even at times when
the Government of Tanzania had resolved to implement
the P4P reform. It can be argued that this stance by inter-
national actors neutralized the Government of Tanzania’s
prerogative to determine its own policy options.
The third principle by Crawford on genuine partner-
ship emphasizes equality. Our data support an image of
the Health Basket Fund in Tanzania as a power arena
where partners fought to promote their own values and
ideologies [31]. This is illustrated in particular by the
moment when the World Bank officially showed interest
in the P4P agenda which immediately gained momen-
tum. We argue that by being the largest funder in the
Health Basket Fund, the World Bank had more bargain-
ing power and clout to impose its worldview. As the
process unfolds, we see international actors engaging in
power games in leading or resisting the P4P agenda leav-
ing Tanzania as a less equal partner.
The fourth and final principle on a genuine partnership
encourages investment of time and commitment in the
building of a strong partnership [31]. Norway did not ob-
serve this principle. As a former member that re-joined
the partnership, Norway was expected to build trust
through showing commitment to the basket fund partners
over time. When Norway rushed to introduce the P4P
agenda despite heavy resistance, Norway sought alliance
with the World Bank, a powerful actor in the Health Bas-
ket Fund. This alliance over time increased the pro P4P
pressure beyond what Norway’s status as single donor
country would allow. This was interpreted by other part-
ners as manipulation of a partnership platform supposed
to be based on consensus and mutual interest.
Partnership theory tends to see strong partnerships as
the ideal or ‘real’ partnerships, while in practice, according
to Maxwell and Riddle, donors tend to prefer weak part-
nerships as it makes it easier to dominate agenda setting
[32]. The approach by Norway when introducing P4P to
the Tanzanian health sector appears to be a text-book ex-
ample of this.
It is important to try to understand why the Govern-
ment of Tanzania was not in control of the P4P agenda,
despite a clear interest in it as expressed in the policy doc-
uments and by the engagement of high level political ac-
tors in the Tanzanian context in setting the P4P agenda.
The role of the Tanzanian Government in P4P agenda
setting
National governments have important roles to play as plan-
ners and executors of national welfare systems, and this re-
mains their role also when they engage in partnerships
Chimhutu et al. Globalization and Health  (2015) 11:38 Page 8 of 10
such as the one under scrutiny here. According to partner-
ship theory, the recipient government is supposed to play a
pivotal role in priority setting and consensus building
among the partners and in assuming ownership to the pro-
grams and strategies developed by the partnership [31, 50].
It is therefore important for a proper understanding of the
P4P agenda setting to analyze how Tanzania played out its
role in the process.
The data presentation above clearly reflects a significant
level of ambivalence and indecision on the part of the
Tanzanian government. Most informants identified the
P4P agenda as owned by the Norwegian government ra-
ther than the Tanzanian. Moreover, the attempts actually
made by the Tanzanian government to influence the
process, such as its initiative to launch a nationally owned
P4P scheme, and its later insistence that the program
should go to scale, were over-ruled by the other part-
ners in the Health Basket Fund. It is demonstrated that at
technical and bureaucratic level, the Government of
Tanzania would have preferred a systems approach to
health sector challenges and not a standalone P4P initia-
tive. This all suggests that the Tanzanian Government was
unable to play the leading role in the process that it was
supposed to according to partnership principles. This may
have several reasons.
In a recent study of eight African countries’ negoti-
ation capital in aid using the country’s economic, polit-
ical, ideological and institutional factors as parameters,
Tanzania ranked among the weakest states [51]. This
strongly suggests that even if it wanted to, the Govern-
ment of Tanzania’s ability to take a leading role in the
negotiations around the introduction of P4P, thereby
contributing to making the Health Basket Fund a strong
partnership was rather limited. However, and perhaps
paradoxically, this may not have been in their interest.
As discussed above, donor partners tend to prefer weak
partnerships to strong ones because they are more easily
managed. Donors, obviously, also control the funding of
the partnerships, and may withhold funding or pull out
if they find that the partnership moves in a direction
they do not approve of, as exemplified by the Tanzanian
P4P pilot that the Health Basket Fund refused to fund.
Hence, although the partnership model emphasizes the
importance of mutual respect, cooperation and sover-
eignty [31], recipient partners may in fact gain most in
terms of funding and goodwill if they give up leadership
of the process and ownership of the agenda and follow
the lead of the donor partners.
There are several examples in the literature of Tanzania
following similar strategies in similar contexts [25, 52]
which further suggests that this may in fact be the coun-
try’s most preferred and rational approach in development
partnerships. This could also illuminate why Tanzania is
sometimes referred to as an unofficial ‘darling of the donor
community’ [52]. Donor countries tend to find the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania receptive to their ideas and agendas,
and respond by maintaining a high level of aid to the
country.
Study limitations
The study lacked the contributions of some of the stake-
holders in the Donor Partners Group for Health, which
were mentioned in our informants’ narratives such as
USAID and the Netherlands, whose views would have
enriched our study. In addition, our data could have been
enriched if we had managed to include more actors from
the Government of Tanzania. However, concerted efforts
were made during the course of the fieldwork to get in
touch with these organizations with limited and varying
success.
Conclusion
The process of introducing the P4P scheme in Tanzania
was fraught with tension, contestations, and mistrust. The
donor - government partnership in Tanzania as expressed
in the case of the Health Basket Fund, was by and large
dominated by donor countries and agencies. This left less
space for Tanzania to be proactive as an agent of its own
development. The study also demonstrates that while high
political interest is important in stimulating reforms, this
does not always translate into quick policy decisions.
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Abstract
Background: Despite limited evidence of its effectiveness, performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading
policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress in reaching Millennium Development Goal 5: improved
maternal health. This paper offers insights into two of the aspects that are lacking in the current literature on P4P,
namely what strategies health workers employ to reach set targets, and how the intervention plays out when
implemented by local government as part of a national programme that does not receive donor funding.
Methods: A total of 28 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 25 individuals were conducted in Mvomero district over
a period of 15 months in 2010 and 2011, both before and after P4P payments. Seven facilities, including six
dispensaries and one health centre, were covered. Informants included 17 nurses, three clinical officers, two medical
attendants, one lab technician and two district health administrators.
Results: Health workers reported a number of strategies to increase the number of deliveries at their facility,
including health education and cooperation with traditional health providers. The staff at all facilities also reported
that they had told the women that they would be sanctioned if they gave birth at home, such as being fined or
denied clinical cards and/or vaccinations for their babies. There is a great uncertainty in relation to the potential
health impacts of the behavioural changes that have come with P4P, as the reported strategies may increase the
numbers, but not necessarily the quality. Contrary to the design of the P4P programme, payments were not based
on performance. We argue that this was due in part to a lack of resources within the District Administration, and in
part as a result of egalitarian fairness principles.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that particular attention should be paid to adverse effects when using external
rewards for improved health outcomes, and secondly, that P4P may take on a different form when implemented by
local implementers without the assistance of professional P4P specialists.
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Background
Performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading
policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress
in achieving the main target of Millennium Development
Goal 5: reducing the maternal mortality ratio by two-
thirds by 2015 [1-3]. The basic principle behind P4P is
that payments are contingent on performance. For ex-
ample, an increase in the utilization of health services
can trigger a bonus to the responsible health workers/
managers [4]. It is assumed that payments to health-care
providers will induce them to offer maternal health-care
services of a higher quality, and that this in turn will in-
crease the number of women and children who receive
high-quality care. In Africa, 17 countries are now imple-
menting P4P, 14 of them as pilots, and three as nation-
wide programmes [5].
Critics argue that P4P need not result in improved
health outcomes, and that it can have adverse effects
[6-10]. In particular, P4P may crowd out motivation
and/or attention for tasks for which health workers are
not paid. Health workers may also play with the books
and alter numbers and not behaviour. Lastly, P4P pro-
grammes are criticized for focusing on the quantity- ra-
ther than the quality of care.
Proponents of P4P refer to a relatively limited number
of studies that demonstrate that P4P can have a substan-
tial effect on the utilization of health-care services and
to some extent on health outcomes [11-15]. A weakness
of these studies, however, is that they do not tell us pre-
cisely how or why these changes take place. If we obtain
a better understanding of what health providers think
about P4P programmes [16], and what they actually do
to make changes occur, it will help us shed some light
on any potential adverse effects, as well as helping us
understand why P4P appears to work well in some set-
tings and not in others.
The majority of P4P studies that have found positive
results in terms of utilization and/or outcomes have
used data from programmes in which substantial tech-
nical and managerial resources accompany the interven-
tion. In countries with weak health sector institutions,
this is unlikely to be the case during nationwide roll-out
organized by both national and local governments. It is
therefore important to also study interventions that are
implemented by governments in low-income countries
using their own resources.
This paper offers insights into two of the aspects lack-
ing in the current literature on P4P: Why changes may
occur in response to the introduction of P4P, and how
the intervention plays out when implemented by local
government as part of a national programme that does
not receive donor funding. The paper is structured as fol-
lows: The first section looks at the underlying conceptual
framework of P4P, while the second section describes the
nationally funded P4P programme in Tanzania. The third
section lays out the methods that we employed, whereas
the fourth section reports on the findings from the in-
depth interviews with health workers and health adminis-
trators. The fifth and sixth sections offer a discussion of
the results and concluding remarks.
Conceptual framework
Payment for performance (P4P), or performance-based
payment (PBP), can be defined as: “the transfer of money
or material goods conditional upon taking a measurable
action or achieving a predetermined performance target”
[17]. Underlying P4P is the principal-agent model. The
principle behind this model is that there is a lack of
alignment of the preferences (interests) of the principal
(employer) and the agent (employee) when it comes to
the goals to be achieved by an organization. The princi-
pal therefore attempts to find ways of aligning the
agent’s goals to the goals of the organization [18]. In the
context of P4P, health workers, or ‘agents’, are provided
with performance bonuses by the principal in order to
achieve health outputs and outcomes.
Nevertheless, even if a health worker is strongly moti-
vated by the reward the principal offers and changes his
behaviour in response, the intervention may not neces-
sarily improve health outcomes.
First, financial incentives may crowd out attention to
tasks important for high-quality care. Health workers
may focus on aspects of health care for which they are
rewarded, while ignoring other aspects of care for which
they are not rewarded yet are nonetheless important for
quality [7]. Holmstrom and Milgrom coin the former type
of behaviour multitasking, and argue that financial incen-
tives may not be very effective in the health sector, as em-
ployers pay for input rather than for health outcomes [19].
Second, external rewards may crowd out health workers’
intrinsic motivation to do the job [20]. Clearly, if health
workers were intrinsically motivated to deliver high-quality
health care, there would be no need for employing finan-
cial incentives as a motivator. Studies comparing what
health workers in low-income countries can do with what
they actually do [21-23] suggest that the intrinsic motiv-
ation for the average health worker is low. However, the
use of external rewards may still crowd out the motivation
for those health workers who are intrinsically motivated,
and if the use of external rewards for some reason is dis-
continued, motivation and effort may end up being lower
than before these rewards were introduced.
Third, P4P is vulnerable to corruption, i.e. health workers
may be changing the numbers rather than the indicators
themselves (see Oxman and Fretheim for a review of ad-
verse effects [6]. Fourth, a major assumption of P4P is that
workers are able to offer high-quality care if they choose
to. This may not be the case, as knowledge of guidelines
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and access to equipment and medication may be inad-
equate. Lastly, P4P presupposes that if health workers de-
liver high-quality care, women will come to the facility.
This may not be the case since women may deliver at
home for reasons outside the control of health workers.
In conclusion then, agency theory tells us that offering
health workers an incentive for an increase in the num-
ber of deliveries need not result in improved health
outcomes, primarily because the incentive is related to
effort and not to outcomes.
P4P in a Tanzanian context
The productivity of health workers in Tanzania has been
proven to be low. One study shows that less than 60% of
working hours are used for productive activities, ([24]:3)
whereas another demonstrates that few health workers
follow clinical guidelines, and that low motivation is a cen-
tral factor [23]. Lastly, a number of studies have shown
that health workers in Tanzania are unhappy with their
working environment and their salaries [25,26].
Norway, one of Tanzania’s long-term development part-
ners, took a leading role in introducing the idea of result-
based financing in the country’s health sector in 2008
[2,27]. The government of Tanzania was very receptive to
the idea and wanted to launch a national P4P pilot
programme in 2009 [28]. Tanzania’s development partners
in the health sector were reluctant to endorse the idea due
to many contested issues. First, there was a strong feeling
that the state of Tanzania’s health management informa-
tion system (HMIS) was not ready for P4P, which had
been documented in an appraisal study carried out in
2009 [2]. Second, other perceived preconditions for a
successful P4P, such as a satisfactory staff situation and
adequate access to essential drugs, equipment and sup-
plies, were lacking [2]. The government of Tanzania was
therefore not allowed to use the funds in the health
basket earmarked for P4P. While acknowledging that
the proper conditions for P4P were lacking, the govern-
ment of Tanzania proceeded with the implementation of
P4P in 2009, choosing to employ a ‘learning by doing
approach’ [28].
The donor community requested that the government
of Tanzania halt P4P [27]. At this point, however, the
government of Tanzania had already issued a directive
that P4P should be included as an activity in the dis-
tricts’ Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP) for
2009/10. Even so, not all the districts followed the dir-
ective, and in some places health workers were eagerly
awaiting a P4P programme that was never implemented
[29]. On the other hand, the district administration in
Mvomero District decided to follow the directive and P4P
was consequently budgeted for in the health plan and im-
plemented in 2009, and health workers received their first
bonuses in 2010. To distinguish the P4P scheme that we
study from the donor-funded scheme which was later
launched as a pilot in Pwani Region in 2011 [30], we will
refer to it as the ‘locally funded P4P’.
The design of the locally funded P4P in Tanzania
(2009–2011)
The main aim of the locally funded P4P in Tanzania was
to “provide better motivation and explicit attention to re-
sults, by ensuring that health workers and their supervi-
sors are motivated to strive for better results in Maternal,
Newborn and Child Health Services and other health ser-
vices in the districts” [28]. The bonuses were to be paid
based on achievements using the following indicators:
antenatal care, institutional deliveries, post-natal care, and
Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). Coun-
cil Health Management Teams (CHMTs) were to monitor
and ensure that health facilities in their mandated area
were submitting their reports in time, and they were also
to review and verify the reports. In turn, the CHMTs were
to be monitored by the Regional Health Management
Teams (RHMTs) [31].
At the facility level, a maximum annual bonus was to
be achieved if the facility met all the targets for all the
indicators, whereas a partial bonus was to be paid if only
some of the targets were met. For deliveries, the target
for dispensaries was that 60% or more of all the expected
deliveries of the catchment area should take place at the
dispensary. At the national level, 51% of all women with
a live birth received delivery care from a skilled provider
in 2010, although the percentages vary between 21% and
91% across regions [32]. New targets were to be set at
the beginning of each year and the basic rule for target
setting was the requirement of improvements from the
previous performance [31]. Furthermore, the bonuses
were to differ according to facility type. Dispensaries had
a maximum bonus limit of T.Shs 1 million (approximately
USD 676) and health centres, CHMTs and RHMTs’ max-
imum annual bonus was T.Shs 3 million (USD 2,000),
while hospitals had the highest maximum annual bonus of
T.Shs 9 million (USD 6,000). Payments at the health facil-
ity were to be shared equally among the staff regardless of
grade, qualifications or position. If a health facility reached
all targets, each individual was supposed to get a max-




The study was conducted in Mvomero, a rural district in
the Morogoro Region of Tanzania. The district covers
more than 7,000 square kilometres, and the population
is approximately 300,000. Administratively, Mvomero is
divided into 17 wards and 101 villages. There are 56
health facilities in the district, including three hospitals,
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four health centres and 49 dispensaries [33]. Six out of
10 live births in the region are delivered by a skilled pro-
vider [32]. Except for a woman’s first delivery and her
fifth delivery and upwards (which should take place at a
hospital), Tanzanian health authorities recommend that
women with uncomplicated pregnancies who have gone
through regular antenatal care deliver at their closest
dispensary. Dispensaries are usually headed by a Clin-
ical Officer (three years of medical training). As a gen-
eral rule, nurses are in charge of deliveries, but the
Clinical Officer will be asked to assist if a delivery does
not proceed normally.
Data collection and analysis
Since we were interested in health workers’ perceptions
and experiences with P4P, as well as their strategies to
meet set targets, we chose individual interviews as our
primary methodology. Moreover, because nurses are in
charge of the majority of services targeted by the locally
funded P4P (antenatal care, deliveries, postnatal care
and vaccinations), we focused on this profession. In June
2010, when P4P had been introduced but payments had
not yet been made, the first author conducted 12 in-
depth interviews with health workers at four public dis-
pensaries and one faith-based health centre (10 nurses,
one medical attendant and one lab assistant). The inter-
view guide was informed by the existing literature on
P4P and focused on expectations related to the introduc-
tion of P4P, including the potential effect of P4P on the
prioritization of work within the health facility, nurses’
perceptions and experiences of midwifery and provision
of care, in addition to perceptions about the access to-,
acceptability of- and quality of care provided to women
in childbirth.
In October 2011, after health workers had received their
first bonus payments, the third author conducted a total
of 14 IDIs with health workers at five public dispensaries
(including a total of three clinical officers, 10 nurses and
one medical attendant). Three of the facilities and three of
the nurses had been part of the 2010 study. The interview
guide covered the following themes: health worker’s
knowledge about the P4P scheme (goals, rewarded tasks),
actions that had been taken to reach the goals (particu-
larly in relation to increasing deliveries), multitasking,
perceptions about the bonus that had been received and
how it had been spent, and the perceived effects on co-
operation within the facility and communication with
the district authorities.
Health workers were specifically asked about sanctions
against women who give birth at home. The background
for including this question was information that we had
gained through focus group discussions (FDGs), which
were conducted with the help of research assistants in
the period from July to early October 2011. A total of 11
focus group discussions (six with women, five with men)
in four different villages were conducted, focusing on
the perceptions of maternal health services in the district
and the potential benefits and challenges of P4P. Due to
the scope of the journal article format, the findings of
the FDGs will not be included here. However, the FDGs
provided important background information for our IDIs
with health workers. For example, we learned from two
of the FDGs that health workers had announced that any
woman who gave birth at home would be fined. Hence,
health workers were asked about fining and other forms
of sanctions directed at home births.
The health facilities were located between one and three
hours by car from each other, mostly in different wards.
The facilities were partially on the basis of acquaintance
through previous visits, which improved their rapport with
informants, and partially on the basis of convenience. In
general, all the health workers who were present at a given
facility at the time of the fieldwork were interviewed.
In addition to IDIs with health workers and FDGs with
community members, we carried out individual in-depth
interviews with two district health administrators, includ-
ing the District Medical Officer. The interviews focused
on the process of implementing the government funded
P4P, including lessons learned and the reasons why the
scheme was discontinued.
All interviews were conducted in Swahili. The first au-
thor speaks Swahili on a high level, while the third author
is fluent in the language and has conducted a number of
long-term ethnographic fieldworks in Tanzania over a
period of 20 years. All IDIs were recorded, transcribed
and translated to English. In addition, rapid note taking
during interviews was done. The third author checked all
transcripts and verified the translations. The study used
meaning condensation as the mode of analysis [34], which
was assisted by the use of software OpenCode 3.6. The
transcripts were subjected to a thorough review and sys-
tematic coding. After coding, the content was assigned to
categories, and central themes were identified from these
categories. During the course of the study, relevant na-
tional policy and design documents by the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare were reviewed in a systematic
manner, including the Payment for performance strategy
[28], the Implementation guidelines for payment for per-
formance [35] and the Results-based bonus design, imple-
mentation and budget [31].
Research ethics
Research clearance was granted in Norway through the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) and in
Tanzania through the Ifakara Institutional Review Board
(IHI-IRB), the National Institute for Medical Research
(NIMR) and the Commission for Science and Technol-
ogy (COSTECH), and oral consent was given. We have
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depersonalized the data by labeling the health facilities
by letters and the informants by title.
Results
Bonuses were given at a flat rate, yet health workers
were satisfied with the payments
The P4P bonuses in Mvomero were paid in February
2011. The District Medical Officer (DMO) and the Dis-
trict Treasurer turned up at each facility and distributed
the money in cash. Even though health workers had been
told that payments were contingent on performance be-
forehand, this turned out not to be the case. In contrast to
the way that the P4P programme was designed (presented
above), the bonus was given at a flat rate and was unre-
lated to the actual results. Nevertheless, we observed that
although payments failed to be contingent on perform-
ance, we can still expect the scheme to have worked as
performance pay, as long as health workers thought pay-
ments would be contingent on performance. However,
future effects are another matter entirely. The district ad-
ministration gave the following reason for paying the bo-
nuses at a flat rate:
In 2009–10 we paid all facilities, they all qualified.
We saw how many vaccinations they had given, if they
had brought the reports timely, etc. We also looked at
deliveries. Some people qualified in some respects and
not in others, and since this was like a motivation for
the employees, we just paid all the facilities the same
amount (…). For the case of last year, we were not able
to pay P4P because it was not in the budget (a new
ambulance was prioritized). If we had continued with
P4P we would have been stricter, we would have put
more efforts to check whether they had really improved
or not. (District Administrator, 2011)
Each dispensary was given T.Shs 500,000, while each
health centre was given T.Shs 700,000 to be equally
distributed to all staff members at the facility regardless
of rank. These bonuses were approximately 50% of the
maximum bonuses stated in the P4P planning docu-
ments. Depending on the number of staff who shared
the bonus at each facility, the actual sums that individual
health workers received varied considerably between the
facilities we visited, from T.Shs 18,000 to T.Shs 169,000,
with the vast majority receiving more than T.Shs 100,000.
In comparison, interviewees had a take home monthly sal-
ary varying between T.Shs 380,000 to 450,000. The bonus
thus constituted 5-40% of what health workers would
usually receive per month. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that many of our informants had taken loans to
finance their children’s education, and after the deduc-
tions of these loans the performance bonuses were even
more significant. The majority of the health workers
used the bonus for their daily requirements, while three
had used the money to move one of their children to a
school that was either of higher quality and/or closer to
where they worked.
Informants expressed gratitude for having received the
payments. While many said that it was “like a dream”,
something that they had hoped for but not fully trusted
that they would receive (due to a prior experience of non-
payment of allowances), others expressed that they had
been quite confident that they would get the bonus:
I wasn’t surprised, as we were told that if we do well
this would follow. (Nurse 3, Dispensary C, 2011,
received 60,000)
Some respondents brought in the question of unpaid
overtime, saying that P4P showed that the government
actually cares about them after all:
I think P4P is good because it motivates the workers and
makes them realize that the government cares about
them. (CO, Dispensary C, 2011, received 169,000)
While some informants hinted that the bonus should
preferably have been a bit higher, others emphasized that
the bonus was a gift (zawadi) and not part of their regu-
lar salary, and therefore not something that they could
demand:
I was so glad to see that our superiors considered us,
the people at the bottom. (…) And whatever a father
decides to give to his son – that is something that
cannot be forced. Personally, therefore, I am so happy
to have received that reward and I saw the sum as large
and satisfactory because I did not expect it to happen.
(Nurse 2, Dispensary B, 2011, received 100,000)
None of the interviewed health workers had been in-
formed about the discontinuation of P4P, and many said
that they expected new bonus payments to be made.
The district administration confirmed that they had not
sent out any written information about the discontinu-
ation of the scheme, but that they had attempted to or-
ally inform health workers during supervisions.
Attitudes toward alternative usage of the funds changed
after payments were made
In 2010, before the bonus payments had been made, a
good number of our informants expressed scepticism to-
wards the idea of P4P. Some informants warned against
rewarding health workers in isolation:
P4P is just addressing health workers, but we do not
work alone or with no assistance. For example, we are
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assisted by traditional birth attendants and
traditional healers. But if the government had said,
OK, we have some incentives for these traditional
health workers…ohh surely we would not miss these
targets. (Nurse 1, Dispensary D, 2010)
In 2011, a number of our informants said that they
had approached Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA) to
encourage them to bring women in labour to a health
facility, though none argued that TBAs or healers should
be given P4P. Another area where the tone has changed
is the question of equipment. A number of studies have
shown that dispensaries in Tanzania often lack equip-
ment and medicines, and health workers often identify a
lack of laboratories as a major hindrance for offering
quality care [23]. In 2010, some informants argued that
the resources that were to be spent on P4P would have
little effect if the equipment situation was not improved
as well:
I think P4P will help, but first of all the equipment
situation at the facilities has to improve. You
know, so that P4P can be successful. But if there
is no equipment, we will not be able to give the
proper treatment and care needed, and then
you can’t reach the target. (Nurse 1, Dispensary
C, 2010)
After the bonus payments had been made, however, all
but one of our informants were in favour of this way of
spending health funds. When asked whether some of the
money should instead be used for equipment, the re-
spondent quoted above had this to say:
The fact is that it (P4P) is a good approach. It’s an
encouragement since working in a village is tedious.
Therefore, when they decided to encourage us ….that
was really motivating. It should be continued and
it shouldn’t be stopped (in favour of buying
equipment). (Nurse 1, Dispensary C, 2011, received
T.Shs 38,000)
Other informants were more outspoken when arguing
that P4P was a good investment compared to spending
money on equipment:
Equipment…? For what? We’re really not in need of
equipment. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2011, received T.
Shs 125,000)
In 2010, some informants expressed concerns that
P4P could lead to unethical behaviour in health care.
These health workers felt that P4P was aiming at mak-
ing them more result-oriented, thereby forcing them to
prioritize results over quality care. One nurse expressed
this reservation in the following way:
It is not good to use targets. For example, if you are
told to treat 100 patients per day, I don’t think you
will treat them accordingly, you will just rush them to
reach the right number. I don’t think it’s a good idea
to put targets in health care. (Lab Assistant, faith
based Health Centre, 2010)
When asked whether the forging of data was another
possible pitfall of P4P, several informants agreed that this
could be a real danger:
They have to think of something that can motivate us
and not the P4P-way which says ‘when you produce
this, then we will give you a bonus’. I think it creates
problems where people will forge data at health facilities
to meet the target. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2010)
In 2011, the tone had changed considerably. While the
above informant said that there may be a chance of for-
gery since “people need money and some aren’t trust
worthy”, the great majority argued strongly that for prac-
tical reasons forging data is impossible. Similarly, while
many informants agreed in 2010 that P4P might make
health workers concentrate on tasks that are rewarded at
the expense of other tasks (crowding out), no informants
saw this as a problem in 2011.
Informants claim that P4P has improved services,
enhanced cooperation and fostered a spirit of
competition
Many informants view P4P as a competition between
health facilities. They feel that in order to attract clients,
they need to offer better services than other primary
health facilities in the same area. In the words of one
clinical officer:
P4P is part of a competition and every person wants to
be a winner. (…) We have several health facilities and
we have the same design and the same indicators, and
most health workers will say ‘why not here’? Every
health facility will want to score better than the other.
Due to that spirit, some changes will happen in health
service provision. (CO, Dispensary A, 2010)
In 2011, when asked whether P4P had entailed competi-
tion between facilities, several informants argued that P4P
had indeed improved services and that their facility now
attracted patients from outside of their catchment area:
P4P has made people be more thorough in the work
that they do. Patients decide to go where they find the
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best treatment. For example, we get patients who
aren’t happy with the services elsewhere and they
come to our facility for better treatment. We get
expecting mothers who were supposed to be treated at
Mkindo, but we can’t tell them to go back. (Nurse 1,
Dispensary A, 2011)
Poor staff attitudes have been noted in the literature as
one of the reasons why expectant mothers prefer to de-
liver at home without assistance from qualified personnel
as opposed to facility delivery. In 2010, nurses explained
that they sometimes had to “be a bit hard” on women who
were delivering or to raise their voice:
You know patients are so different and difficult. A
mother may come in the labour room at the stage of
contractions. Some of them get confused, so when you
try to tell her something and she doesn’t understand or
refuse […] then sometimes you have to be a little bit
hard on her. This is to avoid infections and to help her
deliver the baby safely. (Assistant Nurse 1, Dispensary
B, 2010)
In 2011, nurses still argued that they often needed to
be strict with women who come to give birth, that
women could not choose birthing position but had to lie
down on the delivery bed, and that they would generally
not allow relatives to enter the delivery room. At the
same time, positive staff attitudes were seen by health
workers as one of the strategies to increase service
utilization, which would again enable them to meet P4P
targets. As one medical attendant puts it:
If you are being given incentives you need to realize
that you must have good attitudes towards work and
desist from bad behavior, like using bad language to
clients. If you do not change you will let your
workmates down. (Medical Attendant 1, Dispensary C,
2011, received T.Shs 18,000)
P4P then, appears to have encouraged unity of purpose
at the health facility level since the programme was
designed to offer incentives to individuals as a result of
team performance.
Strategies to make women deliver at facilities
An important aim of the second round of interviews was
to find out what measures, if any, health workers had taken
to make more women deliver at their facilities. Some infor-
mants say that they have increased outreach activities and
sensitized women on the dangers of giving birth at home:
They (women) come here because we sensitize
expecting mothers (…) We tell them that here the
equipment is sterilized well compared to that used at
home, which is not sterilized. They just hang the gloves
to dry which is very risky, it can lead to AIDS
transmission. Once they hear that they can get AIDS,
they come in large numbers. (Registered Nurse 3,
Dispensary C, 2011, received T.Shs 60,000)
One informant said that such health education made
some women decide to deliver at a health facility, even
if her husband or relatives did not see the importance
and wanted her to deliver at home. However, the need
to attract more clients in order to reach P4P targets
has entailed that many health facilities in the district
have developed negative strategies to attract and/or
force clients to utilize their services. In fact, the staff
at all of the five facilities we visited in 2011 admitted
that women had either been told that they would be
fined if they delivered at home, or that they would be
denied a live birth card and/or vaccination for their
newborn.
As for fining, focus group participants in the catch-
ment areas of dispensaries E and F told us that health
workers had announced that women who delivered at
home would be fined T.Shs 10,000. The health workers
we interviewed confirmed that this had been announced,
but that it was only a threat, and not something that was
actually carried out:
Last year there was a clinical officer who used to tell
women that if they give birth at home they will be
charged a fine, and that they should come to give birth
at the dispensary because it is free of charge. He was
just saying that to scare them. (…) If you tell them
that, they are afraid to get the fine. So up till this day
there is no one who gives birth at home. (Assistant
Nurse 2, Dispensary F, 2011)
The reason why the fining had not been carried out
was that in order to actually fine someone, one would
need to involve the Village Government, which had not
yet been done. The health workers got the idea to
criminalize home birth from colleagues from a neigh-
bouring district, Morogoro Rural, where fines for home
birth had been passed as a by-law by local authorities:
When we go for seminars we sometimes ask what
others do to sensitize the people. So whatever you
hear from others, if you haven’t tried it yet, then you
should also attempt it to see how it works, (…) but
only after involving the village leaders. There are some
things - even if it hasn’t been decided at the district
level – that we can make a decision about and then
involve the village leadership. (Registered Nurse 1,
Dispensary E, 2011)
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Other health workers argued against fining, but were
positive towards other forms of sanctions:
I don’t think fining the mother is a good approach. We
should rather educate women by telling them the
consequences of delivering at home. There are many
ways to mobilize them like telling them that they won’t
be given a birth card at the dispensary (…). Instead
they will have to get it from the Ward Executive
Officer, a more tasking process. If she doesn’t do that,
she will end up not getting a clinic card for the baby.
We can manage to mobilize them to a large extent
using these threats. (Nurse 3, Dispensary C, 2011)
Also in this case, the strategy was something the health
workers had learned from others:
We heard that at “Dispensary B” they have more
deliveries these days, so we asked ourselves how are
they doing it? How come they are getting safe
deliveries, how are they doing it? We investigated how
they succeed to have safe deliveries. How come there
are fewer midwives, but they perform better? (…) After
inquiring about their successes we are now educating
our colleagues. (…) If she won’t deliver here, then she
won’t get a clinical card for the baby. So it is just an
educational competition. But there is no forcing of the
mothers. (Nurse 2, Dispensary C, 2011)
At dispensary A, the same approach had been adopted,
but the informant felt that it hadn’t had the expected
outcome:
We said that for those who deliver at home - their ba-
bies won’t be vaccinated and the babies won’t get clin-
ical cards, but they still continued to deliver at home.
Maybe we should look for other means, like fining
them. We should tell them that those who deliver at
home will be fined. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2011)
Health workers, particularly those with a low level of
education, appeared to have little scruples about sanc-
tioning women who deliver at home. The various
methods were weighted against each other on the basis
of the degree to which they were feasible in practice. A
medical attendant had the following response to whether
fining would be a good way to make women deliver at a
facility or not:
The community here is different from that one
(where they fine patients). Here, people are quite tricky
- just a minor thing and he/she will go to the village
administration or to the Councillor to report! You ask
yourself why you should cause all that? (…) But fining
is good (…), since to be fined - when even money for
food is a problem - they will just decide to do what they
are told. (Medical Attendant 1, Dispensary C, 2011)
When we asked the district health authorities what they
thought about strategies such as fining, their response re-
vealed that they were ambivalent and undecided, and that
they did not appear to do anything about these practices:
I don’t know much about it. It is not according to the
government guidelines, we don’t have any regulations
on that. But people say it helps (…). On the other
hand, if the woman doesn’t have the 10,000 shillings
she will not take her child to the clinic (for
vaccinations, in fear of the fine). (Official from district
health office, 2011)
The fact that the council health management team
(CHMT) also benefits from health facilities’ good per-
formance may be one reason why the monitoring and
follow-up of such practices is limited.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that health workers did alter their
behaviour in response to the intervention. However, to
shed further light on how the intervention worked, two
questions warrant further discussion: Why did health
workers focus on coercive methods to increase deliveries
at facilities? And why didn’t the local authorities pay bo-
nuses according to the set targets as outlined in the di-
rectives from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare?
Change in health worker behaviour
Although the payments ended up not being performance
based, health workers were told that they would be, and
they responded to the intervention much as the theory
predicts that they would: They increased effort in areas
where they would receive payments (with a focus on
quantity), while strategies to improve the quality of care
(for which they were not rewarded) appear to have been
largely ignored. Similar results were also reported in a P4P
impact evaluation study on maternal and child health in
Rwanda where the highest improvements in indicators
were observed for those indicators with the highest ex-
pected payment [12].
Health workers reported numerous strategies to attract
women to the clinics. One of the strategies they reported
was to offer better services, educating women about the
benefits of delivering at a clinic and positive attitudes to-
ward women attending the clinic. The use of positive
strategies to persuade women to give birth at clinics may
certainly increase the number of facility births as some
studies in Tanzania have found negative staff attitudes to
be among the barriers against facility deliveries [36,37].
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However, attracting more women to deliver at facilities
does not necessarily ensure that the clinical quality of
care is high. Due to the difficult circumstances under
which many health workers work - lack of equipment,
medication, and skills [38] - it may be difficult to deliver
high-quality care even if they want to. In fact, prior to
the intervention, health workers were afraid that they
would not be able to deliver a high quality of care due to
a lack of equipment.
Health workers not only engaged in positive strategies
to induce women, coercive strategies were also employed,
and these strategies were copied between clinics. While
other studies have noted that incentive structures may
entail coercive strategies, [39,40], to our knowledge, our
study is the first to identify coercive practices against
home birth in connection with a P4P scheme in Tanzania.
Health workers threatened to fine women who did not
give birth at a facility or to withhold vaccinations and/or
clinical cards for babies who had been born at home.
While health workers in Mvomero claim that the threats
were meant to “scare” people and that they have not been
carried out in actual practice, the district health adminis-
tration argue that these threats may have kept women
from coming to the clinic for postnatal care and vaccina-
tions of their babies after having delivered at home, be-
cause they were afraid of being fined.
The effectiveness of both positive and coercive strat-
egies on health outcomes crucially depends on the qual-
ity of care offered, which was not directly targeted by
the intervention. During our fieldwork in 2011, a woman
died of untreated eclampsia because the medical attend-
ant at the dispensary where the woman came to give
birth did not recognize the signs of preeclampsia. Since
poor quality may be an explanation for why women
choose not to deliver at the clinic, health workers could
potentially improve the quality to attract more women.
However, if health workers offer a low quality care be-
cause they are unable to deliver a high quality, coercive
strategies forcing women to deliver at the clinic may be
perceived as the only strategy they have at hand. Such
strategies need not improve health outcomes.
Observe that even if health workers reported that they
had implemented various strategies to attract women to
the clinics, the strategy that would involve the least
amount of effort would be to forge the numbers. Before
health workers received payments, they were worried that
a convenient strategy to fulfill the delivery indicator would
be to forge the numbers. After having received the P4P
payments, however, health workers were adamant that this
did not take place. Certainly, health workers had a vested
interest in making this argument. An assessment of the
donor-funded pilot undertaken in the Pwani Region sug-
gests that verification and data validation has been a prob-
lem and that forging has indeed taken place [41].
Why wasn’t P4P implemented in the way that it was
designed?
Contrary to the directives from the Ministry of Health,
the district administration ended up paying bonuses to
all facilities at a flat rate, which means of course that the
payments were not performance based. The district ad-
ministration’s explanation for giving a flat rate was that
all health facilities did well in at least one indicator, and
that they would be “stricter” if P4P was to be continued.
In our view, two factors were behind this decision.
First, as documented in an appraisal study commis-
sioned by donors in 2009, the Health Management
Information System (HMIS) in Tanzania is too weak to
handle a proper monitoring of a P4P programme [2]. A
weak health infrastructure has been identified as one of
the major threats to the effectiveness of P4P [40]. We
witnessed that the health administrators in Mvomero
were too busy with other work to take on the additional
burden of monitoring P4P. Hence, for an under-resourced
district such as Mvomero, monitoring P4P with the help
of the district’s own resources probably proved impossible.
Second, the district administration argued that a flat
rate was given since the P4P initiative was to be a finan-
cial motivation (motisha) for the health workers, and
that all had done well with at least one indicator. Under
P4P, health workers are rewarded for a change in indica-
tors. The extent of change a single facility is able to
achieve will be a function of factors both inside and out-
side health worker control. For a variety of reasons, some
facilities will find it difficult to increase the utilization of
services (i.e. long distances/lack of transport, strong pref-
erences for home birth among the local population, etc.),
while others may find it easier. In clinics where the know-
do gap is high and low utilization is explained in part by a
low motivation, there may be a high potential for achiev-
ing an increase in indicators.
The extent to which bonus payments are perceived as
fair – even in cases where they depend upon factors that
are partly outside the control of the health workers - de-
pends upon the type of fairness principle that prevails in
a particular culture. Based on different ideas about what
individuals should be held responsible for, notions of
fairness can be divided into two broad categories: liber-
tarianism and egalitarianism [42]. According to libertar-
ianism, performance-based incentives will be viewed as
fair since individuals receive payments based on how
they perform in relation to a predefined target. On the
other hand, according to strict egalitarianism, P4P will
be perceived as unfair since people should not be held
responsible for factors such as talent or other external
aspects outside of their own control. An egalitarian fair-
ness principle may stand strong in socialist societies,
where individual behaviour is believed to be shaped by
society, and inequality as such is a function of an unfair
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societal structure rather than being due to any fault of
the individual. By contrast, in capitalist societies where
ideas of liberalism and libertarianism stand stronger, pay
for performance may be viewed as a fair way to differen-
tiate income, which according to libertarianism should
be distributed in relation to effort and talent (see Nozick
[43] for a defence).
Due to its sociocultural setup and political history,
Tanzania is characterized by an egalitarian mode of
thought. The local government in Mvomero did not
appear compelled to reward good performance and
withhold money if the performance was not optimal; in-
stead, they stated that they wanted to display gratitude
for what they saw as a positive effort. In addition to the
practical limitations mentioned earlier, it is possible that
the social relationships between local policymakers and
health workers made it difficult for the health adminis-
tration to pay some facilities less than others even if
they had not met the set targets.
Because principles of fairness vary across cultures and
countries, P4P may be viewed as fair in some places,
while being perceived as deeply unfair in other settings.
The literature reports a number of cases where health
workers are demotivated by P4P programmes because
the rewards are perceived as being unfairly allocated
[40]. When we told our informants that the bonuses had
been given at a flat rate that disregarded actual perform-
ance, none of them argued that this was unfair; nor did
informants contest the practice of distributing the bonus
equally to all staff members at the facility. One reason
for this may be that we focused on nurses. There is the
possibility that medical doctors at the three hospitals in
the district would have expressed more negative atti-
tudes toward a system where they receive the same bo-
nuses as non-clinical staff.
If it is correct that an egalitarian fairness principle shaped
the way that the locally funded P4P was implemented, then
P4P may work very differently when implemented by local
agents compared to when it is implemented by external
entities. The donor-sponsored P4P in the Pwani Region is
being piloted and led by professional external agents.
Based on our experience from the locally funded P4P in
Mvomero, we expect that the intervention may work
very differently if/when it is taken over by the govern-
ment in its entirety.
Our study has a number of implications for the design
of P4P in Tanzania and other low-income contexts, and
for the studies of such schemes. Firstly, contextual factors
affect the nature and operation of a P4P scheme (such as
a country’s sociocultural context) and it is therefore
important for these factors to be taken into account dur-
ing the design to achieve sustained results. Secondly, in
cases where a P4P design is supply-side oriented (such as
the Tanzanian case), there is need to accommodate and
promote community views and participation in order to
safeguard against coercive practices. Thirdly, our study to
a certain extent implies that P4P is prone to adverse ef-
fects when introduced in a context where systems con-
straints are substantial. Finally, the above points suggest
that studies of P4P impact on beneficiaries should not
only measure utilization of services, but include both
health outcomes and a qualitative element, as paying for
increased utilization does not necessarily improve health
outcomes.
Study limitations
Our study has a number of limitations. Firstly, only three
of the 26 health workers we interviewed for this study
were interviewed both before and after the bonus pay-
ments were made contrary to the original design. This was
due in part to the fact that some of the health workers
interviewed in 2010 had moved or were absent during our
visit in 2011. Another reason was that we wanted better
geographical representation, and therefore decided to cover
a larger area for our 2011 interviews in order to capture
local variations within the district (i.e. the type of sanctions
that had been introduced against home birth). Lastly, study
informants were purposively selected and may not be rep-
resentative of other individuals or settings, hence the study
lacks external validity.
Conclusion
Many scholars have argued that P4P may have adverse
effects. This study has contributed to this body of litera-
ture by showing how health workers in a low-income
setting use coercive strategies in order to reach set targets
for deliveries. While P4P in Mvomero may have contrib-
uted to an increase in the number of institutional deliver-
ies, the overall health outcomes may not have been
positive. Our study has also demonstrated that qualitative
studies of P4P interventions should preferably include
both community and health worker components since in-
formation from community members may be essential in
order to ask health workers the right questions – and vice
versa. The study has also demonstrated that the P4P
programme deviated substantially from the original design
when implemented by local authorities – partly due to
limited resources, and partly due to fairness ideals that dif-
fer from the basic principles of P4P. This lesson is most
likely relevant for the nationwide roll-out of P4P pro-
grammes in other African countries.
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